




International Operations



in
FOKUS

International Operations in FOKUS



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Foreword

As commander of the Danish International Brigade from 2003 to 2005, I was heavily involved in the mission-oriented training that we give our soldiers and units before their deployment in international missions.

It was – and is – a comprehensive and complex training program based on the concept of testing specific military skills in a range of challenging situations. Soldiers carry out assignments in a simulated operational environment created through extensive modeling and simulation and using instructors with mission-area experience. These methods are all intended to provide initial, introductory experience that soldiers can translate into appropriate actions during that first critical period in the mission area before they can rely on personal experience gained during practical assignments.

It struck me early on that although we were perfectly clear about the professional military skills soldiers and units were expected to master, we floundered when it came to defining “appropriate actions”. As we all know, this was because textbook solutions to every conceivable situation obviously do not exist. Another reason was the absence of a conceptual apparatus for the competencies we were striving to develop. Paradoxically,

although we clearly provided solid training, without fully understanding why it was good, we had no way of knowing how to improve it.

In 2003 I saw a presentation by Katrine Nørgaard from the Institute of Leadership and Organization at the Royal Danish Defence College. It addressed learning issues surrounding *combat skills* and *contact skills*. This seemed an appropriate and easily understandable way of systematically organizing the subject, which prompted an effort to *operationalize* contact skills and thus pave the way for a more targeted training program in the area.

Naturally, soldiers make use of all the “tools” available to them, and it is training instructors’ job to provide them with the broadest possible selection. Clearly, in addition to traditional military skills, we needed to teach skills that promote understanding, cooperation and dialogue, as well as negotiating and mediation skills, to name but a few.

As in the past, the first model was initially based on training methods using instructors with personal mission experience, but this time a new conceptual apparatus was defined, the aim being to provide a supplement that would sharpen focus on this as yet rather diffuse field of learning. To follow the level of contact skills and the individual unit’s attitude to the area, Katrine Nørgaard and others “supervised” the training program, thus reinforcing program instruction and feedback. A follow-up seminar on

leadership and management in peacekeeping operations was held in summer 2004, and subsequently a field trip was conducted during the Iraq mission in autumn 2004.

But this publication goes a step further. Its object is to point out the salient features of new security tasks and the leadership and management conditions under which they are to be performed, adeptly described by the authors, Katrine Nørgaard and Vilhelm S. Holsting. I believe, however, that this book delves considerably deeper. The authors formulate and define a series of specific competencies that soldiers need as a supplement to their professional military skills. Ms Nørgaard and Commander Holsting analyze a range of situations and concepts that have, in fact, been evolving and in use for some time, but which deserve separate attention as a basis for *taking a more targeted and systematic approach to the training program, an approach that is neither arbitrary nor left up to the individual*, as the authors themselves put it.



In this area, I sense that several distinct trends are gradually converging into a single, meaningful and interconnected line of development. The link between FOKUS, the future competency development and evaluation system of the Danish Armed Forces, and the operationalization of contact skills is but one example of this convergence. Doctrinal developments in NATO and Denmark show a similar tendency towards taking the

significance of *leadership and management reality* into account and therefore incorporating it to a greater extent into training programs.

During my service on the NATO mission in Baghdad in spring 2005, I discussed the importance of NATO and coalition force training initiatives with Lieutenant General Naiser Abadi, deputy chief of staff of the Iraqi Armed Forces. He illustrated their importance by recounting a slightly adapted version of the Chinese tale about the Emperor's heavenly mandate. As long as NATO and other organizations assist with the training of Iraqi security forces, these forces will become better at carrying out their tasks. If security force performance improves, the population will be more satisfied and support the government. And if the government has the people's support, the democratic process can take root and Iraq will start to enjoy peace and progress. He saw security force training as vital to the restructuring of Iraqi society after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime.

This outlook is in perfect keeping with the underlying idea of this publication. Security missions conducted by international forces are gradually assuming the guise of a *formative process*, with missions accomplishing their objectives by passing on globally acknowledged values and norms to the mission area. However, the process puts demands on the deployed forces because forces must be assumed to have internalized

these values and norms within the organization and its leadership processes. It is, after all, an accepted fact that “we are what we do”.

Leadership and management in the context of international operations – including the extended definition of leadership and management that transcends the traditional subordinate-superior relationship – thus subscribe to the key concepts of collective values and norms as well as “self-governance”. Value-based leadership and management – a model in which all community members act in the same spirit, guided by the same fundamental values and norms – require that the organization propagate a common set of values. At the same time, these values constitute the centralized element of leadership and management, there also being a need to decentralize decision-making competency extensively. Self-discipline thus becomes the best form of discipline.

In the experience of units in the mission area, combat skills generate credibility while contact skills are a prerequisite for supporting and developing the foundation of trust that credibility establishes. The two skills mutually reinforce each other, and neither of them can nor should stand alone.

November 2005

Brigadier General, Agner Rokos

Introduction

"War is a political instrument. It must necessarily bear the character of policy and measure by its standards. Conducting war is therefore in its main contours policy itself – a policy that has exchanged the pen for the sword, but has not therefore ceased thinking according to its own laws."

Carl von Clausewitz (1832)

We begin this publication with a quotation from Clausewitz' classic work *On War* because it alludes to a particular set of problems, specifically the leadership and management issues tied to the changing face of security policy practices and the growing number of military forces being deployed in international operations.

Since the Cold War ended, the role of the Danish Armed Forces has changed in important areas. The conventional military threat against Danish territories has been replaced with an array of new, asymmetric and transnational threats, primarily springing from international terrorism, extremist political and religious groups as well as regional conflicts, ethnic cleansing and massive assaults on civilian populations.

These newly emerging threats radically alter our traditional conception of security. The principles of sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of states are gradually giving way to a more value-oriented

conception of security, one no longer bound to defending nationally and territorially defined boundaries, but rather to defending a range of universal norms and principles set forth in international law (Nørgaard 2004:2). As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan put it when discussing the NATO intervention in Kosovo: “Emerging slowly, but I believe surely, is an international norm against the violent repression of minorities that will and must take precedence over concerns of State sovereignty.” (Excerpt from UN Secretary-General Kofi Anann’s address at the 1999 session of the Commission on Human Rights, Geneva)¹. From a general perspective, international security policy is taking a “humanitarian turn”, viewing a number of humanitarian values, such as freedom, democracy and human rights as a prerequisite for peace and stability.

The complex of problems we set out to address in this book concerns the effect of these security and political changes on the military organization and its leadership and management practices in international operations. How do we handle and legitimize the military exercise of power when it no longer represents a response to a distinct, localized threat but is aimed at defending a humanitarian ethic and establishing a global legal system? In other words: In what ways do the increasing politicization and globalization of military tasks impact the individual soldier and the organization as a whole?

1. Source: *UM tema*, no. 16, November 1999.

The goal of problematizing these issues is not to forge a new code of ethics for military leadership and cooperation in international missions, but rather to offer a trend analysis, an “organizational diagnosis” of sorts, identifying some salient features of the new security tasks and the various leadership and management issues arising in the mission area. In particular, we would like to focus on military personnel’s experience in their encounter with civilian actors², as well as on the total, complex political and cultural context within which personnel operate while deployed. This diagnosis is meant to provide some indicators that can point the way for future international activities, including the competencies that military units will need to develop in order to serve in international operations. The book thus addresses a broad target group of middle- and senior-level staff in the Danish Armed Forces engaged in the education, training and development of military personnel.

The diagnosis builds on a number of empirical studies and activities conducted by the Institute of Leadership and Organization, the Royal Danish Defence College, including the PhD thesis *“Technologies of trust”* (2004) by Dr. Katrine Nørgaard (KN), the research report *“Learning space – a study on the conditions for reflected learning in military units* (2004) by Commander Vilhelm S. Holsting (VH), a brief field study at the Danish

2. This book uses the concept of “civilian actors” as a broad term for the various non-military authorities, organizations, political and religious groups and individuals acting in the mission area.

mission in Iraq, Unit 4 (IRAQ 4), conducted by KN in November 2004, as well as a number of internal working papers and seminar reports. We have also included the theoretical foundation compiled as part of the Danish Armed Force's new competency development and evaluation system (FOKUS).

Thus, we have surveyed the available empirical data, which are based on both qualitative and quantitative studies. This offers the advantage of providing a far-reaching and in-depth body of data that creates the basis for a reliable trend analysis. Consequently, our study builds on an interdisciplinary analysis of the various statements, narratives and constructions of meaning formed and articulated by military personnel. These are not, however, to be construed as conclusive interpretations and definitive formations of experience but rather as a continuous negotiation and construction of meaning.

Thus, we rely on terms like survey, trend analysis and diagnosis as a means of indicating the indeterminate and temporary nature of the process the military is undergoing as it transforms from a traditional armed force engaged in territorial defense into an international task force. In other words, we want to pin down and conceptualize an experiential process as yet not fully developed but on the verge of *becoming* a new everyday military practice. In conceptualizing this everyday practice, we rely on the key concepts of "contact skills", "combat skills", "reflexivity" and "discipline", all of which we will amplify in the following chapters.

Finally, this conceptualization will allow us to discern the contours of a new military “competency profile” describing the special competencies that come into play in the encounter between civilian and military cultures in international operations.

In sum, we wish with this book to contribute to the ongoing construction of meaning in the Danish Armed Forces as well as to bolster unit training programs and operative efforts by providing some overall reflections on the subjects of leadership and management, learning and values in international operations.

Structure of the study

Chapter 1 traces a number of lines connecting the new security paradigm with a classic moral and political vision, namely the idea of Civil Society. As a number of examples make evident, it is in the encounter with the civilian population in the mission area that military formative ideals (i.e. the norms and values that form and regulate social relations) are reinterpreted and reconstructed, their becoming recontextualized and generalized into a set of universal *civilizational ideals*. Thus, in the handling of daily tasks and risks in the mission area, classic military virtues take on new and broader meaning: It is no longer solely the individual soldier but the whole of civil society that must be formed and develop! (Nørgaard 2004:12). Seen through this lens, security becomes global governance, i.e. an international

legal practice meant to regulate the relationship between individuals and states.

Chapter 2 explains how the military organization and its leadership and management practices are changing in the face of new and unpredictable threats. It is argued that the way the military achieves its objectives rests on how it tackles a dual concern: To create security for the population in the area and to support the civil and political reconstruction process. In international operations, the security, political and humanitarian tasks are therefore inextricably bound and must be managed *simultaneously* (Nørgaard 2004:2). This generates a need to differentiate and delegate decision-making processes to a greater extent, a need that thus displaces the traditional hierarchal principles of management and control, shifting them towards a more trust-oriented and decentralized form of leadership and management. Consequently, it can be said that a trend is emerging whereby formal command structures are opening up and thus allowing for a more fluid and flexible form of organization focused on common values and cultural identity.

