


Implementing the Comprehensive Approach in Helmand – Within the Context of Counterinsurgency

By Research Fellow Peter Dahl Thruelsen, Faculty of Strategy and Military Operations, Institute for Strategy, Royal Danish Defence College

Report



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CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	5
INTRODUCTION	8
COUNTERINSURGENCY	11
Categorising insurgency.....	12
Counterinsurgency and comprehensive approach	13
HELMAND	18
The context: international engagement.....	18
The context: current setup	20
The international setup and approach in Helmand.....	23
The Danish setup and approach in Helmand.....	26
Analysis of Danish implementation	29
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS	35
Appendix 1	39
LITERATURE	41

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The point of departure of this report will be an exclusive focus on comprehensive approach (CA), the complex context of Helmand Province and the international and Danish setup there. The report will focus on the resources made available by the Danish state in the Afghan engagement. Fighting an insurgency like the one in Afghanistan is not just a job for the military. Experiences from previous and present insurgencies have shown that a variety of measures including political, economic and developmental play a significant role in gaining progress and success in what can be called state-building. In Afghanistan, the term 'comprehensive approach' has been used to underline the need for a more cross-ministerial interagency approach when fighting the insurgency. A recent report to the US Congress views the importance of CA in the following way *"success will never be achieved through military means alone, but through a comprehensive approach that involves all elements of power: military, diplomatic, and economic. Above all, it will require a sustained effort to continue to develop the capacity of the Afghans themselves."* (Report to Congress 2008: 8). In this report the focus will be on local capacity building and the fact that CA by definition involves more than one player, and that one of these is often a military one.

An overall research focus has been developed to centre the report on the elements of CA within the context of counterinsurgency. The recommendations given in this report have been derived from several field researches and through analysis of the actual situation and implementation in Helmand Province. The focus for the research is:

- Assets – military, civilian and economic – must be available to support and implement elements within the area of operations that will provide the population with basic security and in particular legitimate government.
- Assets – military, civilian and economic – must be available to support and capacity build the host government at central and province level in providing accessible, affordable and corruption-free basic services and security for its population.
- Assets – military and civilian – within and out of theatre must be available to follow and analyse the constant changing counterinsurgency environment on the ground to be able to foresee new resource demands.
- Non-kinetic measures must be available in theatre for follow-up and lead in connection to stabilisation efforts in the area of operations.

The analysis conducted focuses on the organisation and on current and coming tasks, showing the divergence within the organisation, the variety of tasks and the staff available. The tasks dealt with in the Danish Battle Group (DABG) area of operations in central Helmand are developing at a pace that is hard to follow from a distance. The need to conduct 'real-time' fact finding to constantly improve and evaluate developments on the ground with the strategic framework and 'reach back' capacity needs to be rethought. As will be pointed out, CA is not just a question of implementing projects in the DABG operations area. It is also about getting the military, political, economic and civilian players to work together in support of each other and to build local capacity. This challenges both

the civilian and military setup and the wide range of knowledge that needs to be available within the organisations involved.

The following steps are recommended for an improved and strengthened involvement:

- Creating a permanent 'lessons learned' unit at strategic level in Denmark capable of supporting the tactical level, conducting fact finding, providing a 'reach-back' capacity for the 'in theatre' level, formulating strategy and benchmarks on the ground of in-depth analysis, 'real-time' evaluations and ongoing estimations, and finally functioning as the CA think-tank for the government and line ministries in support of the involvement. This could shorten and strengthen the process of developing and especially implementing new initiatives when identified at tactical level and contribute to long term planning.
- A system or team of people to create a flexible domestic 'standby' capacity for civilian advisors who can be deployed when the need is identified at the tactical level. There seems to be a great need for a team of people capable of working in post-conflict environments, working close to the military, facilitating governance, capacity building, supporting rule of law, and making development possible.
- More civilian and military personnel allocated directly to the Civil Military Cooperation section (CIMIC) and CA work needs to be identified and deployed to the mission area. At the moment, too few human resources are available to implement the immense tasks of local capacity building. It is imperative that these experts are identified and trained prior to the need arises in the mission area to be on top of the development. Furthermore, the military forces must show a higher willingness to support this development by allocating the necessary security elements, such as security details and military escorts.
- Ministerial initiatives should be launched with regard to higher wages, personal security and career paths for personnel sent on missions. For instance, using Ministry of Foreign Affairs personnel at the lower level of implementation will strengthen the knowledge, understanding and effectiveness of the whole setup.
- The military intelligence organisation (S2 at Battle Group level) should have the capacity to monitor non-military threats with a view to supporting CA efforts in relation to understanding the complexity of the local power structures. As seen in Gereshk in Helmand, this element is essential when engaging in capacity building of local structures. This is needed to ensure that the right local individuals are included in the local capacity building process. The local and quite complicated power structures in a given area can undermine the overall process if they are not fully understood and engaged with awareness. S2 needs to construct a reliable understanding of the local power structures and the local political processes with a view to minimise the possible negative spill-over effects.

-
- When only deploying one civilian advisor to a mission in connection with a military battle group, it should be considered if two persons for the function/job should be deployed to guarantee continuity and constant presence in the mission. Perhaps a secretary could support this process by producing reports, planning meetings, producing the minutes of meetings and logistical planning.
 - The occupation of the Senior National Representative should be formalised with the military organisation when working in a COIN context. The military tasks and the CA activities need to be seen as equally important and therefore fully integrated.
 - Fact-finding missions – with both military and civilian personnel – should be conducted regularly with a view to strengthen the knowledge of the actual situation on the ground and ensuring that analysis is performed and that resources are adapted to meet the situation at hand.

INTRODUCTION

The conflict in Afghanistan is complex, and so far developments have shown that there are no quick solutions to the great challenges and that the situation is ever changing. Recent events have clearly shown that major challenges lie ahead: the Taliban conducted an advanced manoeuvre to free Taliban prisoners in Kandahar Province on 13 June 2008; and asymmetric measures such as suicide bombs, roadside bombs and other improvised explosive devices are becoming more widespread, culminating with a fatal attack on a French and Afghan military patrol on 18-19 August 2008 in Kabul Province.

Fighting an insurgency like the one in Afghanistan is not just a job for the military. Experiences from previous and present insurgencies have shown that a variety of measures including political, economic and developmental play a significant role in achieving progress and success in what can be called state-building (Stabilisation Unit 2006: 1). The former British commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, General Sir David Richards, described this fact by stating that *"Soldiers will be the first to tell you that military effort alone is not enough. One has to work hard to create conditions that bring all the actors together in a synergistic manner. We can set the conditions but are often powerless to implement key parts of the overall plan."*¹ In Afghanistan, the term 'comprehensive approach' (CA) has been used to underline the need for a more cross-ministerial interagency approach when fighting the insurgency. Dealing with a term such as CA, which is widely used and yet so hard to define is a challenge. A recent report to the US Congress views the importance of CA in the following way *"success will never be achieved through military means alone, but through a comprehensive approach that involves all elements of power: military, diplomatic, and economic. Above all, it will require a sustained effort to continue to develop the capacity of the Afghans themselves."* (Report to Congress 2008: 8). In this report the focus is put on local capacity building, and the fact that CA by definition involves more than one player, and that one of these is often a military player. In the Bucharest Summit Declaration of April 2008 NATO describes CA in the following way:

"...the international community needs to work more closely together and take a comprehensive approach to address successfully the security challenges of today and tomorrow. Effective implementation of a comprehensive approach requires the cooperation and contribution of all major actors, including that of Non-Governmental Organisations and relevant local bodies. To this end, it is essential for all major international actors to act in a coordinated way, and to apply a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments in a concerted effort that takes into account their respective strengths and mandates [...] They relate to areas such as planning and conduct of operations; training and education; and enhancing cooperation with external actors." (Bucharest Summit Declaration 2008: para. 11)

The point of departure of this report will be an exclusive focus on the complex context of Helmand Province and the international and Danish setup there. The report will focus on

(1) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jan/22/afghanistan.afghanistantimeline1>

the resources made available by the Danish state in the Afghan engagement. It will not involve analysis of the possibility of a large Non Governmental Organisational (NGO) involvement, nor will it analyse the more long-term strategic Danish development objectives or the overall significance of a political process. These exclusions have been made because of the current and expected future challenging security situation in Helmand Province, and because this analysis focuses on CA as an interagency approach, primarily involving state actors implementing their campaign in Helmand Province under harsh security conditions. The focus will be on the situation where the military tasks are in need of other state actors in the follow-up of their operations to the period where this relationship will be shifted towards a more civilian-led engagement – from creating stability to the point where elements such as reconstruction and development enters focus. Today, only a few local NGOs and constructors² are present and capable of working in the province – a situation that is not expected to change markedly within the nearest future.³ This fact illustrates the urgent need for a focused approach to build local administrative capacity to fill this vacuum – a key element of CA. The capacity must be developed by international civilian resources working alongside military actors. Therefore, the main aim in developing an integrated approach between counterinsurgency and CA is to foster a development that will create a national and indeed local host nation administrative capacity capable of providing security and basic needs and services in a manner, which is perceived as legitimate by the local population. It should be developed and implemented in a manner that does not compromise the various initiatives and thereby undermines the overall strategic objectives.