Chapter 3 examines the soldier as professional decision-maker. The concept "risk management" designates a new military management practice replacing (slow) external bureaucratic control with (fast) internal self-governance. This allows the individual soldier to build and maintain a more complex relationship to the broader community while also generally

accelerating the organization's readiness to make and act on decisions (Nørgaard 2004:3).

Chapter 4 introduces the concept of competence and learning in a military perspective, with a view to establishing the theoretical basis for a new competency profile for soldiers serving in international operations. In this connection, we make a crucial distinction between the generalized, abstract kind of learning that occurs during a soldier's education and training and the concrete, work-related learning that takes place in the mission area. The key point is that the way in which a soldier manages risk builds on both types of learning, indeed on the totality of his or her personal *formative history*.

As a result, the crux of competency development lies not only in the professional skills acquired, but also in the way personal experience is brought into play and made *meaningful* in a specific context. Thus, the question is how to promote the construction of meaning, learning and competency development in international missions? Every mission presents its own possibilities and limitations, thereby establishing its own specific *learning environment*. This learning environment is where competency development takes place – the object is to take a more targeted and systematic approach to developing competencies, one that is neither arbitrary nor left up to the individual.

To this end, Chapter 5 presents a competency model that is capable of uncovering the organization's intrinsic contradictions between internal and external competency perspectives and between competency perspectives aimed at operations and development. Hence, the organization can be said to span four functional dimensions, each of which must make allowance for and counterbalance the others in order for the organization to survive. The four competency perspectives tied to these organizational functions are: an orientation towards *results*, towards *quality/stability*, towards *renewal* and towards *people*. These four perspectives exist in a state of mutual tension, each continually having to adjust to the others, since changes in one perspective affect how the others operate. This competency model offers the advantage that it does not depend on harmonious balance within an organization, but rather unmask a wide range of interests, requirements and expectations in the organization and its relationship to the broader community.

Finally, Chapter 6 provides recommendations for the specific competencies that collectively form the military *competency profile* in international operations. In keeping with the competency model's opposing perspectives, it is argued that achieving objectives in the mission area calls for two simultaneous but diametrical competencies, i.e. combat skills and contact skills, and that both are necessary in building up civil-military *trust capital*.

By the same measure, we argue that exercising these competencies presupposes certain kinds of learning, specifically *discipline* and *reflexivity*. Using a number of examples, we thus sketch an overall profile that focuses on the ability to adjust and regulate the balance between combat skills and contact skills, security and development, trust and power. It is in managing these paradoxes and dilemmas that the individual soldier forms and presents him- or herself as a professional decision- and meaning-maker³.

The concluding organizational diagnosis reveals not only a new and more unpredictable range of threats, but also a new military *disciplinary regime*, i.e. a new set of military management techniques and practices capable of handling new kinds of risks and of creating new and more complex cooperational relations with civilian actors in the civil-military cultural encounter. In terms of international operations, a new military self-understanding is taking shape, becoming more reflexive and more value-oriented than before. As a trend analysis, this book does not offer definitive solutions about the possibilities and limitations of this trend. More modestly, the intention is to provide a conceptualization and a perspective for observation that paves the way for discussing the issues of military leadership, management and organization in an international security environment.

3. In this connection, “reflexive” refers to awareness of one’s own culture and identity.

Chapter 1

The new security paradigm: From territorial defense to global governance

"[T]he traditional conventional threat against Denmark in the globalized world has been replaced by a more complex set of threats embracing not only new indirect threats but also direct transnational and unpredictable ones."

(The Bruun report 2003)

The Danish government's white paper on *Security policy conditions for Danish defense policy* (2003)⁴ shows that globalization and the steadily rising stream of capital, goods, people, and knowledge across national borders confront us with a new set of security policy challenges.

According to the paper, globalization primarily entails the "increasing strategic impact of non-geographical factors on the threat picture" (ibid.:5). Our growing interdependence means that "no state or region can afford to ignore fundamental problems and conflicts even in remote parts

4. Also known as the Bruun report.

New threats call for new, cross-territorial initiatives

of the world” (ibid.:6). What is more, the immediate threats predominantly come from non-state actors, chiefly radicalized groups and terrorist networks. These types of threats are characteristically “less tied to geography as well as being asymmetric, dynamic and unpredictable” (ibid.:21). Countering the terrorist threat therefore requires a broad spectrum of politically based security measures that transcend geographic boundaries and the established administrative borders between national and international authorities and organizations.



Source: Colonel Niels Bumsdgaard

IRAQ 1, 2003

Focus on
humanitarian
rights

As new and more complex threats emerge, the traditional concept of security becomes increasingly dissociated from the national state, tied instead to more abstract, universal humanitarian principles. A report by the Danish Institute of International Affairs indicates that the trend in international legal practice is shifting towards viewing humanitarian values like *freedom and inviolability of the individual* (and not just of the state) as prerequisites for peace and stability (Danish Institute of International Affairs 1999:7). The Institute's report goes on to say that the classic conception of sovereignty is increasingly being challenged by "the norm asserting that the legitimate exercise of sovereignty rights depends on respect for *human rights* and for *the principles of representation*" (ibid:17, our italics). In other words, the legitimate enforcement of sovereignty is contingent on respect for a set of fundamental ethical and political principles intended to ensure the individual's freedom and participation as an actor in the public sphere.

Consequently, a security policy is evolving that prioritizes a range of humanitarian and political values above considerations concerning principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. Hence, the government's report states that the new security conditions call for the reinforcement of international cooperation and the further development of the international legal system based on the UN system, which binds states together in a network of obligations and control measures. "The UN system will remain a cornerstone of the international system, the source of global legitimacy and establishment of norms. The UN Charter is the

The UN as a
source of
legitimacy

international community's fundamental rule of law, and the UN provides the central framework for developing a worldwide body of law encompassing rules on disarmament, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the environment, human rights, humanitarian international law and counter-terrorism. Many global challenges require global solutions that can only be found through the joint efforts of the global community" (Bruun, et al. 2003:13).

Politicization of military tasks

The new security paradigm articulates not only a new set of threats but also a new rationality and morality for global governance, i.e. an ethical and political *security program* that is made operational and institutionalized through a growing number of international operations and humanitarian interventions.

UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), which authorized the NATO intervention in Kosovo, established that the purpose of the military and civilian presence in Kosovo was to ensure "the development of democratic institutions", "facilitate the political process", "support the humanitarian organizations" and "protect human rights", all with a view to promoting "financial welfare, stability and regional cooperation". Thus, the resolution directly links the military security objective to the political reform process and to the development and institutionalization of democratic values and rights.



Source: Major A.B. Olesen

Local election, IRAQ 4, 2004

Overall, we could say that military tasks are becoming increasingly politicized, which presents the organization and the individual soldier with a whole new set of leadership and management challenges. Referring to these challenges, former commander of the Danish International Brigade, Brigadier General Agner Rokos, said: "To some degree peacekeeping operations are by nature leadership: i.e., the peacekeeping force endeavors to 'lead' the development of an area towards enduring peace. Seen from this perspective, all the soldiers deployed can be viewed as

“All the soldiers deployed can be viewed as ‘leaders’ ...”

Governing the political formative process

Power and values in the civil-military encounter

‘leaders’. Through their contact with the community, they each represent the unit and its actions. Everyone is involved in leading the operation – and to varying degrees (depending on function) in leading the peacekeeping force.”⁵

The leadership and management perspective presented in that quotation departs from the narrow definition of military leadership and management. Leadership and management in this context pertain not only to the ability to lead one’s own military units, but also to governing a socio-political *formative process*. Accordingly, an officer from KFOR 3 said: “After all, we are not here simply as soldiers. We are also here as representatives of Denmark... And what we do down here has little to do with actual soldiering, but rather entails going out and representing a form of society that we believe in... So what do we do is: well, we tell them how we believe a society should work in practice.”⁶

Consequently, in terms of interacting with civilian actors in the mission area, the primary battle is about the power to establish certain values rather than about the power to control geographically defined territories. In light of this trend analysis, the question becomes what precisely are the values and formative ideals articulated and operationalized in the civil-

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5. Quotation from seminar held at the Centre for Administrative Training, Høveltegaard, June 2004.
 6. See Nørgaard, 2004 p. 183.

military encounter? Or put another way: What is the ethical and political vision of society that emerges as a security concern in “the new wars”?

Security and development

Apart from the heightened focus on human rights, another characteristic of the new security paradigm centers on the increasing interconnection between the concepts of security and development. In *Global governance and the new wars* (2001) political scientist Mark Duffield thus explains: “[T]here is a noticeable convergence between the notions of development and security. Through a circular form of reinforcement and mutuality, achieving one is now regarded as essential for securing the other. Development is ultimately impossible without stability and, at the same time, security is not sustainable without development” (Duffield 2001:16).

One consequence of linking security and development is that the line between humanitarian and military activities blurs in so far as humanitarian and security-related aspects are increasingly construed as interlocking: Creating peace and security requires political reforms that can stabilize humanitarian conditions. A sustainable political reform process cannot, however, be implemented before the necessary security is established in the area concerned. For this reason, security and development appear with increasing frequency as synonymous concepts in international security policy (Duffield 2001). This trend has left its mark on

Blurring of the
distinction
between military
and humanitarian
tasks

the Danish security policy agenda for the Iraq war, generally under the heading “the civil-military cooperation initiative”. On the subject of coordinating civil and military efforts, Minister for Foreign Affairs Per Stig Møller and former Minister for Defence Svend Aage Jensby write: “For the civilian population in a conflict zone, improvements in the social and the economic situation are inseparable. International crisis management is therefore not a task for the military alone ...This is why we need to reinforce the interaction between Danish civilian and military activities in the trouble spots of the world” (Berlingske, Kronikken, March 10, 2004).



Source: Colonel Niels Bundsgaard

Distributing drinking water, IRAQ 1, 2003

Thus, in the new security paradigm humanitarian tasks are no longer confined to the civil system, but have become a routine aspect of military security tasks. As the commander of the Danish CIMIC unit says in IRAQ 1: “We are not a relief agency, for we lack the necessary competencies. But that’s the work we’re doing” (Urban 26/9 2003). When it comes to performing daily tasks and reconstructing civil infrastructure in the mission area, a tightly knit interaction emerges between the military forces, the civilian population, the political representatives and the humanitarian organizations, each of which, however, attempts to apply its own agenda and perception of security. The military security task is thus neither pre-defined nor pre-determined, but is rather a state of affairs that is constantly challenged and redefined in relation to the civilian, religious and political actors in the mission area. Security refers in this sense not to an objective reality but should rather be seen as a *social construction* that selects something and securitizes it⁷.

As a result, civil-military interaction cannot be divorced from the various cultural and political agendas prevailing in the mission area, but must be seen as part of a complex field of *power relations*, i.e. an all-encompassing network of differing interests and positions over which everyone is fighting to gain power and legitimacy.

7. · “Securitizing” something should, according to Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde (1998), be seen as a discursive strategy for legitimizing the use of political and military force and making it easier to obtain political backing.

Interplay between
military, political
and cultural
agendas



Source: Colonel Niels Bundsgaard

Dinner at the sheik's residence, IRAQ 1, 2003

As an intelligence officer in the Danish battalion in Kosovo, KFOR Unit 3, put it: "[T]he vast majority of people who meet with us do so because they stand to gain something, since, of course, we support the people in power down here, but we also create them... the fact being that the people who cooperate with KFOR [Kosovo Force, ed.] at the political level – and with UNMIK [United Nations Mission in Kosovo, ed.] for that matter

- can achieve things politically that reinforce their own position of power...."⁸

In this respect, the civil-military encounter in international operations has the character of a formative process, in which the social order itself becomes an object of continued negotiation and the processing of meaning. As a liaison officer said: "This is how we try to influence the process, and this is, after all, a politically supported maneuver that we realize has great importance down here [in Kosovo, ed.]. Also because if the parties don't fight - if we can get them to deal with their problems at the negotiating table, then we don't have to go out there with our shields raised"⁹.

Similarly, the chief of planning at IRAQ 4 explained that "the system is Hobbesian" or, in simple terms, a power structure, and that the "task is to make the local population understand that democratization is an advantage for them."¹⁰

In an attempt to "govern" the formative process, for example, by providing support to reconstruct the civil society and by "getting them [the political actors, ed.] to deal with their problems at the negotiating table", security becomes associated with establishing a specific ethical and political order,

8. See Nørgaard, 2004 p. 41.

9. See Nørgaard, 2004 p. 182.

10. K. Nørgaard, interview from Iraq, Unit 4.

in other words: a specific *social order* that regulates the exercise of power and supports the relation between the private and public spheres, between individual and state. This connection serves to reactualize and operationalize the classic notion of *Civil Society*, an idea rooted in the tradition of Western political philosophy and a concept that, having been rendered and securitized as part of the new security paradigm, has passed into “neo-modern myth” (Comaroff & Comaroff 1999:4). To show how the new wars turn Civil Society into a current, general security concern, it would, however, be useful first to give a brief explanation of the concept.

The idea of Civil Society

Originally, the concept of Civil Society was defined in contrast to the state of nature. In 18th- and 19th-century political thinking it therefore referred to a social order founded in law and enforced by a central political authority whose powers were subject to and limited by the prevailing laws and rules. This original idea of a *societas civilis* did not oppose but presuppose the existence of a state that monopolized the legitimate use of power and could protect the individual citizen against lawlessness and anarchy.

According to this definition, Civil Society is closely tied to what sociologist Norbert Elias (1897-1990) refers to as “the civilizing process” – a historical process in which the power of the state and the formation of individuality are seen as simultaneous, interconnected processes (Olofsson 2000:402).

Civil Society provides a basis for rational debate as an alternative to conflict

Similarly, political scientist Mary Kaldor points out that the notion of Civil Society was originally linked to the concept of *civility*. It meant respect for individual autonomy, based on security and trust among people. This required regularity of behavior, rules of conduct, respect for law and control of violence. Hence, a civil society was synonymous with polite, well-ordered society, in short: civilized society, a society in which strangers act in a civilized manner towards each other, treating each other with mutual respect, tolerance and confidence, a society in which rational debate and discussion becomes possible (Kaldor 2003:17).



Source: Colonel Niels Bundsgaard

Northern Basra Regional Council, IRAQ 1, 2003

Thus, the notion of public morality based on individual responsibility and self-control and the idea of Civil Society are intertwined. According to

Immanuel Kant, Civil Society was the ideal and ultimate goal of human society, a society capable of reconciling the conflict between individual interests on the one hand with the need for social association on the other. He writes: "Man has an inclination to *socialize* himself by associating with others, because in such a state he feels himself more than a natural man, in the development of his natural capacities. He has, moreover, a great tendency to *individualize* himself by isolation from others, because he likewise finds in himself the unsocial disposition of wishing to direct everything merely according to his own mind..." (Kant [1787] 1991:102). For Kant, therefore, only the public use of *reason*, and not the development of an innate instinct or need, could transform "the pathologically enforced agreement into a society and, finally, into a moral whole" (ibid.). The development of a civil society was thus, according to Kant, the only principle that could guarantee compatibility between politics and morality (Habermas [1962] 1997:98).

More recently, however, Civil Society and its moral implications have come to denote a broader, modern project of emancipation, one covering a full spectrum of social movements and public debate forums. Anthropologist Ernest Gellner thus defines Civil Society as "that set of diverse non-governmental institutions which is strong enough to counterbalance the state and, while not preventing the state from fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace and arbitrator between major interests, can nevertheless

prevent it from dominating and atomizing the rest of society" (Gellner 1994:5).

The conceptual history of Civil Society represents an attempt to present tenable visions elucidating how morally and politically to organize the relationship between individual and community in an increasingly differentiated and complex society. According to Mary Kaldor, the idea of Civil Society has always tied in with man's endeavor to establish a political alternative to violent conflicts (Kaldor 2003:3).

The new security paradigm, however, no longer represents the idea of Civil Society as a counterbalance to modern society's increasing differentiation, but rather as an explicit security strategy concept aimed at transforming the *whole* of society and its moral foundation. This conceptual understanding makes it possible to trace the tradition linking the idea of Civil Society with the emergence of a new military security strategy based not on defending national territory but on forming a pluralistic social order and a genuine political sphere. This new social and political order does not rest on biological origin and clan structures, but rather on *democratic* values and legal principles (Nørgaard 2004:188).

From occupying power to formative power

A closer look at this general trend analysis raises the question, however, of how military personnel in the mission area experience and handle this

increasing politicization and value orientation. The answer is, of course, multifaceted, since experience among personnel varies considerably depending on rank and function. Despite these apparent differences, a number of qualitative studies and interviews conducted among deployed units reveal that military personnel construct a common narrative explaining the purpose of their presence and their daily tasks. A statement from an interview with a private in IRAQ 3 provides an example of one such narrative: "The goal is to rebuild the country, get the democratic processes going. They [the Iraqis, ed.] need some personal freedom to develop and find their place in our great global arena. That's how I feel we're helping them."¹¹

The above passage is interesting not just because it contains the key concepts of democracy, freedom and development that signal the new security paradigm shift toward values. It also conceptualizes a new identity and leadership rationality in the military itself, a new *mode of governance* whereby one governs others as "one governs oneself" (Nørgaard 2004:196). This is bolstered by the experience drawn from a management seminar for personnel serving with IRAQ 1, IRAQ 2 and KFOR 7, during which it became evident that "the individual soldier must in a sense be able to play the role of teacher/instructor, advisor and/or supervisor in relation to the local population in the mission area."¹²

11. See Holsting, 2005 p. 13.

12. Excerpt from report on seminar held at Høveltegaard, June 2004.

Accordingly, each soldier represents not only a military occupying power but also a formative power that educates and molds the local community, thus attempting to shape it according to a set of global norms and values that will allow it to “find its place in the great global arena”.



Source: HOK Foto

Cooperation with the local authorities, ISAF 7, 2005
As former commander of IRAQ 1, Colonel Niels Bundsgaard says, the new soldier is not just a warrior but a “governor of international society”. He practices, in other words, a new form of global value management, a global governance aimed at developing and stabilizing not just local national security structures but also the very *social contract* that mutually binds individual and state.

The soldier as
“governor of
international
society ”

An officer from IRAQ 4 confirmed this point when he stated that the task was to “design a *nation*, not simply a state”, emphasizing that merely establishing formal power structures was insufficient, their *legitimacy* also had to be secured by obtaining the civilian population’s consent to and co-responsibility for the reform process. This officer felt that only by embedding legitimacy in the Iraqi people and in their desire to shape themselves as a nation could extremists ultimately be marginalized and prevented from gaining footholds in the local communities.

Hence, the new security paradigm creates not only a new operative context in international missions, but also a new military *disciplinary regime* capable of both handling new kinds of risk and forming more complex relations in its cooperation with the civilian population and political actors.

Now that we have outlined these general trends in the security policy environment, we will use the following chapter to take a closer look at how this disciplinary regime impacts the organization of the military and the way it handles its tasks in the mission area.

Chapter 2

Reconstructing the military organization: From bureaucracy to risk community:

“The armed forces are to be reorganized and developed. Together with Denmark’s allies, Danish Defence must be able to participate effectively in high intensity operations under conditions that are often difficult and unstable in order to provide the prerequisites for stabilizing of areas of conflict and to rapidly deploy forces in such areas. By so doing Danish Defence can and must have a much greater ability than before to participate in peace support operations, including conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peacemaking, humanitarian and other similar missions.”

(Danish Defence Agreement
2005-2009)

In the previous chapter we outlined the emergence of the new security paradigm, tracing the lines of two general trends:

- 1) the transition from a conventional, static set of threats to new, dynamic, asymmetric and unpredictable threats
- 2) the transition from a national and territorially defined concept of security to a transnational and value-oriented one.

This shifting international security environment thus produces new types of risks – contingencies that are forcing the military to make changes not only in its specific daily tasks, but also in its leadership and organizational structure.

These changes are evinced in the new Danish defense agreement, called the “largest reorganization of the Danish armed forces in recent times”¹³. Both internally and externally the military organization is in a transitional phase, its traditional structures and control principles being broken down and reconstructed.

Culture, rationality and power

This reconstruction of the military, its structure and its self-identity, is most apparent in international missions, chiefly because the civil-military encounter is the interface at which the military self-identity is challenged and reflected. On this subject, Brigadier General Agner Rokos comments:

“Peace support missions are most often conducted in cultures with traditions and values that deviate from our own, and in cooperation with nationalities and organizations whose national culture and work ethos may be strikingly different. We like to depict ourselves as rational, the

13. See press release issued by the Danish Ministry of Defence June 10, 2004; *Danish Defence Agreement 2005-2009*.

benchmark, interestingly, being our own rationality. The opposite might be an 'emotion-based' culture, which is, of course, equally rational but founded on another form of rationality. 'Our' rationality tends to be based on goals, on the tasks we undertake, but other bases for rationality could include values, feelings or the like. The problem is that it is incredibly difficult to acquire the rationality of other cultures while also maintaining our own."¹⁴

In international peace support missions, the military identity and rationality becomes manifest in contrast to the foreign culture and its traditions. This demands greater awareness, both of one's own cultural values and of those prevailing in the local community. What is more, tasks in the mission area are often accomplished jointly with other nations' military units, all operating with their own specific "corporate cultures", which may radically depart from our own but nonetheless appear "natural" and "rational" in their individual cultural contexts.

Insight into and an understanding of cultural differences are therefore the crux of rebuilding efforts and cooperation with civilian actors as well as the other coalition forces in the mission area. Without this insight, the motives behind and meaning of the parties' actions are extremely hard to

14. ^{*} Quoted from a management seminar held at the Centre for administrative Training, Høveltegaard, June 2004.

comprehend, as are the daily incidents and conflicts that result from them. Consequently, cultural understanding is a prerequisite for assessing the current threat and, ultimately, for supporting the political formative process.