At the overall level, CA cannot be implemented as a single model applied to all conflict scenarios. When implementing CA as the desired approach in the context of counterinsurgency in Helmand Province, CA is about combining military, political and developmental actors to create stability, conducting security sector reform (SSR) and especially to capacity build local authorities to perform governance tasks in the area (Teuten 2007: 2). When combining CA and counterinsurgency, the latter is to be seen as an overall campaign theme determined by the conflict context and CA as the desired approach enabling success.⁴ Implementing CA then becomes an effect based (or benchmark focused) approach that is to enhance and stimulate cooperation between the different actors within the given context of counterinsurgency. Throughout the report, the fact that Denmark is

(2) The Danish Battle Group in Helmand announced a ‘constructor’s day’ in Gereshk, where local constructors could register for work. During the day only six very small local constructors came to register.

(3) Interviews conducted in Afghanistan in Kabul on 9 May 2008 with the Director and the Chief of Policy and Advocacy of DACAAR. During the interview it was emphasised that the lack of security throughout the province made an international NGO present impossible within a reasonable future. Also, a list received from the British led PRT in Helmand showing 29 registered local NGOs present in the province. Of these NGOs however, only about two-thirds were implementing projects. In Gereshk in Helmand Province approximately two NGOs – one local and one international – are implementing minor projects.

(4) CA is the preferred approach within all NATO campaign themes: Peacetime Military Engagement (PME), Peace Support (PS), Counterinsurgency (COIN) and Major Combat (MC) (NATO AJP-3.2: 1-7). More on this subject in the chapter on counterinsurgency.

only a minor contributor to the whole process and not a sole provider of military, political, economic or civilian assets is recognised.⁵ However, anyone involved in complex counterinsurgency warfare in a place like Helmand Province has to face both responsibilities and expectations. In other words, broad-based means of supporting, developing and manifesting the involvement have to be in place to avoid failure.

The data used in this study is based primarily on qualitative empirical research and on the written literature on the subject. The empirical data has been collected following semi-structured interviews with key informants in central positions, plus observer participation in Denmark and Afghanistan (Yin 2003: 7-8 and Bryman 2001: 312-315). Interviews were conducted in Denmark at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the Danish Defence Command. Field research was then conducted in Kabul and in Helmand Province, in Afghanistan (see appendix 1).⁶ Collecting data in a conflict zone is difficult, and it has the negative methodological consequence that the majority of the interviews were conducted in military establishments or at government offices and at times through interpreters. To compensate for this difficulty, interviews were conducted with third-party representatives whenever possible.

To fully appreciate the role CA should play in the context of counterinsurgency, this report will commence by theoretically describing what counterinsurgency is and how the different players need to support each other's efforts. This section will work as the theoretical framework and list the analytical focus to guide the following analysis. With this in mind, the CA context of Helmand Province will be described with the aim of combining counterinsurgency theory with empirical reality. Following the description of the situation in Helmand Province, the international and the Danish setup and approach in Helmand will be analysed. Finally the report will conclude and list recommendations regarding how to strengthen the organisational setup in Denmark and with regard to the Danish contribution in Helmand Province.

(5) These four foci are based on the NATO 'Effects Based Approach to Operations' doctrine. (NATO 2007: 1-2 – 1-3).

(6) The interviews were conducted by the author of this report and Søren Schmidt PhD, a project researcher at the Danish Institute of International Studies. In addition to this particular field trip, the author has conducted field research in Afghanistan on several occasions since 2004.

COUNTERINSURGENCY

In classic counterinsurgency (COIN) theories⁷ experts such as David Galula⁸ describe insurgency and counterinsurgency as "... *the battle for the population ...*" (Galula 1964: 4). This struggle for the support or consent of the population – the centre of gravity – was and still is the focal point of any insurgency and counterinsurgency. The prime goal for the counterinsurgent within any affected area is to create a situation in which the local population – without the permanent presence of external forces – actively support the fight against the insurgents and thereby oust the insurgents from the area. Galula describes success as "... *the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population but maintained by and with the population*" (Galula 1964: 54). Early lessons from COIN campaigns show that this is primarily done by providing the population with basic security and in particular legitimate government. The population, which constitutes the centre of gravity for both parties in an insurgency, can be divided into three main groups: the active minority in favour of the cause, the neutral majority, and the active minority against the cause (Galula 1964: 53). The challenge for the counterinsurgent is to identify the minority that supports the host government, to activate them, and then to use them to mobilise the neutral majority of the population and thereby eject the insurgents.

To gain the active support of the majority of the population, the counterinsurgent must address the root causes that ignited the insurgency in the first place – causes which is often the factor fuelling the insurgency. Robust insurgencies are often fuelled by and rely on deep grievances – root causes – in which inequalities between different nations or ethnic groups exist, and when the legitimacy of the state is low in the eyes of the population. Grievances about the effectiveness, equality, integrity and especially inclusiveness of the state are often the main triggers of an insurgency, so in order to succeed COIN needs to capacity build an able and accountable government (RAND 2008: xxxii). The experiences of numerous COIN campaigns show that the civilian population cannot be won by military means alone, and that killing most of the insurgents only has a limited effect on the outcome of the campaign (Drapeau et al. 2008: 3). As Galula puts it: "... *conventional operations by themselves have at best no more effect than a fly swatter. Some guerrillas are bound to be caught, but new recruits will replace them as fast as they are lost.*" (Galula 1964: 51).

Recent experiences in Iraq illustrate the dilemma of focusing too heavily on military means, resulting in increasing support for the insurgents. From January 2004 to October 2006, the US-led coalition killed or detained some 70,000 Sunni insurgents. During the same period the estimated constant number of insurgents grew from 5,000 to 25,000,

(7) The term 'classic' counterinsurgency warfare points to the post-World War II counter-revolutionary warfare writings of theorists such as David Galula, Roger Trinquier, Mao Tse-Tung, Che Guevara and Robert Thompson (Kilcullen 2006b: 1).


(8) As a French Lieutenant, Colonel David Galula fought during World War II in North Africa, Italy and France. Later in his career he was involved in the fighting in China, Greece, Indochina and Algiers. Before he died he wrote the book *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, Praeger Security International, London, United Kingdom.

and the average number of casualties per insurgent attack rose from 10 to 60 killed (RAND 2008: 8-9). These figures not only show that the primary use of military force does not work, but also that a war of attrition against the insurgents will not create the desired effect in terms of achieving a stable 'end state'. The fight against the insurgents and for the support and consent of the population therefore becomes a fight that involves a wide range of military, political, economic and civilian factors, so the focus of the struggle must be elevated from the tactical military level to the control of the wider political space. Thereby, the consent winning activities will be focused towards the host government and the government's legitimacy among the population and not so much towards the international soldiers. David J. Kilcullen defines an insurgency as:

"An insurgency is a struggle for control over a contested political space, between a state (or group of states or occupying powers), and one or more popularly based, non-state challengers. Insurgencies are popular uprisings that grow from, and are conducted through pre-existing social networks (village, tribe, family, neighbourhood, political or religious party) and exist in a complex social, informational and physical environment." (Kilcullen 2006a: 2)

The struggle to win the support and consent of the population is illustrated below.

Figure 1: The struggle for the centre of gravity. Inspired by Drapeau et al. 2008: 3



Categorising insurgency

Insurgencies vary a great deal, differing in their nature, scope, resources and the context within which they are fought. Insurgencies have often been categorised either by the aim of the insurgents or by the involvement of local and external players. The comprehensive

RAND Corporation study of counterinsurgency shown below lists four overall types of insurgency, which can be seen as ideal types. The point of departure for the four types is the fact that all insurgencies seek to replace an existing order with one that conforms to the views of the insurgents. The categories presented below are defined by the impact globalisation has on the ends, ways and means of the insurgency, thereby categorising insurgency in ways that make it possible to identify counterinsurgency measures (RAND 2008: 23-24).

Type I – Local insurgency: Self-contained in cause, conduct, scope and effects. The goals of this type of insurgency are local and circumscribed with no outside support, e.g. the Philippines insurgency of 1899-1902.
Type II – Local-international insurgency: Constantly seeking external support such as money, arms, expertise, media attention and fighters. The course and outcome, however, will be decided by local players. Example: the Vietnam war.
Type III – Global-local insurgency: At some point a Type II insurgency may develop into a Type III insurgency. This happens when the insurgency becomes part of a regional or global struggle. Iraq and Afghanistan are examples of this type. They are transnational in nature, support and scope. They start locally but can develop into global-religious motivated struggles.
Type IV – Global insurgency: Non-state-focused insurgencies unconnected with territory, in which the theatre of violence is global. For instance, Al-Qaeda with their global threat of violence and Che Guevara’s translational attempt to expel capitalism and US influence in Latin America. Relying on the mobility of today’s world. The success of Type IV insurgencies often depends on access to Type III insurgencies.

Figure 2: Four types of insurgency (RAND 2008: 25-32)

Type III Global-local insurgency is regarded as the hardest to combat. In many respects, Afghanistan can be categorised as a Type III insurgency. It is a Type III insurgency owing to the growing external involvement with regard to both practical support such as weapons, training and personnel, but also with regard to the ideological cross-border contacts to movements such as Al-Qaeda in the border areas of Pakistan. The effects of globalisation on Type III insurgencies with regard to Afghanistan can be seen in areas such as the use of information technology, cross-border identities and nationhood, mobility and the role of the global media.