Source: Major A. B. Olesen

Market in Al Medinah, Iraq, 2004

As former commander of KFOR 7, Colonel Peter Bartram says: "In the civil-military encounter, mutual respect plus the recognition that it takes time

to rebuild a society form the basis for fulfilling the objective. Honesty and transparency foster understanding of each other's interests and motives. Finally, you have to be able to negotiate with both sides simultaneously, while coordinating all the various political and humanitarian initiatives. The civilian actors have careers as well, and you can exploit that in the civil-military power game – through military strength and authority and by creating a network of relations to the various NGOs and DANIDA.”¹⁵

Cultural understanding is thus what makes it possible to maneuver and negotiate in the maze of power positions in which a military force in the mission area finds itself. The military exercise of power assumes new significance in this context – or as Clausewitz might have put it: it reveals its inner nature, that is as an instrument of *character building* and for disciplining the *forces of the soul* (Clausewitz, [1832] 1986:73).

The aim is not to eliminate an opponent or deprive him of his freedom, but rather to *form* him by involving him and giving him co-responsibility in a network of mutual obligations and trust relationships. In this capacity, the exercise of power becomes more “instructive” than suppressive, relying as it does on rebuilding and maintaining a number of trust strategies aimed at aiding the process of democratizing and reconstructing a functioning civil administration. The importance of this formative role can hardly be

15. See management seminar held at the Centre for Administrative Training, Høveltegaard, June 2004.

overestimated. Failure to acknowledge this normative turn in the military exercise of power can, in a worst case scenario, shatter the military's hard-won trust relationship with the civilian population and ultimately compromise the forces' own security.

This became apparent in the so-called "torture case" in the Danish camp in Iraq, an episode occurring shortly after the news about American soldiers' assaults on Iraqi prisoners broke. These incidents primarily stoked debate about the boundary between use of military force and regard for fundamental human rights. An age-old discussion in itself. The new dimension was, however, the speed and intensity with which an apparently isolated and local event in the Danish camp attained global influence and attention. Within the space of a few days an internal charge against an intelligence officer developed into a foreign policy concern:

- Monday, August 2, 2004: The Danish daily paper *Ekstra Bladet* reports that an intelligence officer is suspected of torture and has been ordered to return to Denmark from the Danish camp, Camp Eden. An interpreter accused the officer of refusing water to Iraqi prisoners during interrogation and forcing them to sit in painful positions. The charges make headline news in the wake of the gruesome images from Abu Ghraib prison.
- Tuesday, August 3: The Danish minister for defense announces that he has decided to recall Danish battalion commanders in Iraq. His

grounds for the decision include a loss of confidence in the leadership's power of judgment. In a press release the Danish Armed Forces chief of defense states that he is "shaken and sincerely distressed about the matter" but agrees with the minister's decision to recall them: "The information presented to us has led us to recall the leadership in Iraq. I regret that we must take so drastic a step, but we have no other recourse if we are to preserve respect for the Danish battalion's efforts. We will do our utmost to maintain the respect that Danish soldiers deserve for the tremendous work they are doing in many areas in Iraq and other sites."¹⁶

- Wednesday, August 4: The woman under suspicion, Captain Annemette Hommel, appears for the first time on TV, where she denies the charges.
- Thursday, August 5: Political attention focused on the case is so great that the defense minister is summoned to a meeting with the Danish parliament's Foreign Policy Committee.

This episode leading to torture charges against the Danish intelligence officer illustrates how individual soldiers are assuming increasing strategic significance in international operations. A single statement by an interpreter, a private or non-commissioned officer in the public media can

16. Source: DR Nyheder Online – articles.

attract political interest and gain international attention. The local and global spheres are compressed and condensed in isolated incidents whose effects can have incalculable consequences. Similarly, Brigadier General Rokos comments: "It is often said that what we normally call the levels of warfare are compressed in peace support missions. This causes an immediate spillover between the strategic, operative and tactical levels, with each independent unit being in touch with all three levels simultaneously. Purely tactical events can have immediate strategic repercussions and vice versa. This means that subordinates can probably rely on fixed (formally learned) tactics, techniques and procedures, but must employ them in a situation-specific manner that harmonizes with the overall intention and objective of the deployment. Holistic understanding becomes paramount."¹⁷

The flexible organization

When the strategic, operative and tactical levels are compressed and realized *simultaneously* in the civil-military encounter, leadership ceases to be the sole domain of officers and NCOs; each individual also becomes responsible for governing himself "in accordance with the overall intention", i.e. in keeping with an understanding of the security-based, cultural and organizational whole within which he operates.

17. See seminar at the Centre for Administrative Training, Høveltegaard, June 2004.

Holistic understanding as a tool for handling complexity

Regardless of which level and function a soldier is placed in, he must have a holistic understanding to be capable of acting in a situation-specific manner also in keeping with the fundamental values the organization represents. In other words, it is not enough to apply purely instrumental considerations of what, seen in isolation, is most rapid and effective. The complexity of daily tasks generally demands an ability to weigh a range of considerations and deal with them one at a time. Take, for example, a situation where impatient Iraqi women are creating a disturbance in their struggle to head up the line for gasoline. Which is more important: security considerations or regard for the local culture and the rule that men (read: soldiers) must not touch any women to whom they are not related? As many might know, soldiers resolve this particular dilemma by administering “controlled kicks to the shins” – a solution suggested by the Iraqis themselves – because, as they say: that’s what they usually do!

Negotiation and value exchange stimulate reflection about one’s own identity

In this and many similar situations the individual soldier is challenged therefore to reflect on his own cultural identity and to weigh the question of how to maintain his own attitudes and rationality while also adapting to and showing respect for the local culture. In reality, however, the solution is always a matter of a mutual negotiation between the military and the civilian parties involved. One could say that a value exchange takes place – a “spillover” that both signals and eliminates cultural differences.



Source: HOK Foto

Negotiating a water project, Afghanistan 2005

This spillover also occurs internally between the various levels of command. As a result, deployed personnel generally experience a gradual “softening” of the formal hierarchic structure during the course of their deployment. A private from KFOR 3 described the relationship between officers and enlisted men in this way: “They [officers, ed.] were quite strict down here the first month and a half, and everything was still strictly by the book after our military service. But then gradually we all relaxed, got all mixed together, and that’s how it went from that point on.”¹⁸

18. See Nørgaard, 2004 p. 55.

“...Control is good,
but trust is
better...”

This account highlights the transition from a formal, control-oriented organization and leadership style to a more trust-oriented and flexible leadership practice. This does not, however, forestall control, but rather changes its character from an outer bureaucratic control to an inner self-control. A platoon commander from KFOR 3 confirms: “I am still the one in command, but the notion of leadership has shifted from that of being a commander issuing a range of orders to being the salesman of an idea... Down here [in Kosovo, ed.] where things are far more liberal, they [the enlisted men, ed.] are actually personally responsible for properly maintaining things, and for being in the right place at the right time. And the more they take care of themselves, the less we need to command and control... And so we have to ensure that we sell the ideas in a way that makes them do things themselves so we don't have to control them. You have to sell things to them, make things interesting.”¹⁹

Many have experienced that trust and control are not mutually exclusive but rather mutually reinforcing leadership principles. Squad leader T. Stenz from IRAQ 4 says: “In general there's a lot of 'freedom with responsibility'. The soldiers are good at taking initiative and at making quick decisions. On the other hand, giving freedom with responsibility is useless unless it is controlled.”²⁰

19. See Nørgaard, 2004 p. 56.

20. Quotation from seminar at Centre for Administrative Training, Høveltegaard, June 2005.



Source: Major A. B. Olesen

Hanging out at the barracks, IRAQ 4, 2004

Peter Bartram, battalion commander of KFOR 7, backs up this viewpoint, saying: "In the unit's internal relationships, the leader's role is of commander, colleague and friend. It's the same people you work with all day, eat with in the mess hall in the evening and brush your teeth with in the bathroom in the morning. That's why you also have to maintain military discipline (e.g. morning roll-call), to signal that the military hierarchy is still in effect. At the same time, as a leader, you must show respect for competencies at lower levels. We can't escape from each other

Values must be communicated for daily tasks to be considered meaningful

and have to resolve conflicts that arise as we go. Similarly, a private from IRAQ 3 comments: "I think we're incredibly good at distinguishing between when we can talk and when action is required. There's room for everything."²¹

When the organizational order no longer relies on control but on self-control, one task of leadership becomes to "sell ideas", to identify and communicate the overall values that encompass the ever-changing array of activities that constitute daily life in the mission area. General Jesper Helsø, chief of defense, describes this swing towards values in military leadership practice in this way: "If you don't discuss values, the organization becomes a workplace without meaning. It is important to discuss and articulate the impetus of the mission, otherwise your actions are meaningless."²² The overall values must be communicated concretely for the individual soldier to experience the tasks he executes as meaningful and coherent.

In international operations, where many feel that the orders issued for tasks are prone to sudden changes, ensuring that this communication reaches all the way to the operative end of the organization becomes vital²³. The more complex and changeable the daily life of personnel

21. See Holsting, 2005 p. 12.

22. Source: Forsvaret no. 3, June/July 2004, p. 24.

23. See report on *Leadership and cooperation in international operations* (in Danish, Holsting 2004:14), which shows that the more sudden changes in orders, the more the situation is perceived as meaningless.

becomes, the more important it is to create a meaningful narrative and a common framework that does not leave it to the individual to construct his own reality and understanding of the world around him. This requires, however, that each leader realize the actual set of military values he uses in his personal form of leadership and make them visible by his own example. As General Helsø says: "Personally, I strive to live by these values in practice. They have to be an inbuilt part of what I say and do."²⁴

In the kind of close, daily social interaction that takes place with colleagues and friends in the camp, military rank and the right to give orders do not carry and communicate values in themselves, but merely constitute a formal structure, an "empty shell" that one fills through personal authority and trustworthiness. As a squad leader from KFOR 3 explained: "A good squad leader is someone who does not pull rank to gain respect. It has to be implicit that when we're together [in the camp, ed.] we have the leisure to talk to together, but, hey, when we hit the road, I'm the one in command. No question about it. And you don't get this respect by pointing at your shoulder and saying 'I've got three chevrons, so I'm the one who decides.' You get respect by being well prepared and having a grip on everything, by leading the way and striking the appropriate tone. At least that's what I've learned."²⁵ This articulates

24. Source: *Forsvaret* no. 3, June/July 2004, p. 24.

25. See Nørgaard, 2004 p. 115.

It is up to the individual soldier to handle formal and informal authority and imbue it with meaning

the difference between a formal, bureaucratically founded authority and an informal personal authority. Formal authority is vested and contained in the command structure. Personal authority, on the other hand, builds on commitment, communication of values and a willingness to go first, to take risks.