Counterinsurgency and comprehensive approach

According to the literature on counterinsurgency, the lack of legitimacy of the central government in the eyes of the civilian society is one of the most important factors igniting and prolonging an insurgency (Galula 1964 and Pirnie, O’Connell 2008 and Maloney 2008). A strong and legitimate central government has the capacity to provide basic services for the population – services such as jobs, education, health care and especially security. If the government does not provide these services, the insurgency will enjoy extremely favourable conditions. The literature on insurgencies demonstrates that insurgencies rarely develop in societies where a legitimate government presides. A government is per-

ceived as legitimate by the population if the population can identify advantages in their daily lives that have been provided by the government. In Afghanistan the wide scale of corruption from the lowest government level in the districts to the ministries in Kabul is an immense problem that needs to be confronted to prevent it from playing into the hands of the insurgents. If the local population regards the government as corrupt, their incentive to support the government against the insurgents will be undermined. In addition, the lack of a credible security guarantee provided by the government for the people is undermining. As described in the RAND study: *"Any government that fails to provide for its citizens' safety will be unworthy in their eyes and that much more vulnerable to insurgency."* (RAND 2008: xxxii). Consequently, the provision of basic services and the creation of stable and sustainable national security forces – military and police – are pivotal with regard to gaining the support of the population. If the local population cannot see a legitimate alternative to the international security presence and an alternative to intimidation by the insurgents, they will not openly support the government. Thus, the success of any COIN campaign depends ultimately on the ability of the host government to provide accessible, affordable and corruption-free basic services and security for its population, which is why *"Winning cannot be measured in fragile democracies installed, armies returned home, and access restored to countries where Westerners now fear to travel."* (Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy 2008: 1). Therefore, the main aim in developing an integrated approach between COIN and CA is to foster a development that will create a national and indeed local host nation administration that is capable of providing security and basic services in a manner which is perceived as legitimate by the local population, developed and implemented in a manner that does not compromise the various initiatives involved and undermine the overall strategic objectives. This process should include the local provinces and district administration, creating a legitimate partner to which the international players can ultimately transfer responsibility.

NATO works with four different campaign themes when conducting military operations. The campaign themes are not to be identified by the activities involved but are determined by the context and conditions that exists in the area of operations (NATO AJP-3.2: 1-9). The four campaign themes are: Peacetime Military Engagement (PME), Peace Support (PS), Counterinsurgency (COIN) and Major Combat (MC). A campaign and CA involvement are described by NATO as:

"...a set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area [...] Furthermore, since strategic success can rarely be achieved by military means alone, military activities at all three levels [tactical, operational and strategic] will often support, or be supported by, other government agencies, international organisations and non-government agencies." (NATO AJP-3.2: 1-5).

CA is the desired approach in all the campaign themes. In the spectrum from major combat through peacetime military engagement the role and direct involvement of CA changes and becomes more predominant in the latter (NATO AJP-3.2). CA *"is applied perversi-*

vely across all levels of command so that tactical level commanders work in a complementary manner with the other elements of power [political, economic and civilian] and agencies required to address the root causes of a crisis and to achieve enduring end-states across the various elements of the environment" (NATO ATP-3.2.1: xi).

The relationship between CA and counterinsurgency can best be understood by the activities implemented. NATO works with four overall military activities that can be applied to each campaign theme: offensive, defensive, stability and enabling activities.⁹ The four activities can be used simultaneously at any given time, but in the complex environment of counterinsurgency the first three activities are predominant (NATO ATP-3.2.1: 1-6 – 1-7). In particular, stabilisation has a direct link with CA as a crucial element for reaching the civilian led reconstruction and development (R/D) activities. Stabilisation can be defined as *"the process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a break-down in law and order are managed and reduced, whilst efforts are made to support the preconditions for successful longer-term development"* (Teuten 2007: 1-2).

The analytical process of developing actions and integration within the context of COIN and CA involves various lines of operation (military, political, economic and civilian), and begins with the definition of the overall goal or strategic 'end state' (NATO 2007: 1-2 – 1-3). In the case of Afghanistan, the strategic 'end state' has been defined by the Afghan government together with the international actors involved in the efforts (The Afghanistan Compact 2006). From there, the individual analytical process works backwards to identify individual objectives for each line of operation. When defining the objectives a number of effects or benchmarks are identified, and from there initiatives to achieve these are developed. All this should ideally support and interact with each other within the overall strategy. See figure 3 next side:

(9) Offensive activities: activities in which forces seek out the enemy in order to attack him; Defensive activities: activities that resist enemy offensive activities; Stability activities: activities that seek to stabilise the situation and reduce the level of violence. They impose security and control over an area while employing military capabilities to restore services and support civilian agencies; and Enabling activities: tactical activities that link, support, or create the conditions for offensive, defensive and stability activities (NATO ATP-3.2.1: 1-6).




Figure 3: Lines of operation and the analytical process¹⁰

As the figure illustrates, the various lines of operations are interdependent and linked by individual benchmarks (B) and their links to the other lines. Each line has an objective which will ultimately contribute to the overall strategic 'end state'. For example, the objective for the military line of operations could be creating a safe and secure environment. The point of departure of the illustration is the Danish Afghanistan Strategy and the Danish Helmand Plan, which have been developed based on and in coordination with the Afghanistan Compact, the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS)¹¹ and to some extent the British Helmand Road Map. The importance of the figure is illustrated by the dotted lines, highlighting that benchmarks cannot be defined and isolated from the overall context and implementation plan. Each line works in support of each other, and if major challenges appear within one line of operations resources can be allocated to this area, thereby strengthening the overall development. Therefore direct support from one line to another will occur when support is needed. Ongoing, in-depth analysis and evaluation

(10) Based on the idea of Effects Based Approach to Operations (NATO 2007: 5-10).

(11) <http://www.and.s.gov.af/main.asp>

tion of each process is necessary with regard to developments within the overall context. These evaluations are then incorporated into the operational plans and overall strategies, thereby constantly improving the involvement. Ideally, depending on access to information by developing this type of analytical framework, the allocation of resources and personnel will be based on actual needs and evaluations instead of on the available existing resources. The process thus becomes demand driven.

Based on the above description of counterinsurgency and CA, the following analytical focus to guide the analysis and recommendations are formulated as follows:

- Assets – military, civilian and economic – must be available to support and implement elements within the area of operations that will provide the population with basic security and in particular legitimate government.
- Assets – military, civilian and economic – must be available to support and capacity build the host government at central and province level in providing accessible, affordable and corruption-free basic services and security for its population.
- Assets – military and civilian – within and out of theatre must be available to follow and analyse the constant changing counterinsurgency environment on the ground to be able to foresee new resource demands.
- Non-kinetic measures must be available in theatre for follow-up and lead in connection to stabilisation efforts in the area of operations.

Based on this focus an analysis of the current context and available resources in Helmand Province will be conducted. The analysis will not be structured according to the above bullets, but will be led by the complex settings within the province. This is done to illustrate the importance of understanding the local complexities of the counterinsurgency environment when implementing CA – allowing the context to carry the analysis.

HELMAND

With the theoretical framework defined and the research focus listed, the context of the Danish involvement in Helmand Province will now be described and analysed. In the following sections, the context of the counterinsurgency campaign and the comprehensive approach will be described followed by analysis and assessment of the international and Danish approach to the engagement. Before commencing on the main part of the report, the geography of Helmand Province is listed below.

Helmand Province	
Province capital	Lashkar Gah
Square kilometres	Approximately 62,000
Estimated size of the population	820.000
External border	Southern Pakistan
Internal provincial borders	Kandahar, Oruzgan, Day Kondi, Ghowr, Farah and Nimruz
Districts	13 (Baghran, Dishu, Gereshk, Now Zad, Musa Quala, Lashkar Gar (province capital), Nawa-I-Barakzayi, Kajaki, Nad Ali, Garmser, Khanashin, Washir and Sangin)
The majority ethnic group	Pashtuns
Minor ethnic groups	Smaller Baluch and Hazara communities
Main crop in terms of income	Opium followed by wheat and corn

Figure 4: The geography of Helmand Province

The context: international engagement

Between the autumn of 2005 and the summer of 2006, ISAF accelerated the preparations to take over operational command of the whole of Afghanistan. Until the summer of 2006, the southern and eastern parts of the country had been under US command; whereas the capital, western and northern areas had been under ISAF command. One of the aims of the takeover was to release US troops deployed under the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) mandate for other tasks primarily in the east, and this finalised the ISAF expansion. On 31 July 2006, command of the six southern provinces (Regional Command South) was given to ISAF and on 5 October the same year, regional command east was also transferred to ISAF command.¹² Between the time the Taliban regime fell and the time ISAF took over the southern provinces, the US presence in the area had been limited. The US had been permanently present at Kandahar Airfield from the fall of the Taliban, but no major military or civilian presence had been established on a large scale throughout the south (Maloney 2008: 207). In September 2004, the US opened a Provincial Re-

(12) For more see: <http://www.nato.int/isaf/index.html>

construction Team (PRT) in the main city of Helmand Province (Lashkar Gah), but the PRT had only a limited capacity and a few hundred soldiers (Jakobsen 2005: 13). To facilitate ISAF's takeover of the southern provinces, US and Coalition troops conducted large-scale combat operations in the area to make way for ISAF and to decrease Taliban influence and military power throughout the area. Operation Mountain Thrust, involving some 10,000 US-led troops, gave ISAF a taste of things to come. The operation lasted for approximately two months and at the time some of the heaviest fighting involved Coalition troops, the Taliban and other anti-government forces.

With the ISAF takeover of the southern provinces, the UK committed itself to take the lead in Helmand Province. Alongside the UK were Denmark and Estonia. The UK took over the US PRT in Lashkar Gah and a number of other bases in the province. One of these was Forward Operation Base (FOB) Price on the outskirts of the town of Gereshk, where the main Danish military contribution is currently located. The first British deployment of troops in Helmand consisted of an air assault brigade and a civilian and military element of the PRT. The brigade or Task Force Helmand and the PRT were organised as two separate pillars, with Task Force Helmand as the main and senior party. The two pillars coordinated and consolidated their overall tasks through the Helmand Executive Group (HEG)¹³, but the military pillar led the efforts. The UK approach to the task in the early days of the takeover was characterised by a strong kinetic focus and a campaign with an extensive involvement of Afghan politicians regarding how and where to commence operations (Maloney 2008: 213).¹⁴

By the spring of 2007, the UK's knowledge of the ethnic, tribal, cultural and other characteristics of the province began to interact with the campaign plan, and a more counterinsurgency-focused campaign plan was introduced. The non-kinetic effects gained a larger role, and the kinetic operations began to focus on smaller and more populated areas – Afghan Development Zones – that could be held by the international forces, rather than on maintaining a presence throughout the whole province (Thruelsen 2007: 11-13 and Azarbaijani-Moghaddam 2008: 34). In the autumn of 2007, the UK began fact finding for reviewed, longer-term and civilian-led plan for the province. A new reviewed plan called 'The Helmand Road Map' was developed and was approved by the British in the spring of 2008.¹⁵ Among other things, the PRT was upgraded to include a 'two-star level' senior civilian representative placed above the 'one-star level' military commander of Task Force

(13) The Helmand Executive Group is no longer operative. When operational both province officials, the PRT and Task Force Helmand were present in the group.

(14) The at that time unclear command and control structures and the interests of Helmand province governor, a number of districts governors and president Karzai resulted in what became known as the 'platoon house strategy' where small contingents of international soldiers were spread thin in government district compounds throughout the province (<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm080617/halltext/80617h0001.htm>). The 'strategy' did not favour some of the basic principles of using military force.

(15) Approved by Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO), Department for International Development (DFID) and Ministry of Defence (MOD). The UK government made the final approval.

Helmand.¹⁶ All operations now needed to have a specific long-term objective in support of the civilian and political development goals – the process now became civilian and political led.

The context: current setup

The situation in Helmand Province in the summer of 2008 is characterised by uncertainty. Although progress has been made and a number of small- to large-scale reconstruction programmes have been implemented, the local population is still waiting to see which is the stronger and more determined party – the insurgents or the counterinsurgents.¹⁷ At the moment, large-scale military operations are ongoing in the province; corruption and opium production are flourishing;¹⁸ local militias are still armed; and the legitimacy of the central and local administration is low (Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste 2008: 39). However, at the provincial level the recent appointment of Governor Gulab Mangal has shown a positive progress.¹⁹ Local governance at this level is improving and is now showing positive nascent signs of increased influence at district level. On 26 August 2008, Governor Mangal conducted a visit to Gereshk and met with a large group of local community leaders. The significance of this was the inclusion of local district leaders and the fact that it was only the second visit to Gereshk by a provincial governor in 30 years. Other encouraging governance signs in the province are the newly established presence of defence lawyers – something that did not exist during recent regimes – and the focused pursuit at both provincial and district level to improve and strengthen the education sector.²⁰

Helmand Province is currently the biggest opium producer in Afghanistan, with more than 80% of the farming families in the province involved in opium cultivation and 35% of the farmers' annual cash income coming from opium – indicating a strong dependence in the province on the opium economy (UNODC 2007: 16). The opium production in the province is not a new problem and it can be traced all the way back to the period before the Soviet invasion in December 1979. From 2002 to 2008, production more than tripled in the province, and in 2008 approximately 103,500 hectares of Afghanistan's 157,000 hectares of opium production were located in Helmand (UNODC 2008a: 1, 34 and UNODC 2008b: 3-5). This high level of opium production in the province has a variety of implications and challenges for the economy, the local power structures and governance. It also has a strong influence on and connection to the insurgency (UNODC 2007: 20, UNODC

(16) Interviews conducted in Afghanistan in Gereshk on 17 May 2008 with a civilian PRT representative and phone interview conducted on 28 August 2008 with Lars Jensen Senior Danish Representative at the British PRT in Helmand.

(17) Interviews conducted in Afghanistan in Gereshk on 15 May 2008 with Mayor Said Dur Ali Shah and the at that time Gereshk District Chief Haji Manaf and a survey conducted by Danish CIMIC among key elders in Gereshk in May 2008.??dette korrekt forstået?nes her. i tilbudsavisenri.

(18) From 2007 to 2008 the opium cultivation remained almost constant in Helmand Province. Thereby, the province remains the number one opium producer in Afghanistan responsible of 2/3 of the total production (UNODC 2008b: 5).

(19) Governor Gulab Mangal was appointed governor of Helmand Province in March 2008.

(20) Phone interview conducted on 28 August 2008 with Lars Jensen Senior Danish Representative at the British PRT in Helmand.

2008b: 4 and Thruelsen 2008: 9-10, 12). The cultivation of opium therefore has quite a negative and complicating effect regarding the positive development of the area. Farmers routinely bribe the police to avoid crop eradication, middlemen and insurgents collect taxes to safeguard the fields and earn large amounts of money on trafficking, and it is estimated that government and provincial officials are involved in as much as 70% of all opium trafficking in the country (Government Accountability Office 2008: 40, Glaze 2007: 6, UNODC 2007: 37, 40 and US Department of State 2007: 229). It should be said that Governor Mangal has been very outspoken with regard to poppy cultivation and production and the influence of drug barons within the local power structures. Afghan national security forces have apprehended some local criminals and seized more than a ton of opium over the last few months. Most of this progress is a direct result of the appointment of Governor Mangal who also has a positive record in other Afghan provinces. The governor is currently working on strengthening his counter narcotics plan in close co-operation with the PRT and Task Force Helmand.

In the central part of Helmand the opium cultivation in the 'green zone' north of Gereshk city is controlled by a major drug lord called Haji Khan Mohammed, who lives on a large estate on the road between FOB Price and Gereshk.²¹ Haji Khan Mohammed reputedly owns a large part of the arable land in Helmand where the opium is cultivated, and he is believed to be connected with high-level Helmand Taliban commanders and other illegal armed groups in the province.²² He is also known to be involved in a family blood feud with the family of Abdul Raziq, the Deputy Chief of Police of Gereshk, which frequently results in gunfights between the two sides. On 13 April 2008, the struggle escalated with an attack on a police check point followed by an ambush on the rescue convoy going to reinforce the check point. Four police officers were killed and five wounded. The attack and subsequent ambush are believed to have been planned by Haji Khan Mohammed with the purpose of killing deputy police commander Abdul Raziq, who was leading the rescue patrol. The purpose of the attack could be related to Haji Khan Mohammed's ambition to become Chief of Police in Gereshk, and to his attempt to enrol his own fighters in the local police.²³

Local militias also flourish in Helmand. Two of the most important militia commanders with regard to the Danish engagement in Helmand are Haji Kaduz, who controls the road from Gereshk to Lashkar Gah, and Mullah Daoud, who commands Afghan Security Group (ASG), which guards the outer perimeter of FOB Price.²⁴ The two militia commanders are brothers. The Deputy Chief of Police of Gereshk, Abdul Raziq, was a former member of the ASG before he became Deputy Chief of Police. So the ASG have participated in the struggle on the side of Abdul Raziq against the drug lord Haji Khan Mohammed. These lo-

(21) Interview conducted in Afghanistan in Gereshk on 12 and 16 May 2008 with DABG intelligence unit (S2).

(22) Interview conducted in Afghanistan in Gereshk on 12 and 16 May 2008 with DABG intelligence unit (S2).

(23) Interview conducted in Afghanistan in Gereshk on 12 and 16 May 2008 with DABG intelligence unit (S2).

(24) Interview conducted in Afghanistan in Gereshk on 12 and 16 May 2008 with DABG intelligence unit (S2). Also, the authors visited Mullah Daoud in Gereshk on 16 May 2008.

cal and quite complicated power structures fully illustrate that the main problem in the area is not isolated to the Taliban insurgency, but also the local power struggle and the fight to keep Afghanistan from becoming a narco-state.




Figure 5: Politics and power structures in Gereshk

On the official government level, the local provincial authorities are as described above undergoing a fast development supported by the international commitment; but there still seems to be a long way to go, and intensive international involvement will be needed before confidence and trust in the local authorities have been established. Public services in the province are underdeveloped because of a history of neglect, and the technocratic competences of the authorities are scarce. The presence of line ministries in Helmand Province is primarily focused on Lashkar Gah, and there is little evidence of ministerial presence allocated through the province capital to the major cities such as Gereshk.²⁵ Governor Mangal however, seems to be on the right track with the focused education programmes and his outreach program attempting to show the general population in Helmand that he is there to serve and support them.²⁶ On the security side the Afghan army and police are present in most areas. ANA 5 Corps covering southern Afghanistan currently has 8,500 soldiers on hand with a brigade stationed in Helmand, and the ANP is present in all the districts of the province (Government Accountability Office 2008: 22, 31-32). Whereas the credibility of the ANA in the province is high, the credibility of the ANP is comparatively low. According to an official US government report, none of the Afghan police units are fully capable of performing their role in the country (Government Accountability Office 2008: 31-32). During interviews conducted in Gereshk, it was mentioned that the two main challenges to security in Gereshk were intimidation by the Taliban and by the police.²⁷

(25) The Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development is present in Gereshk.

(26) Phone interview conducted on 28 August 2008 with Lars Jensen Senior Danish Representative at the British PRT in Helmand.