The transition from a centralized to a decentralized organization requires individuals to reflect more seriously on and have an ability to *administer* two different but interlinked power structures, namely formal and informal power. A current trend analysis does not pivot on examining *either one or* the other side of the relationship between trust and control, person and rank, formal and informal, but on observing how the *relationship* itself between trust-based and control-based, formal and informal leadership strategies is handled and imbued with meaning.

The military risk community

In international operations soldiers live nonstop with their colleagues for six months under tough conditions. They therefore collectively consider themselves to be in service not as single individuals but more as a family that has to compensate for sacrifices on the homefront... (Holsting 2005:13). The traditional description of the military organization as a formal, bureaucratic and hierarchic structure thus no longer provides a sufficient framework for the experiences Danish soldiers have internally in

the organization or externally in their interaction with the civilian population.

In international missions, where operative tasks are primarily taken care of by small mobile units spread out over a large area, and where threats change from day to day, hour to hour, the traditional hierarchic command structure is put under greater pressure, and the need to delegate and decentralize decision-making becomes more urgent. Colonel Niels Bundsgaard describes his leadership experience in IRAQ 1: "I have had to delegate some of the decision-making competency to the leader on site, so that he can adapt his decisions to the conditions the soldiers are under. Some things had to be decentralized. It's hard for me to issue decisions for the entire battalion because people work under extremely different conditions."²⁶

26. Source: *Hærenyt* no. 3, 2003, p. 10.



Source: HOK Foto

Unpredictable terrain, Afghanistan 2005

The growing complexity and unpredictability of international missions thus creates the need for a new and more decentralized organization that is less controlled by rules, more flexible and more open to the surrounding world than before. In short: New types of risks engender new types of organization. These observations thus make it possible to advance an organizational diagnosis describing the organization of the military community in international operations as a specific *risk community*, i.e. a community of practice that exerts a certain form of *risk management*.

The military risk community is based on *esprit de corps*

The concept of risk management relates to a risky and temporary community of practice where the distinction between structure and process, person and authority, trust and control is both suspended and practiced *simultaneously*. In international operations the military community is thus (re)shaped into what Ole Fogh Kirkeby calls a *communitas* (Kirkeby 2001:12-13)²⁷, a community that does not rely on rigid routines and procedures but on a particular *ethos* – or what the military colloquially calls “esprit de corps”.

A platoon commander from KFOR 3 named esprit de corps and the intensity of the military risk community when asked to describe what was most important to him in his daily work: “I love what I do. I’m totally committed, and I feel that same sense of commitment to the people I love. And it’s daily routine for me that if someone I am truly close to and must, for some reason, work closely with, I want them to know that there is a certain – if not mutual affection – then at least mutual respect, to know that we take what we do seriously. And we’re doing it not just for our own sakes but for each other and because it’s a serious job we’re doing.”²⁸

This does not, of course, mean that all soldiers in international operations love their work and their colleagues. A risk community embodies – like all other human communities – both inclusion and exclusion mechanisms,

27. According to Kirkeby, *communitas* denotes an intense, norm-based community that builds up trust and breaks down barriers.

28. See Nørgaard, 2004 p. 62.

A risk community includes and excludes members according to certain rules of acceptance

It is acceptable to talk about emotions – “you need to be able to unload”

social rules determining when a person is deemed to be inside or outside the community²⁹. Whether inside or outside, a person in the military risk community experiences, however, inclusion or exclusion more radically and intensely than in other types of communities of practice, because no sphere lies beyond the community's influence. Consequently, the *whole* person and not just certain sides of him is included or excluded. Thus, internally as well as externally, the organization becomes a *disciplinary regime* positioning and regimenting its members according to certain rules of acceptance.

The transition from a formal bureaucratic and centralized organization to a more informal and decentralized risk community also alters the rules of acceptance. Traditional organizational culture tends to exclude personal feelings and make them taboo. In the risk community talking about, but also showing, feelings is acceptable. A private from IRAQ 3 explains: “Not only is it meaningful but also necessary [to talk to each other, ed.]. If you don't, you won't last long. You pick things up, things you need to be able to unload. The pressure in the last few months has been so heavy, and you get overwhelmed even though you can talk... The community is alpha and omega. If you don't function in the community, you won't last long...”

29. An analysis of questionnaire surveys conducted among 9,560 soldiers deployed in the period 1998-2003 shows that a group of employees falls outside the social security net (see Holting, 2004 p. 15).

There are, however, always some outsiders... we sent people home who didn't fit in."³⁰

This statement underlines the intensity of the risk community, showing how the line between formal and informal dissolves: "The community is alpha and omega". It also marks the flip side of the community - exclusion: "We sent people home who didn't fit in." In the organizational diagnosis this leads to the question of how the individual soldier "fits in" to the risk community and handles the new types of risks arising in the civil-military encounter. From considering the structure of the military risk community, we would like in the following to take a closer look at how the individual is positioned as and rendered a professional and trustworthy risk-taker.

30. See Holsting, 2005 p. 13.

Chapter 3

The soldier as professional decision-maker: From leadership and management to self- governance

"The officer in charge must always remain cheerful and work tirelessly ...He must be able to act independently, keep a cool head and trust his personnel (which will be the case if they can trust him) ... A certain amount of recklessness is also necessary; basic soldiering skills are merely a prerequisite. The key assets are general training and education, human insight, reliability and common sense."

(War recollections from the Eastern Front, XXIII)³¹

As we have discussed: The new security paradigm and politicization of the military tasks involved in international operations is generating a new form of organization, leadership and management, breaking down classic, bureaucratic structures and replacing them with more flexible, value-oriented management principles capable of handling greater complexity and uncertainty in civil-military relations. In the preceding chapter, this organizational and management form was described as a specific

31. Source: Hærens Brevskole (army correspondence school) 1964.

disciplinary regime, one more explicitly defined as a military risk community that practices a certain type of risk management. In this context, risk management refers to the pursuit of dual aims: 1) creating security and 2) supporting the civil reconstruction process. In this sense, military risk management deals with the administration of a basic paradox: how to create stability and progress, order and reform, law and freedom – simultaneously³².

Trust as a tactical concept

For the individual soldier, this means being able to adjust rapidly from a combat situation to a cooperative situation, from armed conflict to negotiation and dialog. In other words, he must be able to make a series of independent and situationally determined decisions that simultaneously increase both trust and control in the civil-military encounter. One could say that risk management in the context of international operations relies on the accumulation of mutual *trust capital*, since trust enables greater freedom while still involving an element of social control: Trust *educates*. Trust thus becomes a tactical concept that enhances readiness while also reducing the uncertainty of civil-military decision-making processes (Nørgaard 2004:162).

32. The concept “risk management” should not be confused with the formal concept of “risk control” (FKODIR KT. 152-1), which relates to military exercises and project implementation.

In contrast to conventional war operations, missions in international operations employ a risk-minimizing security strategy that requires soldiers to switch from an outlook of mutual distrust to mutual trust.



Source: 2PNINFKMP/ DANBN/KFOR 3

Social patrol, KFOR 3, 2000

A liaison officer from KFOR 3 comments on the phenomenon: “Our job down here is different from in a normal war. There aren’t that many actual soldiering tasks here, which is what we’ve been trained to do and have practiced at home. Down here you have to make a rapid assessment of what’s needed and adapt to it ... And pretty soon you build a relation of trust with people. You know whom you can talk to but cannot trust. But,

most people are honest with you, and if you just remember to be so with them, you won't have any problems."³³

The individual soldier cannot approach his encounter with the local population from a pre-determined standpoint of either trust or distrust, but must rather assess the current threat and on that basis *select* one or the other. For this reason, the individual soldier essentially has to adapt his risk management to the given situation, assessing on a case-by-case basis whether he should have positive or negative expectations of the civilian actors. In other words, the key to military risk management lies in the individual's ability to process information, to put local incidents into a general context, to readjust decisions continually and to modify the risk assessment from trust to control and back to trust again; in short: the use of *judgment*.

Exercising judgment or "using your common sense" is an expression often invoked to characterize the conduct and mentality of Danish soldiers and distinguish them from soldiers of other nationalities. A KFOR 3 platoon leader explained that: "We think our soldiers are good at independent thinking ... That's what we mean when we say our soldiers use their common sense. That they can think for themselves and don't necessarily stick to textbook solutions ... It's not simply because our whole nation is

33. See Nørgaard, 2004 p. 171.

so different. It's also that ours [soldiers, ed.] have undergone freer training and education. We may not seem quite so quick to snap 'Yes, sir!' or quite so sharp in highly sensitive situations. But in more ordinary day-to-day situations ours [soldiers, ed.] are better because they're used to being told: 'Get on with it, think for yourselves.' We don't need to remind them of the ten steps it takes to polish their boots. It's enough to say their boots have to be A1."³⁴

In this personal description "common sense" becomes a central value, a military formative ideal linking a special cultural identity ("our soldiers") with a certain style of leadership and management ("freer training"). "Common sense" thus signals an outward difference to the other coalition forces and an internal identity dissociated from rigid routine, focusing instead on the individual and his independent decision-making ability. As Brigadier General Agner Rokos puts it: "Right now, our agenda entails both fighting an enemy and rebuilding a civil society. This challenge means our soldiers have to be able to analyze a complex situation and make a decision based on the tangible facts rather than seeking a textbook solution."³⁵

Thus, risk management in international operations means foregoing

34. K. Nørgaard, interview in Kosovo, 2000.

35. Source: *Forsvaret* no. 5, December 2004, p. 32.

control in favor of “common sense”, or trust in each other’s judgment. The benefit of this shift in thinking is greater change readiness and faster, more decentralized task completion. As a KFOR 3 officer said: “I can delegate far more tasks. I don’t need to keep such close tabs on them – if I wasn’t confident in their ability to use common sense, I’d have to stand out there all day myself ... I can easily give a private and an officer each a task, well aware that they might not do the job exactly the way I want, but they’ll do it along the right lines because they have common sense – I hope.”³⁶

This officer’s statement challenges the conception of a soldier as a passive and predictable trivial machine, an “obedient body” mechanically receiving and executing a given set of orders. A soldier cannot simply be described as an anonymous, dispensable part of an efficient bureaucratic apparatus. Each and every personal decision he makes represents the entire military community and its ethos. Hence, risk management also means “governance of self ” in the sense of “shaping oneself” as a responsible and trustworthy individual. However, in the military community, trustworthiness is not a virtue soldiers can decide to acquire; it is something they have to earn. As a private said: “To be fully accepted, you’ve got to stand out in some way, don’t you? But you also have to

36. K. Nørgaard, interview in Kosovo, 2000.

Trust does not automatically go hand in hand with formal rank

"In our line of work everyone is special..."

prove your worth; everyone in the armed forces has to do that. You simply have to earn it. That's just the way things are."³⁷

Earning respect

In a military community, trust is not a function of one's formal rank and position in the chain of command, but rather of individual ability to handle risks, i.e. to make ongoing decisions in complex and changing situations. As is often pointed out, "the number of chevrons on one's uniform" means less than "standing out" as a person worthy of "respect". To win this respect, a soldier has to present himself as a "professional decision-maker" – someone who goes beyond the call of duty, seeking to improve himself of his own accord and undertaking tasks over and above what is expected of him.