(27) Interviews conducted in Afghanistan in Gereshk on 15 May 2008 with Mayor Said Dur Ali Shah and the at that time Gereshk District Chief Haji Manaf and a survey conducted by Danish CIMIC among key elders in Gereshk in May 2008.

The context described above illustrates the current challenges that the international involvement and the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) have to counter if success is to be achieved in Helmand. The counterinsurgency and CA strategy to counter these challenges must address the security challenges, the local power structures and the local political reality, as well as encouraging the development of a legitimate national government. If this is to be done a variety of activities need to be carried out in a timely and sequencing manner within a comprehensive framework including military, political, economic and civilian instruments (see figure 3 above) (Stabilisation Unit 2006). These instruments will be touched upon below.

The international setup and approach in Helmand

The British assumed control of the Helmand PRT in May 2006. The PRT, which is considered well funded and which is one of the most 'civilian' PRTs in Afghanistan with some 50 civilians, carrying out reconstruction, recovery and development activities in the province (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam 2008: 13).²⁸ The engagement in Helmand is organised with the PRT on one side and a military task force (Task Force Helmand – TFH) on the other. The PRT is run by a civilian chief with the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO), Department for International Development (DFID) and Stabilisation Unit (SU)²⁹ all included within the organisation.³⁰ In addition, the Danish government has stationed a senior Danish Representative (one-star level) and one civilian educational advisor³¹ sponsored by Danish International Development Assistance (DANIDA) in the PRT and some Danish military liaison officers within the Task Force headquarters. Task Force Helmand is led by the military and consists of some 7,900 British troops along with Danish and Estonian troops.³² The task force is responsible for facilitating reconstruction and extending the authority of the Afghan government. The task force works in close coordination with the PRT and Afghan security institutions.

(28) <http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/fco-in-action/uk-in-afghanistan/afghanistan-reconstruction/helmand/uk-prt> and interview conducted in Afghanistan in Gereshk on 17 May 2008 with civilian and military PRT representatives.

(29) It has been decided that the Stabilisation Unit will provide all civilian UK personnel apart from the political staff for the PRT.

(30) Other institutions such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) are also present within the PRT. Helmand Province is one of the largest recipients of USAID donor money in the world. Interview conducted in Afghanistan in Gereshk on 17 May 2008 with the regional chief of USAID in southern Afghanistan.

(31) A second civilian educational advisor will be stationed at the PRT in late 2008.

(32) <http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/fco-in-action/uk-in-afghanistan/afghanistan-reconstruction/helmand/task-force-helmand>




Figure 6: Organisational structure of the British led PRT and Task Force in Helmand

The British involvement in Helmand is being implemented on the basis of a strategic plan that presents an operational guide for both the PRT and Task Force Helmand. The strategy – the Helmand Road Map – is a two-year plan which is to be evaluated annually.³³ It replaces previous British plans, and in contrast to these it focuses on the concentration and prioritisation of all resources. Accordingly, all civil and military activities to be carried out in Helmand will concentrate on and prioritise five main geographical areas or district centres, and will be controlled by the concept of a politically-led counterinsurgency campaign. This approach implies that the focus is on gaining the consent and support of the population towards the host government and not solely on winning territory or fighting the Taliban and other illegal armed groups.³⁴ As a result, in principle all the military campaigns focus on the civilian effects to be achieved.³⁵ The Road Map emphasises the need for a political and intelligence led approach and introduces the term 'good enough approach' – thereby incorporating the reality of the immense challenges in the province.³⁶

(33) The Helmand Road Map was approved in the spring of 2008, and it is expected to be implemented in late 2008.

(34) Interview conducted in Afghanistan in Gereshk on 17 May 2008 with civilian and military PRT representatives.

(35) Interview conducted in Afghanistan in Gereshk on 17 May 2008 with civilian and military PRT representatives and a representative of the Stabilisation Unit.

(36) Interview conducted in Afghanistan in Gereshk on 17 May 2008 with a representative of the Stabilisation Unit.

The Road Map places a civilian in charge of the joint efforts in Helmand, giving the PRT a civilian face.³⁷

The actual merger of the counterinsurgency campaign theme and CA that the Road Map constitutes is in practice a close integration of both civil and military elements working together across different planning cells. Integration of especially CJ3 'current operations', CJ5 'plans' and CJ9 'Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC)' together with a close co-operation between the civilian and the military leader on a daily basis is pivotal for positive implementation and effects.³⁸ The overall work process when identifying, preparing and implementing initiatives in the province can be illustrated through eight steps of action:

- Step 1: Identification of a civilian led priority of desired effects.
- Step 2: Joint (civilian and military) identification of possible actions with the aim of reaching the desired effects.
- Step 3: Joint (civilian and military) efforts in preparing the involvement of all elements within the different actions.
- Step 4: Individual civilian and military analysis of available resources. Individual civilian and military approval of resources.
- Step 5: Joint (civilian and military) development of a resource plan including interaction between the resources.
- Step 6: Joint (civilian and military) integration of resources, preparation and plans at tactical level including Public Affairs and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS).³⁹
- Step 7: Execution. Conduct operations including both civilian and military resources. Normally with military lead supported by civilian stabilisation initiatives. Including constant Public Affairs and PSYOPS.
- Step 8: Consolidate the desired effects. Normally with civil lead supported by military security initiatives. Including constant Public Affairs and PSYOPS.

The civilian chief of the PRT keeps the process en-route. According to the process described, the initial priorities will usually be identified by the PRT, but in reality the priorities often originate from the daily interaction between the top civilian and military leaders. This may lead to immediate adjustments to the delivery of civilian effect and security, without resorting to a formal planning process. However, there will be cases in highly non-permissive environments where the security line of operation is so dominant that there will be little or no involvement of civilian actors in the planning and delivery process.⁴⁰

To lead the implementation of the Road Map, eight strands are in focus, combining the

(37) Interview conducted in Afghanistan in Gereshk on 17 May 2008 with civilian and military PRT representatives.

(38) CJ is the military acronym for Combined Joint.

(39) Public Affairs relates primarily to international media and secondary to local and regional media. PSYOPS relates to the local population in the mission area. For more see "Military Committee 457 NATO Military Policy on Public Affairs" and "Military Committee 402/1 NATO Military Policy on Psychological Operations"

(40) Email correspondence on 04 September 2008 with high-level civilian representatives of the PRT.

military counterinsurgency approach with the civilian contribution. Seven of the eight strands will lead the next two years of development of five chosen districts in the province, and will work to direct the military involvement. The districts are Lashkar Gar, Gereshk, Sangin, Garmser and Musa Qala. The strands are:

- Politics and reconciliation
- Governance
- Rule of Law (justice, police and prisons)
- Security (military)
- Economic development and reconstruction
- Counternarcotics
- Communications
- Regional engagement (engagement with regional players. Not included in the district development programme)

The implementation of the Road Map constitutes a major challenge to the current organisation within the province, and especially with regard to the Danish contribution and the tasks and function of the civilian advisors. Each strand will ideally require a specialist or at least advisors with great knowledge of the complexity of the area. The Danish educational advisor is an example of such a specialist. This build-up of civilian expertise is on-going, but will take some time, and it will be crucial for successful implementation. During interviews with representatives from Task Force Helmand and the PRT, it was stated that as many as six to eight civilian advisors in each 'Road Map district' will be needed.⁴¹ The countries currently present in Helmand has agreed on a division of labour, where each country will have to deliver experts within the sectors for which they have the responsibility for the coordination of foreign aid. Denmark has taken lead on the education sector and is currently looking into taking the lead on a second sector. Today, the British led PRT is staffing four stabilisation advisors to the five chosen district centres. With Gereshk as one of the primary focus areas in the Road Map, referred to as the most promising town in the province, the importance of a stronger integrated civil-military organisation within the framework of CA seems to be vast.⁴²

The Danish setup and approach in Helmand

The Danish military and civilian contribution to developments in the Helmand Province has undergone major changes since the first deployment of troops in the province in the summer of 2006. The first Danish military contribution consisted of a light reconnaissance squadron with supporting elements. Under the current Danish Afghanistan strategy the military ceiling is set at 750 troops, including two infantry companies, a tank platoon,

(41) Interview conducted in Afghanistan in Gereshk on 17 May 2008 with civilian and military PRT representatives.

(42) Interview conducted in Afghanistan in Gereshk on 17 May 2008 with a representative of the Stabilisation Unit.

scout squads, artillery hunt radar and more.⁴³ The Danish military contribution is organised in the form of a battle group (DABG). On the civilian side the contribution has also developed, although at a slower pace. In 2006, Denmark had one civilian development advisor in the PRT. This contribution has gradually grown to one senior civilian national representative and one educational advisor in the PRT⁴⁴. In Gereshk, only one Danish stabilisation advisor was stationed at the DABG until summer 2008. Currently, two Danish stabilisation advisors are stationed there. In addition, the Danish police have two police officers stationed in the PRT at Lashkar Gah, as part of EUPOL.⁴⁵

Danish Battle Group/ISAF 6




Figure 7: Organisational structure of the Danish Battle Group in central Helmand

The Danish involvement in the province is managed and directed by a Danish one-year Helmand Plan and a Danish five-year Afghanistan Strategy.⁴⁶ The Helmand Plan is reviewed annually and lists benchmarks for its implementation.⁴⁷ The Danish Afghanistan Strategy deals with the strategic level for the whole of Afghanistan. The latest Danish Afghanistan Strategy states that Denmark will spend DKK 400 million (USD 80 million) a year in development funds from 2009 until 2012. Of these funds approximately DKK 50 million (USD 10 million) will be allocated to Helmand (Udenrigsministeriet 2008b: 26-27). From the late autumn of 2008, the Danish civilian setup in Helmand Province will consist

(43) <http://www.afghanistan.um.dk/NR/ronlyres/A2B41ECE-2CAF-44EE-841C-70ACA2D70ABD/0/FinalAfghanistan-Strategi.pdf> p. 16.

(44) A second civilian educational advisor will be stationed at the PRT in late 2008.

(45) <http://www.afghanistan.um.dk/NR/ronlyres/A2B41ECE-2CAF-44EE-841C-70ACA2D70ABD/0/FinalAfghanistan-Strategi.pdf>

(46) For more see www.um.dk

(47) <http://www.afghanistan.um.dk/NR/ronlyres/8997720D-000F-4FB4-B7C9-B5AD5A7BBC54/0/HELMAND181207.pdf>

of one senior representative and two educational advisors at the PRT, and three advisors stationed at FOB Price. The three advisors at FOB Price are in coordination with the British allocated through the PRT, but are all employed by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On the military side a CIMIC team of 14 people is stationed in FOB Price. The CIMIC team works in close coordination with the civilian advisors at FOB Price.

The development of the Danish Afghanistan Strategy, the Helmand Plan and underlying benchmarks for the use of funds is based primarily on cooperation between the Kabul embassy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen, Denmark. The analytical process prior to the formulation of the documents cannot be described as founded on in-depth analytical work or specific long-term fact-finding missions, but relies on at times intensive dialogue with partners at the PRT in Helmand, the Afghan government, more informal international networks in Kabul and the knowledge of the embassy and ministry staff.⁴⁸ The focus of these documents is identified and approved together with Afghan government officials, for instance at the Ministry of Education, and in coordination with the larger donors in Kabul, including the British Embassy and DFID. Because of the short rotation cycles for Danish embassy staff – one to one and a half years in the country at a time – the knowledge of developments and the complexity of the country cannot be described as being in-depth.⁴⁹ The Danish Afghanistan Strategy and the Danish Helmand Plan are to be an integrated political, military and developmental contribution to the fight against the insurgency with the aim of creating an improved security situation (Udenrigsministeriet 2008a: 3 and Udenrigsministeriet 2008b: 2). These foci work as preconditions for creating stability and economic development, reducing poverty and promoting individual rights in the country.

Because of the nature of the institutional structures and knowledge of how complex it can be to integrate military and developmental tools in a counterinsurgency environment, it is hard to say whether the plans, strategies and benchmarks are actually working. What can physically be evaluated by August 2008, is that some 16 schools have reopened throughout Helmand since 2006 and it is expected that more will open by September 2008. Current Danish plans are being finalized involving another 9 schools and 2 teacher colleges in the province. Also, the district centres of the province are increasingly becoming more involved in delivering services, all though still at an immature level.⁵⁰

However, to develop integrated plans and strategies in a field of this complexity, a number of questions need to be asked and analysed before new plans and strategies are im-

(48) Interview conducted in Denmark in Copenhagen on 9, 14, 17, 21 and 22 April and 17 and 18 June 2008 with representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danish Defence Command and Ministry of Defence.

(49) The latest Danish ambassador to Afghanistan was stationed for one year in Kabul before receiving a new post. However, when Denmark had a Danish Representation in Kabul from 2002 – 2006, the personnel stationed there stayed for as long as three years.

(50) Phone interview conducted on 28 August 2008 with Lars Jensen Senior Danish Representative at the British PRT in Helmand.

plemented. Questions such as: Do our focus, initiatives and projects help to achieve the overall 'end state'? Do our focus, initiatives and projects create negative spill-over effects in the area – or to the other initiatives? Do we know if the focus, initiatives and projects will create the desired long-term effects? Do we know if the needs on the ground in the specific area match the political objectives? And are we integrating the military and political objectives into our benchmarks? These questions can only be answered by conducting ongoing and in-depth analysis based on a wider knowledge base. However, the structures needed are not available at the moment, either within the Kabul embassy or at the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. More permanent structures involving less frequent rotations between Copenhagen and Kabul, combined with a more analytical approach could strengthen the efforts (see figure 3).

Analysis of Danish implementation

The Helmand Road Map states that it will be "... a politically led, intelligence shaped counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign in Helmand, delivered through a flexible combination of military and civil effect." (TFH Road Map 2008: 3) and that we will see "... some transition from military to civilian led effort." (TFH Road Map 2008: 5). To make this and the two-year implementation horizon possible, the implementation strategies for each focus district created in accordance with the Road Map by the civilian advisor(s) need to be followed strictly, and the military action needs to be conducted in support of these strategies. As described in the Road Map: "Each District Stabilisation Advisor will need to maintain the District Plan for their area. These provide the over-arching direction for all PRT and TFH activity..." (TFH Road Map 2008: 13). So, the civilian advisor(s) in charge of implementation must be formally placed and authorised within the DABG at a level that will enable this process and especially the military support of it to succeed.⁵¹ But the introduction of the Road Map also highlights the need for continuity.⁵² Excessive frequent rotations and leave throughout the year, in combination with short-term 6-month/12-months contracts, constitute a challenge to efficient implementation and long-term planning. If CA is to be maintained under such critical operational conditions, stable and long-term human resources – both military and civilian – need to be available to support the longer focus of the Road Map.

The two Danish civilian advisors stationed through the PRT with the DABG in FOB Price are employed by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 6-months/12-months contracts. They are stationed on a 6:2 ratio, which means that they spend six weeks in Afghanistan followed by two weeks out of country. Until the early summer of 2008, when the civilian advisor was travelling or on leave, no advisor was available for the DABG in Gereshk. By late summer the PRT had stationed four stabilisation advisors at FOB Price which markedly improved the situation. The main task of the civilian advisors at present is the planning

(51) Interview conducted in Afghanistan in Gereshk on 12, 13 and 17 May 2008 with civilian and military DABG representatives.

(52) Interview conducted in Afghanistan in Gereshk on 17 May 2008 with civilian and military PRT representatives.

and implementation of the Helmand Road Map conducted in close cooperation with the district authorities. Individual district development plans within the framework of the Road Map are to be formulated for each of the districts involved.⁵³ These plans will be formulated in a decentralised fashion so the local context and conditions can be taken into account. The district civilian advisor "*should be able to determine what level of PRT support to critical, local level institutions or processes is required in order to maintain momentum towards the political settlement for that area, and to reach the objectives ...*" (TFH Road Map 2008: 29).

The Road Map also challenges the domestic flexibility to back up and support implementation. According to the British, the seven strands to be implemented in the city of Gereshk will require additional civilian resources in the form of sector matter experts, even if only two or three of the seven strands are to be followed. The concept behind the Road Map is governance and national ownership as opposed to building parallel structures in support of implementation.⁵⁴ Relying on building national capacity and thereby ownership, challenges the expertise of the civilian advisors, the continuity of the international setup, and the national 'reach back' capacity available out of theatre. The expertise of the international advisors will need to be focused within each strand to build up the local civilian capacity within the districts. When estimated realistic to implement the civilian resources need to be identified internationally and deployed in Helmand relatively fast if the initial implementation of the Road Map is not to be delayed. Currently, it might be premature to station sector matter experts in all the Road Map districts primarily due to the challenging security situation, but if the military is willing to provide the necessary security details and escort capacity this challenge can be overcome. When appropriate programs and projects are identified it is clear that the stabilisation advisors will have to step aside and make room for these experts and more development oriented activities.⁵⁵ It is imperative that these experts are identified and trained before the need arises, in order to be on top of the development, and it is imperative that the military forces prioritise and support this development by allocating the necessary security elements. In Lashkar Gah however, recent experiences have shown that within one month as many as 75% of the planned civilian advisor visits to the districts had been cancelled by the military because of the lack of priority and personnel.⁵⁶

To a large extent, the formulation of the Road Map reveals the rapid development of the counterinsurgency environment on the tactical level and the need for 'real-time' follow up at tactical and strategic level to support and strengthen the joint efforts. For example the city of Gereshk had according to the DABG undergone a rapid development in relation to

(53) Interview conducted in Afghanistan in Gereshk on 17 May 2008 with civilian PRT representatives.

(54) Interview conducted in Afghanistan in Gereshk on 17 May 2008 with a representative of the Stabilisation Unit.

(55) Phone interview conducted on 28 August 2008 with Lars Jensen Senior Danish Representative at the British PRT in Helmand.

(56) Interview conducted in Denmark in Copenhagen on 9 April and 17 and 18 June 2008 with representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

security in 2007, and had to a large extent since late 2007 been ready for an enhanced civilian-led involvement to secure the military progress with longer-term political, economic and civilian initiatives.⁵⁷ By May 2008 – more than six months later – there was still only one civilian advisor with some support from the PRT available for this job. Only by September 2008, had the PRT upgraded the involvement to four advisors. In particular, the British in Afghanistan had the same experience early in the build-up of the Helmand PRT. As noted by Richard Teuten⁵⁸ “...there is no doubt that the speed, as well as the nature of response by the international community, is crucial to success.” (Teuten 2007: 2). The British realised that the institutional backup at the embassy in Kabul and in London needed to be strengthened in terms of real-time fact finding, evaluation and analysis in order to rapid support of mission implementation.⁵⁹ These lessons can probably be transferred to the Danish contribution.