This formative ideal is not only expected of those normally considered "decision-makers" but is realized at all organizational levels. A private from KFOR 3 says: "In our profession everyone's special ... So you also have to show why you're special in your field ... And I think everyone would agree when I say that if you don't show you're something in your field, we might as well call everyone the same, judge them by the same yardstick. And I

37. See Nørgaard, 2004 p. 116.

fight pretty hard to prove I'm not just a guy in a khaki uniform who gives or takes orders."³⁸

Everyone in the military shares this aim of "being something" in his field, of being a community of special individuals each "fighting to prove" he is more than an empty uniform that "gives or takes orders". To become a member of this community, a soldier must continually make decisions, thus *getting into character* and identifying himself as someone on whom others can depend, not simply on the strength of rank but also character. The military risk community thus involves a process of personal development in which the individual gradually assumes responsibility for his own (self-)formation, transforming external discipline into internal (self-)discipline.

An officer from KFOR 3 commented on this process: "The vast majority of your actions enable you to put your personal mark on various things, and I think that's true of my actions as well ... [My personal mark] is probably the belief that a soldier can do something without having to be told a thousand times. I'd like people to understand that even if they don't obey an order the first time, they'll be made to do it in the end, so why not do it right away? I would like people to be trained to do things themselves that they know have to be done anyway. And if they can think one step

38. See Nørgaard, 2004 p. 132.

“Professionalism” involves the whole individual and his personal character

further: ‘What can I do to help him finish his job faster?’ or better yet, run over and help him... If people have the independence to get the ball rolling and the attitude ‘I do this because it’s my job’. That’s what I think anyway. This happens to be my job, and I’m going to do it the best of my ability.”³⁹

A recurrent theme of these personal military narratives deals with showing the right “attitude” or, more specifically, a “professional attitude” expressed not only through professional expertise and basic soldiering skills but also through the will to *improve oneself* continually. “Professionalism” thus embraces the full breadth of an individual’s character and moral outlook – i.e. the values he represents and exemplifies in the way he presents himself. In this context, “professionalism” is a military formative ideal, a *will to create order* that shapes and identifies the individual soldier as part of an organizational hierarchy.

An officer from KFOR 3 gives an example: “All this business about attitudes is a large part of being professional. You better know what you’re doing and why. And it makes personal demands that are clearly related to attitudes – and appearance. This goes for leaders, but also for the troops on the ground. Moral standards are guidelines or rules that leaders issue and have to live up to personally, but people further down the ranks also need the moral fiber to intervene if others are failing to do what’s best.

39. See Nørgaard, 2004 p. 153.

But there are lots of examples to illustrate this: if you don't have the right attitude and sense of responsibility, you'll never be a professional."⁴⁰

This narrative clearly shows how professional attitude embodies elements of both discipline and self-discipline: You have "to live up to the rules... personally" but also need "the moral fiber to intervene if others are failing to do what's best". As a formative ideal, the concept acts as a disciplinary mechanism including and excluding certain positions and avenues of action.

As the opening quotation of this chapter implies, there is essentially nothing new in the observation that the military risk community is based on a series of values and norms like professionalism, mutual respect and trust. The interesting discovery, however, is how military formative ideals are reinterpreted and their values transferred in the encounter between civilian and military cultures, because this is precisely where these ideals are put under pressure and made into objects of negotiation.

Generalization of military formative ideals

The military organization's use of various (self-)disciplinary and trust-generating technologies that both include and exclude, integrate and differentiate the individual in the social community is not a radical departure from past practice. What is new, however, is the use of trust strategies not only internally as the informal "silent" side of the

40. See Nørgaard, 2004 p. 155-56.

Military values are highlighted and exercised in the local community

organization but also their external exercise in military *relations with the external world*.

So, in fact, soldiers are not the only ones that need to be formed and disciplined in the civil-military cultural interface: the Iraqis, the Serbs, the Albanians are also subjects in a formative process.

When meeting civilian actors in the course of international operations, the military organization and individual soldiers reveal their own formative ideals – their own values in other words – using them as the basis for their security strategies.



Source: HOK Foto

"Contact operation", KFOR 12, 2005

The internal rules of acceptance used to shape both the risk community and responsible, trustworthy, professional soldiers – i.e. people who use their “common sense” – are also applied externally to mold the local community and its members into responsible, trustworthy and “sensible” *citizens*. The concept is often presented as a matter of enacting a long-term *change of attitude* in the local community, an undertaking that the military presence has to support.

The management rationale – the “professional attitude” that is *internalized* and *individualized* in the transition from bureaucratic management to risk management – thus gains new, broader significance in the civil-military encounter because it is *externalized* and *generalized* as a universal civilizational ideal: Iraqis, Afghans and Kosovo Albanians have to “govern themselves”, tackling the risks that persistently emerge in their relations with the world around them. To build up the mutual trust and respect that spawns “rational debate”, they need to assume responsibility for their own disciplinary process. In other words, they have to “form themselves” while also building a social order based on democratic values and principles of law.



Mitrovica, KFOR 3, 2000

In the international security discourse this tendency is seen as a way of linking military risk management with the shaping of a moral and cultural attitude known as “culture-centric warfare”⁴¹ – a term indicating a shift from the conventional focus on the technological development of weapons systems and military hardware to a focus on identity, motivation, learning and interaction.

41. See, e.g., U.S. Naval Proceedings, Oct. 2004 p. 32.

The Danish military system has acknowledged the need to instruct soldiers in such topics as “cultural understanding” and “contact skills”. Such instruction would (1) give soldiers an understanding of their own and other cultures through insight into the values and norms of these societies and (2) enable them to use the know-how acquired to adapt their own actions (exercise of power) in a given context and thus engage in constructive dialog and cooperation with civilians as well as other countries’ military units.

As Danish soldiers are increasingly expected both to “govern themselves” and to govern the development of civil societies, the distinction between personal, political and cultural formative processes becomes less clear-cut. Internal and external boundaries shift continuously, constantly having to be renegotiated and justified. In a radical trend analysis, one could thus argue that the meeting of civil and military cultures produces not only new types of risk but also new forms of cooperation, in short: new types of social *organization*. The leadership and management diagnosis thus indicates an inherent duality in the civil-military encounter during international operations. The encounter both destroys and creates an order – a *system* – that the individual soldier himself has to manage and put into practice through his own self-representation, that is to say through his own understanding of and relations to the world.



Source: HOK Foto

Market in Feyzabad, Afghanistan, 2005

The question remains of how to prepare Danish soldiers for the challenges of international operations and of which skills they are expected to possess. Drawing on our organizational and management diagnosis, in the following two chapters we will sketch out a new “competency profile”, attempting to identify and specify the qualifications soldiers need to carry out their assignments in a manner meaningful to themselves and to the organization.

Chapter 4

A changing world: Competency development in a military perspective

In modern times personal development has come to denote a lifelong process. Schooling is no longer enough: we also have to develop ourselves at work, together with our families or in our leisure-time pursuits. We generally assume that people who stop developing themselves either have come to a standstill or are actually regressing. Concepts such as *competency development, learning and self-realization* are thus becoming more common than static concepts like qualifications, traditional learning and skills.

The new concepts have come into vogue precisely because we perceive knowledge differently. Knowledge has traditionally been seen as objective and conclusive, something for experts to pass on to the uninitiated. This view is entirely compatible with a relatively stable society (Egidius, 2000). However, recent decades have shown that post-modern society is not a stable, homogenous entity but rather a multitude of different, constantly changing interpretations and perspectives of observation. In keeping with

Knowledge in
post-modern
society represents
a diversity of
perspectives

this tendency, knowledge becomes a question of identifying the observers and their methods of observation rather than finding absolute truths.

This perspective-oriented approach to knowledge ties learning and competency development to a personal experiential and existential process of self-formation that contrasts with the authoritative transfer of knowledge from expert to layperson. In a daily working environment, however, the concepts of learning and competency development are often considered exotic or alien 'buzz words' and rarely get beyond the drawing board stage.

Nonetheless, we have ventured to use the concepts of competency, learning and self-formation in this publication because studies and pilot projects have convinced us of their validity in Danish military practice. Using these concepts also gives us the opportunity to address important problems arising from the global, differentiated world in which the Danish Armed Forces operate. Before incorporating the concepts into the military competency profile in Chapter 6, however, we need to account for their use to date and their relevance in a military context.

From training to competency development

The interest in and need to focus on competency development is a relatively modern phenomenon. During the industrial age, from which the Western world is now emerging, the workplace was characterized by

Tasks during the Cold War were stationary and predictable

Tasks in international operations are complex and unpredictable

standard routines, centralized decision-making, stable, uniform tasks and external demands, and production methods based on assembly-line technology. Short-term educations and traineeships qualified most people for their jobs because the work required a limited, relatively unchanging set of skills (Korsgaard, 1999). Danish military practice offers numerous parallel examples, its assignments having been largely stationary and predictable during the Cold War. As a result, the military training program basically met the Danish Armed Forces' need for qualified soldiers.

However, one should be aware that the learning imparted by training programs and learning that can be regulated are abstract forms of knowledge. They can be generalized and transferred between vastly different situations. Acquiring these forms of knowledge presupposes that future tasks will be relatively simple and predictable. It is, however, difficult, perhaps even impossible, to predict and simplify all the knowledge required to handle serving on international missions. As a soldier back from Bosnia put it: "Being a soldier in war and conflict zones isn't a romantic walk in the park. Guidelines for preparing yourself before and after a military deployment can never be simple and clear-cut." (Munkebo, 2005:9)⁴².

42. Y. Munkebo has been deployed five times to Croatia, Afghanistan and Iraq in the period 1998-2004.

Learning during military training creates abstract understanding

The quotation illustrates the importance of developing soldiers' competencies during missions as a supplement to the knowledge they acquire before their deployment. Essentially, basic military and pre-mission training can only provide an *abstract* understanding of the demands of deployment. It is not until the soldier is on a mission that *concrete* learning or competency development can take place.



Source: HOK Foto

Meeting local people, Afghanistan, 2005

For example, training courses can teach soldiers a lot of useful information about conditions in a foreign country such as Afghanistan. They can learn

about the country's culture, history, geography and climate as well as its special customs and practices. Natives of Afghanistan can also be invited to supplement the theory with lectures, and soldiers can do exercises designed to help them tackle various hypothetical situations that may confront them once in Afghanistan. Although all useful basic learning, it remains highly abstract to those who have never set foot in Afghanistan before. A person who has been there previously will have gained practical insight and experience that provide a completely different, more tangible basis for doing the job in strange, new situations.

Soldiers must consciously continue targeted, on-the-job learning after completing their training. Military training in itself cannot build up the necessary competencies. The knowledge soldiers acquire on the job cannot *replace* the need for training programs but can provide a vital *supplement*. Whereas military training provides a professional understanding that is relatively abstract and theoretical, competency development in the field represents a highly concrete learning process directly related to the task at hand.