With its new focus on non-kinetic effects, the Road Map challenges the current Danish approach and engagement. Danish resources available for strengthening activities in Gereshk in connection with implementation of the Road Map are one to two CIMIC teams of two people, plus by late fall 2008 three civilian advisors. This prioritisation seems to be in vast contrast to the British aspiration of making Gereshk one of the four chosen cities in Helmand Province where development activities and the “*need to deliver influence without having to use kinetic effect*” will be in focus (TFH Road Map 2008: 3-4). In addition, the aspiration to create a “*Civilian-led PRT district office*” (TFH Road Map 2008: 2) in Gereshk will be hard to implement, unless the civilian resources and the military means to support them are upgraded significantly.

The DABG resources available to conduct direct support for CA efforts are scarce, and the main focus for the DABG still seems to involve conducting security operations. As CA-related structures, the DABG has a deputy commander, a CIMIC section, an S2 intelligence cell, and various but limited military escort elements to support the CIMIC teams and the civilian advisors. On paper, the CIMIC section is manned by 14 people with four teams of two people ready to conduct CIMIC- and CA-related tasks. However, the CIMIC section on team 5⁶⁰ was short of three people before being deployed, thereby reducing the section to three CIMIC teams on the ground. In addition, in a fatal incident in Gereshk a CIMIC team was attacked by a suicide bomber, killing the two CIMIC officers. No permanent replacements were provided.

(57) Interview conducted with former commander of DABG Kim Kristensen on 26 March 2008 on his return to Denmark after six months in Helmand Province.

(58) Richard Teuten is the head of the Stabilisation Unit which is the former Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (<http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/>).

(59) Interview conducted in Afghanistan in Gereshk on 17 May 2008 with civilian PRT representatives.

(60) Team 5 in Helmand from February to August 2008.

Function	Planned organisation	Current organisation ¹
CH	1	1
Second in command (2IC)	1	1
Driver	1	1
Operations officer	1	1
Administration officer	1	1
Liaison officer	1	0
CIMIC teams of two people	4	2
Total personnel	14	9

Figure 8: CIMIC – planned and current organisation of DABG team 5

The CIMIC section has been given a variety of tasks ranging from direct support and follow-up for the units conducting combat operations in the 'green zone' to supporting the work of the civilian advisor conducting CA activities in and around Gereshk city. In particular, the CIMIC support for the work of the civilian advisor and concurrently the PRT was frequently highlighted as being crucial for the work done in the province.⁶¹ The CIMIC section is to operate throughout the DABG operational area. The three teams available for the DABG at the beginning of the mission were tasked with supporting the units and carrying out what is called 'consent-winning activities' in forward operating base (FOB) Keenan, FOB Armadillo and FOB Sandford in the green zone. In addition, a team was tasked with carrying out operations in Gereshk city – including support for the PRT.

Between the beginning of Danish activities in Helmand Province in September 2006 and May 2008, a number of different CIMIC sections have identified, implemented, overseen or supported approximately 255 small- to large-scale projects. 221 of these projects were implemented with 'CIMIC money', 31 with 'CA money', and 3 with 'UK PRT money'.⁶² The main distinction between CA and CIMIC projects is defined by the reason for initiating the project. CIMIC is force protection, and CA is for helping the Afghan population without expecting anything in change. As the projects will often be very alike, the local population will have difficulties in separating the two types of assistance and often the CIMIC teams will mainly distinct them by the amount of money involved in each project. One CIMIC project had a maximum amount of DKK 50,000 (USD 10,000), while one CA project had a maximum amount of USD 50,000. DABG team 5, had DKK 400,000 to conduct CIMIC activities and DKK 3 million for CA projects. However, in practice the amount of CA money

(61) Interview conducted in Afghanistan in Gereshk on 17 May 2008 with civilian PRT representatives.

(62) 'Project Tracking' received from the Danish CIMIC team in Helmand in the summer of 2008. However, their might have been additional UK funded projects implemented by the Danish CIMIC when the CIMIC section at an earlier stage were stationed in Lashkar Gah at the PRT.

available was unlimited.⁶³ The types of projects implemented by CIMIC money vary in nature from furniture and equipment for schools to fire-fighting equipment and cash for work and 'consent-winning activities'.⁶⁴ The CA projects also vary from water towers and refurbishment of schools to gates at police outposts and tailoring for poor women. The projects show that a strict division of labour between CIMIC projects and CA projects does not exist at the tactical level. The strategic Danish army ambition that CIMIC should only perform tasks with the sole purpose of 'force protection' cannot be realised owing to tactical realities on the ground. Furthermore, the low priority regarding the number of civilian advisors, the military protection allocated to them and the CIMIC section deployed with only three teams to support operations in a whole battle group area⁶⁵ illustrates the lack of understanding at strategic level of the importance of gaining the consent of the population by non-kinetic means.

The relationship between CIMIC, the PRT and thereby the civilian advisors and the military needs to be reviewed with a view to adapt the organisation to match the complexity of the counterinsurgency environment. Medium to large-scale⁶⁶ development in a counterinsurgency environment needs to be closely incorporated into the overall strategic framework for the area (as illustrated in figure 3). This will ensure a close connection between the various efforts involved, and minimise the risk of negative side effects and possible counter-productive outcomes. Granted close interaction within an overall framework for the area, medium to large-scale projects may have a wider effect than simply providing water, for instance. Building a well or irrigation canal can also contain an element of strengthening the capacity of local officials and administration with the positive side effect of supporting the legitimacy of the local government in the eyes of the local population. On the other hand, it can have the negative side effect of contributing to poppy cultivation. But to make this overall interaction possible, human resources for analytical work need to be in place.

During interviews in FOB Price it was emphasised by numerous individuals that the civilian advisors were fully dependent on CIMIC to identify, implement and oversee the various initiatives.⁶⁷ This has now by summer 2008 changed and with the current four civilian advisors in place supported by contracted private security, the ability for these to move around Gereshk to oversee the work has significantly improved. The Danish advisors have

(63) Interview conducted in Denmark in Copenhagen on 9 April 2008 with representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

(64) These consent-winning activities could include hospitality offered for key leaders, gifts provided for local leaders, gifts for the population, small-scale construction projects generating employment, and peace offerings (Stabilisation Unit 2008: Stabilisation Issues Note Quick Impact Projects).

(65) The Danish Battle Group is deployed with two manoeuvre companies, but the DABG is responsible for the whole battle group 'space' of central Helmand, so additional non-Danish manoeuvre units is under Danish command. These non-Danish units are also supposed to be supported by CIMIC teams.

(66) The term medium to large-scale development is used to illustrate that small project like e.g. poor women's tailoring hardly effects an overall aim of defeating the insurgency.

(67) Only one civilian advisor was stationed at FOB Price until the late summer of 2008.

also, as the only internationals maintained the possibility of being transported by and with the DABG when found appropriate and best suitable for the task at hand.⁶⁸ The CIMIC section is used to doing a little of everything without a single focus. This is fine if the organisation is structured, trained and manned for these tasks. However, this is not the case with the Danish setup. Here, the small CIMIC section operating in a counterinsurgency environment is needed to support the units conducting combat operations. The civilian contribution must include sufficient staff and their own or military supplied security capability to ensure a permanent presence. A strong civilian capacity makes it possible to incorporate both civilian and military resources in order to achieve the 'end state'.

In addition, in the more traditional terms of force protection the CIMIC section needs to be empowered to cope with the complex and high-risk environment of counterinsurgency. The units conducting the kinetic counterinsurgency operations have shown a need for direct support during and immediately after combat. A Danish CIMIC team attached to a Scottish infantry company at FOB Keenan in the Green Zone in Helmand was involved in around 30 CIMIC activities spanning 3-4 weeks. Around half of these activities were related to the refurbishment of combat-inflicted damage in local compounds, where the local residents were given money to rebuild the damaged property. Under the current CIMIC setup conducting these different activities with the small CIMIC section is far from optimal, and can have a negative effect on the tasks to be conducted.

(68) Phone interview conducted on 28 August 2008 with Lars Jensen Senior Danish Representative at the British PRT in Helmand.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

At the overall level, CA cannot be implemented as a single model applied to all conflict scenarios. When implementing CA as the desired approach in the context of counterinsurgency in Helmand Province, CA is about combining military, political and developmental actors to create stability, conduct security sector reform (SSR) and especially to capacity build local authorities to perform governance tasks in the area and thereby support the overall strategic goal in Afghanistan. Today, only few local NGOs and constructors⁶⁹ are present and capable of working in the province, which is a situation that is not expected to change markedly within the nearest future.⁷⁰ This fact illustrates the urgent need for a focused approach to build local capacity to fill this vacuum – a key element of CA. The capacity must be developed by international civilian resources working alongside military actors. So, the main aim in developing an integrated approach between counterinsurgency and CA, is to foster a development that will create a national and indeed local host nation administrative capacity capable of providing security and basic needs and services in a manner, which is perceived as legitimate by the local population. By deploying sufficient civilian resources and by supporting these with military means, the essential contested 'political space' (see figure 1) can be filled during the limited time available.

As outlined in the chapter on counterinsurgency, the overall research focus has been derived from theories on counterinsurgency. This was done to centre the report on the elements of CA within the context and complex environment of counterinsurgency. The following recommendations have been derived from several field researches and through analysis of the actual situation and implementation in Helmand Province.

The analysis conducted focuses on the organisation and on current and coming tasks, showing the divergence within the organisation, the variety of tasks and the staff available. The tasks dealt with in the DABG area of operations are developing at a pace that is hard to follow from a distance. The need to conduct 'real-time' fact finding to constantly improve and evaluate developments on the ground with the strategic framework and 'reach back' capacity needs to be rethought. As pointed out above, CA is not just a question of implementing projects in the DABG operations area. It is also about getting the military, political, economic and civilian players to work together in support of each other and to build local capacity. This challenges both the civilian and military setup and the wide range of knowledge that needs to be available within the organisations involved. During some of the interviews conducted in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs it was emphasised that change and input improvements should come from the bottom up. This seems reasonable in a situation in which developments at the tactical level on the ground in Hel-

(69) The Danish Battle Group in Helmand announced a 'constructor's day' in Gereshk, where local constructors could register for work. During the day only six very small local constructors came to register.

(70) Interviews conducted in Afghanistan in Kabul on 9 May 2008 with the Director and the Chief of Policy and Advocacy of DACAAR. During the interview it was emphasised that the lack of security throughout the province made an international NGO present impossible within a reasonable future. Also, a list received from the British led PRT in Helmand showing 29 registered local NGOs present in the province. Of these NGOs however, only about two-thirds were implementing projects. In Gereshk in Helmand Province approximately two NGOs – one local and one international – are implementing minor projects.

mand are so fast that the strategic level in Kabul or in Copenhagen cannot keep up. However, for bottom-up input and feedback to be possible the tactical level has to be organised for the task. If the tactical-level organisation is overstretched the input to the strategic level will be characterised more by reactions to upcoming challenges than by qualified longer-term needs, evaluations and tasks. In addition, the strategic level setup needs to be organised to handle the information received from the tactical level, and to analyse and transform this information into operational support and overview.

Everyone interviewed at the strategic level in Denmark emphasised the fast development CA has undergone since the Danish involvement in ISAF Stage III commenced in the summer of 2006. Earlier Danish CA experiences have been shaped to some extent by involvement in Kosovo, and to a large extent by involvement in Iraq and Feyzabad in northeastern Afghanistan. Before the Stage III enlargement, Danish security policy had not been dominated by a focused counterinsurgency military strategy, which challenges the 'reach-back' capacity and fast-track overview of any nation involved.

Even though the Danish setup has undoubtedly developed fast since the summer of 2006, it seems to have been developed and limited within the existing ministry-to-ministry framework, instead of involving 'out of the box' analysis on the basis of actual demand.


From the military side at the more tactical level within the DABG, the priority of providing military escort security to the civilian advisor going out of camp and the priority of CIMIC seems to have been low. Even a fully manned CIMIC section of 14 soldiers will find it difficult to perform all their tasks, especially in a manner that is based on in-depth analytical work and in line with the overall plan. This fact, together with the slow involvement of civilian advisors to Gereshk, has slowed the process of building local capacity and gaining the consent of the population. The city of Gereshk within the Danish area of operation, has according to the DABG undergone a rapid development in relation to security in 2007, and has to a large extent been ready for an enhanced civilian-led involvement to secure the military progress with longer-term political, economic and civilian initiatives since late 2007. In May 2008 – more than six months later – there was still only one civilian advisor with some external support from the PRT available for this job. By September 2008, the PRT had upgraded the involvement to four advisors, but still the initiatives to fill the contested 'political space' have been delayed.

The following steps are recommended for an improved and strengthened involvement:

- Creating a permanent 'lessons learned' unit at the strategic level in Denmark capable of supporting the tactical level, conducting fact finding, providing a 'reach-back' capacity for the 'in theatre' level, formulating strategy and benchmarks on the ground of in-depth analysis, 'real-time' evaluations and ongoing estimations, and finally functioning as the CA think-tank for the government and line ministries in support of the involvement. This could shorten and strengthen the process of developing and especially im-

plementing new initiatives when identified at tactical level and contribute to long term planning (see figure 3).

- A system or team of people to create a flexible domestic 'standby' capacity for civilian advisors who can be deployed when the need is identified at the tactical level. There seems to be a great need for a team of people capable of working in post-conflict environments, working close to the military, facilitating governance, capacity building, supporting rule of law, and making development possible.
- More civilian and military personnel allocated directly to the CIMIC and CA work needs to be identified and deployed to the mission area. At the moment, too few human resources are available to implement the immense tasks of local capacity building. It is imperative that these experts are identified and trained prior to the need arises in the mission area to be on top of the development. Furthermore, the military forces must show a higher willingness to support this development by allocating the necessary security elements, such as security details and military escorts.
- Ministerial initiatives should be launched with regard to higher wages, personal security and career paths for personnel sent on missions. For instance, using MFA personnel at the lower level of implementation will strengthen the knowledge, understanding and effectiveness of the whole setup.
- The military intelligence organisation (S2 at Battle Group level) should have the capacity to monitor non-military threats with a view to supporting CA efforts in relation to understanding the complexity of the local power structures. As seen in Gereshk, this element is essential when engaging in capacity building of local structures. This is needed to ensure that the right local individuals are included in the local capacity building process. The local and quite complicated power structures in a given area can undermine the overall process if they are not fully understood and engaged with awareness. S2 needs to construct a reliable understanding of the local power structures and the local political processes with a view to minimise the possible negative spill-over effects.
- When only deploying one civilian advisor to a mission in connection with a military battle group, it should be considered if two persons for the function/job should be deployed to guarantee continuity and constant presence in the mission. Perhaps a secretary could support this process by producing reports, planning meetings, producing the minutes of meetings and logistical planning.
- The occupation of the Senior National Representative should be formalised with the military organisation when working in a COIN context. The military tasks and the CA activities need to be seen as equally important and therefore fully integrated.
- Fact-finding missions – with both military and civilian personnel – should be conducted



regularly with a view to strengthen the knowledge of the actual situation on the ground and ensuring that analysis is performed and that resources are adapted to meet the situation at hand.

Appendix 1

Interviews conducted in connection to the report

Day	Organisation	Function	Name
26.03.08	DABG	Commander	Kim Kristensen
09.04.08	MFA	Chief ALA	Sus Ulbæk
09.04.08	MFA	Head of Section	Anna Kjær
14.04.08	Danish Defence Command	Chief KDS	Jens Hansen
17.04.08	MoD	Chief 1. Office	Jens Garly
17.04.08	MoD	Chief 8. Office	Peter Alexa
21.04.08	MFA	Chief SIK	Lone Wisborg
21.04.08	MFA	Head of Section	
22.04.08	MFA	Chief HUM	Anne Birgitte Albrechtsen
22.04.08	MFA	Head of Section	Pernille Hougesen
08.05.08	ISAF-HQ	Chief ANDP	Chris Ameye
08.05.08	ISAF-HQ	PRT engagement team south	Chris Chodan
08.05.08	ISAF-HQ	Chief PRT CJ9	Stearling Daramius
08.05.08	ISAF-HQ	Chief PAG	Kristian Sørensen
09.05.08	DACAAR	Director	Dr. Arif Qaraeen
09.05.08	DACAAR	Chief Policy and Advocacy	Chrissie Hirst
09.05.08	DA Embassy	Attaché	Arne Hjersing Hansen
09.05.08	DA Embassy	Ambassaderåd	Lene Volversen
10.05.08	NGO	Independent Consultant	Sippi Azerbaijani
10.05.08	UNAMA	Senior mil. Advisor	Sean Crane
10.05.08	DA Embassy	Ambassador	Franz-Michael Skjold Mellbin
12.05.08	DABG	CIMIC Administration	Johannes Klemmesen
12.05.08	DABG	CIMIC Operations	Brian Weber
12.05.08	DABG	CIMIC 2IC	Kai Hedegaard Madsen
12.05.08	DABG	S2 Intelligence	
12.05.08	MFA	PRT Representative	George Güntelberg
13.05.08	DABG	Deputy Commander	Peter Boysen
13.05.08	MFA	PRT Representative	George Güntelberg
14.05.08	ANCOP	ANCOP Check Point (45 min. visit)	Talk with CP Commander and police officers

Day	Organisation	Function	Name
14.05.08	Patrol	Patrol Gereshk (four hours patrol and walk)	Observation and talk with local national
14.05.08	DABG	CIMIC Team	Heinz Jacobsen
15.05.08	Local Nationals	Joint District Coordination Centre (two hour meeting)	ANA, ANP, ANCOF, Highway Police, NDS, Mayor, DC
15.05.08	Local National	District Chief (DC)	Haji Manaf
15.05.08	Local National	Mayor of Gereshk	Said Dur Ali Shah
15.05.08	PMT	Chief UK Police Mentor Team	
16.05.08	DABG	S2 Intelligence	
16.05.08	DABG	Commander	Jens Lønborg
16.05.08	Local National	Leader of militia	Mullah Daud
16.05.08	Patrol	Patrol Gereshk (three hour patrol and walk)	Observation and talk with local national
17.05.08	International representatives	Meeting on the 'Helmand (Gereshk) Road Map'	USAID, UK PRT, US GOV Rep., US Army, DABG, UK GOV Rep.
17.05.08	UK GOV Stabilisation Unit	Implementing 'Helmand Road Map'	Tim Foy
17.05.08	UK PRT	DK PRT Representative	Kim Schultz
17.05.08	DABG	Deputy Commander	Peter Boysen
17.05.08	DABG	Chief CIMIC	
17.06.08	MFA	Head of Afghanistan Section	Pernille Dueholm
18.06.08	MFA	Kabul Embassy	Maria Tarp
27.08.08	PRT Helmand	Senior Danish Representative	Lars Jensen
28.08.08	PRT Helmand	PRT representative	

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