The concept of military competency

The concept of military competency is fairly recent, and systematic, on-the-job competency development has failed to become an active asset in the Danish Armed Forces since the personnel evaluation system FORPUBS

was implemented in 1976⁴³. Nonetheless, the concept is by no means without value and historic significance in the military context. The competency concept is not a civil theory irreconcilable with military practice – quite the reverse.

Military history offers an important precedent to the concept of competency, underscoring its fundamental significance to the military sphere of activity. Military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz understood, for example, the need to focus on the soldier’s *genuine* abilities rather than considering war solely as a mix of strategy, tactics and technique. In Clausewitz’ conceptual perspective, the concept of competency is defined as the *Kriegerische Genius* or *military genius*, about which he states: “To achieve excellency in war, the soldier must be in possession of a special warrior spirit at all levels ... Every special calling in life, if it is to be followed by success, requires peculiar qualifications of understanding and soul. When these are of a high order and manifest themselves by extraordinary achievements, the mind to which they belong is termed *genius* ... thus by genius we understand the exceptionally highly developed mental aptitude to perform certain activities.” (Clausewitz, [1832] 1986:66.)

43. See the Danish Defence Centre for Leadership: *Evaluation and possible revision of FORPUBS*, February 2000.

The definition of *personal competency*, to be presented later, corresponds to a certain extent with this view in that an effective soldier is associated with “exceptionally highly developed ability” – the personal competency to perform situationally determined military activities. In other words, a competent soldier is one who translates his personal experience (genius) into appropriate actions leading to the achievement of military tasks.



Source: HOK Foto

IRAQ 3, 2004

Clausewitz described military genius as consisting of a variety of different qualities that combine to create military genius (or a competency profile in

our terminology). Clausewitz derived these competencies from the special circumstances and tasks characteristic of wars at the time – contemporary large-scale campaigns and battles in which combatants meet in direct confrontation⁴⁴; a war image recognizable in modern wars right up to the end of the Cold War. In this context, Clausewitz identified the qualities of *courage, resolve, presence of mind, energy, determination, perseverance, strength of mind and character, self-control and imagination* as the personal competencies required for soldiers.

A closer examination of some of Clausewitz' competencies reveals their continuing relevance in many ways today, although the soldier's tasks have changed radically. This could be used to argue that military practice has not changed significantly despite changes in military practice and the world at large. One can counter this argument by saying that it is not the qualities of *courage, resolve, energy, etc.*, that have changed but the importance attributed to them over time, people and place. What specific actions do we associate with, for example, *resolve*? Translated into concrete military actions, resolve has an ever-changing face, one in 1832, another in 1980 and yet another in 2005. The set of personal competencies has to be reinterpreted and developed according to the specific demands made on military practice.

44. Clausewitz primarily bases his studies on eyewitness accounts from the Napoleonic Wars.

FOKUS to replace
FORPUBS

FOKUS marks a
departure from
traditional notions
of education and
learning

The concept of competency as used by FOKUS

FOKUS, the Danish Forces' future competency development and evaluation system, has been used as a basis for describing the contemporary "warrior spirit". Replacing FORPUBS, FOKUS is intended to underpin targeted competency development in the workplace. One aim of FOKUS is to develop a set of personal competencies considered essential for carrying out assignments in the Danish Armed Forces, regardless of whether they relate to the Naval Base Korsør or an international mission in Afghanistan⁴⁵.

FOKUS applies a concept of competency tied to the learning that takes place at work. The basic assumption is that professional soldiers learn some of their most important lessons while carrying out assignments (Elström & Hultmann, 2004). FOKUS thus departs from the conventional assumption that, independent of time, people and circumstances, the accomplishment of specific tasks can be defined according to a set of "surefire", general procedures and regulations. The concept of competency used here in fact refutes the theory that training is the answer to any competency requirement. The concept thus broadens our understanding of how competency development in the armed forces can

45. The FOKUS competencies have been developed in close dialog with Armed Forces personnel at all levels. Information about the FOKUS competencies can be found in *Kompetenceudvikling i FOKUS*, in Danish, by L. Buhl, K.B. Madsen and V.S. Holsting, the Royal Danish Defence College, 2005.

address the fundamental change in the nature of its assignments from relatively territorial and predictable defense tasks to the value-laden enforcement of international conventions on freedom, democracy and human rights. Human rights operations require a different appreciation of the soldier's role: Purely professional military competencies are not in themselves enough but have to be combined with more relational competencies.



Source: HOK Foto

ISAF 7, 2005

Mastering such professional military disciplines as terrain utilization, man-to-man combat, security, riot control, first aid and signal service is not

enough. Soldiers need to command a range of socially related competencies including cultural understanding, communication and cooperation with civil authorities, and conflict management.⁴⁶ In contrast to purely military competencies, these cannot be learned through well-defined training programs. Instead, they are built up through a lifelong process and are strongly influenced by the individual soldier's childhood development and upbringing and current life situation, including military service. First lieutenant R.N. Kjær, IRAQ 4, comments: "The events a soldier experiences before entering the services shape his personality. I believe this is where many of the skills he later needs are formed. These experiences determine how a soldier reacts in given situations. His response is based on a wide variety of previously experienced incidents – in fact, the sum total of his life – right up to the present – which is to say your military service also has an impact on you."⁴⁷

When required to deal with the risks related to the daily tasks of international missions, soldiers draw on the full gamut of their personal

46. FOKUS terms these competencies "common competencies" and "management competencies". Common competencies apply to all Armed Forces personnel whereas management competencies are relevant only for leaders. Management competencies are thus formulated to reflect the demands on personnel at every level.

47. Quoted from a seminar held at the Centre for Administrative Training, Høveltegaard, June 2005.

Risk management is based on professional and personal competencies

An experience is not a once-and-for-all occurrence

and professional competencies. Military risk management does not, therefore, build solely on pre-rehearsed military disciplines and routines but on the soldier's entire *formative history*. An individual soldier's formative history is based on his personal narrative and relations to the world around him. The actual behavior through which this history is manifested is termed *personal competencies*. FOKUS defines personal competencies as *experiences that are converted into concrete actions with a view to performing current and future tasks*.

In this conjunction, experiences should not be seen as isolated phenomena or impressions stored in the brain. Experiences engender contextual processes in which past experience conditions new experience, and new experience helps to reconstruct and transform earlier experience in an ongoing process of development. So an experience is not a once-and-for-all occurrence. When we act and are actively involved in performing a task, the *set of related activities* of which we are part challenges and brings our experience into play in a special way (Pécseli, 2003). Thus, competency development is not only conditioned by individual experience, but is always expressed through the interplay between the individual and the social context in which he finds himself.

Social context is shaped by various relationships and interests

The learning and competency development environment

The word “context” is a general term for the environment to which a person belongs. Context includes, for example, the physical conditions under which we operate, such as buildings, equipment, communication media, geography and climate. Similarly, we also refer to “social context”, which covers the relationships between the people in the environment.



Source: [M] A. B. Olesen

IRAQ 4, 2004

The mission creates a specific learning environment that puts soldiers in alien and risky situations

Learning arises with the need to create meaning

Social context is made up of a wide variety of interpersonal rationales, relationships and interests. The interaction between a person's life experience and the socially constructed community generates a specific *learning and competency development environment* that simultaneously enables and limits, in other words, *forms* the individual within the social community.

The workplace – in this case the international mission – constitutes a specific learning and competency development environment, that is, a specific context for developing personal competencies. Here, soldiers face new, alien situations with elements of risk that create a basis for learning. According to Peter Jarvis, learning starts when problems or situations arise that for some reason cannot be handled on the basis of past experience: "Learning begins with a fundamental disjuncture between individual biography and the socially constructed experience... Disjuncture occurs whenever there is a lack of accord between the external world experienced by human beings and their internal biographical interests or knowledge." (Jarvis, 1992:4)

Consequently, situations where "disjunctures" arise between personal experience and the outer world force the individual soldier to confront his experiences consciously, to ask himself what is happening and what it means (ibid.). In other words: Learning occurs in step with the need to create a meaningful relationship between personal experience and external influences. For the soldier, for example, learning will often consist

of reflecting on the relationship between the training received at home and the actual tasks carried out during his deployment. This processing of meaning creates the basis for the soldier's, as well as the organization's, learning. It raises the question of the quality of the learning environments offered by international missions. In contrast to the mission area, of course, schools offer a good, stable framework for concentrating and learning, with teachers, classrooms and other facilities on hand. And most importantly, the school provides an environment in which learning is expected. International missions cannot provide so solid a framework, and certainly not under the often stressful, risky and hectic conditions of military operations.



Al Hartha, IRAQ 6, 2005

Source: PIO/DA BG/ IRAQ 6

Long-term focus
on learning easily
assumes lower
priority

Difficulty finding time and resources makes it hard to target efforts at creating good learning environments. The very nature of the situation demands that attention be directed elsewhere – to the tasks, the uncertainty and the need for security. Much is at stake during international missions, for which reason everyone easily becomes keenly focused on the operation and concrete issues that come with each different task. Long-term focus on learning and competency development can therefore quickly assume lower priority.

Nonetheless, much can be done to promote learning conditions during international missions. For instance, a soldier can contemplate the characteristics of the mission in which he has personally participated. In this context, learning environments can be categorized under three fundamentally distinct headings (ibid.:83):

- 1) Learning environments characterized by a sense of meaninglessness or rejection of what is different.
- 2) Learning environments characterized by the reproduction of others' knowledge through rote learning and drills.
- 3) Learning environments characterized by opportunities to experiment, think innovatively and reflect critically on one's own daily practice.

These learning environments rarely exist in pure form, and features from one environment will always be found in others and vice versa. If the

Which type of learning environment do you work in?

soldier wants to determine the learning environment of which he is part, he can ask himself about the extent to which he finds his work *meaningful*⁴⁸. Does he feel involved in decisions about his tasks, how to go about them and why? He can also ask himself how he experiences the sense of fellowship with his colleagues. Does he enjoy open, constructive daily dialog with colleagues, superiors and others with whom he is in contact? Can he get systematic, constructive feedback on his work and can he give others feedback? Does he feel he gets adequate support and back-up from colleagues and superiors? A last example concerns whether the soldier feels he has the opportunity to make changes in areas that are not working properly. If he can answer these questions affirmatively and has little difficulty finding illustrative examples, the learning environment on the whole probably promotes competency development. If the contrary is the case, the situation presents an opportunity to identify some of the chief environmental barriers to competency development.

Surveys of learning environments in international missions

A working memo on leadership, management and cooperation during international missions⁴⁹ was prepared on the basis of questionnaires completed by all personnel on their return from the mission area. The

48. See Holsting & Ladegaard, 2004.

49. Working memo written by Captain Lieutenant Vilhelm S. Holsting. Not yet published.

Most perceive the mission as meaningful

The younger the soldier, the harder it is to find meaning

memo uncovers a number of general trends in learning environments, gleaned from a total of 30 units returning from missions in ex-Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq. Based on 9,560 responses in the period from 1998 to 2003, the working memo thus constitutes an exceptionally comprehensive source of documentation.

Overall, the members of the surveyed units have plenty to do, and most perceive their mission as meaningful. By the same token, most agree that they support each other and can discuss the problems and difficulties they encounter. Despite the often grueling and dangerous conditions under which they operate on a mission, only a handful feel their deployment was emotionally stressful. All these trends impact favorably on the individual's readiness to learn and develop competencies.

However, a series of significant problems can be identified within these general trends. These problems are not the result of objective evaluation and analysis, but express the soldiers' own experiences:

- More than a third of the privates indicate that their daily tasks generally seemed meaningless to them. This proportion increased the younger the age of the respondent group.
- 43% of the youngest members indicate that they largely consider their tasks meaningless. Over a quarter also said they lacked enough to do.

Most feel they have developed both personally and professionally

- Additionally, about 40% of all personnel stated that the mission had featured many sudden changes in orders, contributing to the sense of meaninglessness.
- Whereas equal-ranking colleagues are good at providing mutual support and help, the overall picture changes when it comes to back-up from immediate superiors. About a third of all personnel do not feel their leaders provide support.

These problems adversely affect the possibilities of competency development. Despite all the hardships and risks inherent in international missions, the survey results nonetheless show that it is possible to create a reasonable learning environment. Reports that soldiers had learned something during their missions reinforce this assumption, with most indicating that they have developed not only as soldiers but also as people (see appendix). In other words, they sense they have developed personally as well as professionally, the overriding goal of competency development.

Neither do the data presented produce any clear picture of an international mission's learning environment, since the circumstances vary from mission to mission. To identify unit-specific learning environments, we must therefore address the specific results of employee attitude

surveys, work climate surveys and other research⁵⁰. Captain Lieutenant Vilhelm Holsting carried out a study of a specific learning environment during a mission to Iraq showing that the following learning environment characteristics promote competency development⁵¹:

- Facing major, demanding challenges.
- Less hierarchy and bureaucracy within the unit in general than at home.
- The tasks intrinsically gave personnel at all levels more opportunity to act independently without direct supervision.
- When tasks were delegated, higher priority was given to personnel's actual competencies than to their formal qualifications.
- Open, direct dialog across levels of seniority.
- Joint consultation committees worked well and had genuine influence.
- Discussing feelings was an accepted part of social discourse.

On the other hand, the following had a negative impact on learning:

- When threats of attack from various combatants became too frequent.
- Pressure from the Danish media and Danish military leadership.

50. The Armed Forces' work climate survey system (AKM), due to be implemented in 2007, will offer the opportunity to measure and focus attention on developing the learning environment and the potential for competency development in the workplace.

51. See Holsting & Ladegaard, 2004.

- When the mission leadership focused too keenly on short-term task completion rather than on long-term development opportunities.
- When insufficient efforts were made to pass on experience and lessons to the next unit.
- Risk of exclusion from the community.
- The unit basically never spent time critically considering its own practices.

Despite marked differences in the experiences gained and meaning constructed during specific missions, the surveys indicate that learning and competency development intensify at the interface between a series of fundamental but diametrical organizational needs. At one end is the need for regulation, order and stability, and at the other, the need for freedom, creativity and development (Strand, 2003). All organizations have to deal with this classic paradox, a dilemma that surfaces in all types of work.

Accordingly, an overall picture of the competencies required of all personnel serving on a mission has to be based on the organization's opposing needs and the dilemmas they generate. In the next chapter we present a competency model and a case highlighting these inherent tensions – not as mutually exclusive but as mutually required competencies.

Chapter 5

Development and security at an interface: A master model for personal competencies in the Danish Armed Forces

“Any force in a social system has a tendency to release a counter-force. However, people tend to overlook these oppositions, concentrating instead on the part they prefer, currently find most promising or least contrary to their former beliefs. Examples of paradoxical forces within an organization are the need for regulation and order coupled with the need for freedom and creativity, and the need for rationality coupled with the need for emotional involvement.”

(Festinger [1954] cf. Strand 2003:35)

In the previous chapter we introduced the concept of competency and several other related concepts concerning experience, development and learning environments, and placed them in a military context. Collectively, they make up a conceptual platform useful in clarifying the special leadership and management circumstances and avenues for constructing meaning that shape and develop the personal and professional competencies of soldiers on international missions. Changes in the outside world and in the operating methods of the Danish Armed Forces require a

targeted focus on learning and competency development, not only when a contingent is preparing for deployment but in particular during the deployment itself. In this chapter we attempt to specify and apply these concepts within the framework of the new leadership and competency model used by FOKUS.

For this purpose, we draw on a theory of social systems inspired by Talcott Parsons and Robert Quinn⁵², which points out that every social system must balance four functional dimensions that, so to say, produce and maintain the social order. These four dimensions concern 1) the need to provide for and develop human relationships, 2) the need to sustain qualitative stability, 3) the need to adapt and renew and 4) the need to generate results.

Fig. 1:

Developing human relationships:

This dimension focuses on handling and providing for human relationships internally and externally to create good living and working conditions for people.

Adaptation and renewal:

This dimension focuses on adapting and renewing unit practice to meet the demands and expectations of the broader community.

Sustaining qualitative stability:

This dimension focuses on sustaining professionalism, structure and continuity to maintain the level of experience and quality.

Generating results:

This dimension focuses on initiating the "combat power", energy and perseverance needed to achieve results.

52. Cf. Quinn, 2003: *Becoming a Master Manager*, p. 13 ff.

Leadership is not a personal quality but a social practice

These four functional dimensions are tied to task performance and are each equally important and indispensable to the survival of the system. Disregarding one dimension will, over time, affect the entire system as a whole. Co-existing in a tension field full of dilemmas and paradoxes, the four dimensions thus vie with each other for attention. Attending to one dimension naturally affects the others, inevitably creating contradictions and conflicts that an organization's personnel and leaders need to balance through holistically oriented initiatives. In this context, leadership is not a quality vested in a single individual – *the leader* – but rather a social practice pursued through the *interaction* of leaders and personnel; in fact, through all the relationships embraced by the organization. The model is thus linked to a relational view of management that can be summed up as follows:

“A melting pot of contradictions, management has the task of dealing with organizational insecurity.” (Strand, 2003:32).

The traditional line of management theory

The model thus belongs to a management theory tradition whose historical development and theoretical perspectives are reflected in the four functional dimensions. At the start of the 20th century, the Taylorist theory of management, *Scientific Management*, focused on generating *results*. The administrative school of thought dating from roughly the same period and inspired by such theorists as Henry Fayol focused on *quality and stability*. The exclusive focus on these needs severely

challenged the morale of the workforce, which was overlooked or reduced to being a cog in a giant production machine. This dilemma is eminently illustrated in Charlie Chaplin's film *Modern Times*, in which the main character's role is existentially reduced from human being to insignificant function in a long assembly line.

These theories triggered a lengthy counter-reaction during which management development focused on human relations, a trend led by the Human Relation Movement, with its focus on human self-realization and belief in the human potential to develop. In the latter half of the 20th century, "Open System" theories particularly influenced management development, being able to meet organizations' need to *renew* themselves in step with a constantly changing world.


Thus, in keeping with Parsons' four functional dimensions, we can view the various theoretical approaches of traditional management thinking as representing equally necessary contributions to an organization's overall need for competencies. The contradictions between the various management theories also clearly illustrate the dilemmas and paradoxes that an organization needs to address when carrying out its tasks.

FOKUS – A model for personal competencies

Against the background of these considerations, FOKUS introduces a competency model spanning the four perspectives, each of which relates to its own organizational need. Each perspective highlights expectations

and demands on military practice as perceived from *inside* and *outside* the organization and focusing on *operations* and *development* (as illustrated by the four main axes in Fig. 2).

Fig. 2:



The figure illustrates the interface created by the four competency perspectives.

The four perspectives are outlined below for the purpose of comparing them with the competency requirements for international missions, addressed in Chapter 6.

1. Perspective: Result orientation

The surrounding world of the Danish Armed Forces – in this case the international community (UN, NATO or ad hoc alliances as in Iraq), the Danish government and local political actors – makes certain demands about which tasks a given military unit is expected to perform, and how it is expected to perform them. Outwardly, this entails demonstrating the power of action and efficacy necessary in a situation dictated by these external demands. The tasks normally require decisiveness, initiative and a result-oriented approach on soldiers' part. Soldiers also have to handle the physical and psychological pressure that go with the mission, and to find the energy needed to carry out demanding military duties. This competency perspective concerns generating results.

2. Perspective: Focus on quality and stability

Task performance also entails carrying out routine internal jobs, for example, equipment and supply maintenance, organizing and planning activities. The basic conditions for delivering the necessary combat power externally have to be created internally. Internal coordination, technical infrastructure and personnel welfare (sanitation, food supply, leisure activities, etc.) are major operations requiring extensive control and thus calling for systematic processes, analytical thinking, planning and professionalism. This competency perspective concerns the creation of qualitative stability.

3. Perspective: Focus on renewal

Task performance also relies on the ability to handle situations relative to an outside world (local actors, the press, alliance partners and so on) marked by rapid change, unpredictability and unfamiliar conditions. Soldiers must be able to deal with the intrinsic dynamics of the mission itself and the mission area. They need to be flexible while keeping the specific mission assignments and goals in view. They have to consider the long-term implications of their actions and maintain a constant focus on the overall effort to which they are contributing. Small errors and flaws can have untold consequences for a mission. The individual soldier is in himself an ambassador for the international community and the overall mission objective. This competency perspective concerns renewal in that the correct thing to do is not necessarily the normal *modus operandi* but rather whatever measures a given situation demands – even if one must radically rethink ways of accomplishing the task. The individual soldier's readiness to act independently and adequately on international missions is closely linked to this third aspect.

4. Perspective: Focus on people

Lastly, task performance means taking good care of one's fellow soldiers; that is, the internal relations between soldiers and units throughout the organization. It means creating good internal communication, supporting opportunities for cooperation and resolving the potential conflicts inherent in any working situation. It also means creating the necessary


motivation and developing the individual and organizational competencies that the unpredictability and dynamics of the mission demand. In brief, it is about creating a good, effective psychological working environment. This competency perspective concerns the people involved in the mission.

Dilemmas and paradoxes

The four competency perspectives do not exist in a harmonious interrelationship. Changes often occur in one dimension, thus interfering with or provoking problems in the others. Changes in the outturning perspectives – for example, unexpected climate fluctuations or the need to step up patrols – can strain inward perspectives like work planning, logistics and personal motivation. Conversely, internal problems such as insufficient supplies or poor planning and communication can impact negatively on relations with the outside world. A holistic understanding of the competency model therefore means implementing and adapting all the various competencies to achieve a harmonious balance. Any one competency can become excessive if exercised unilaterally without attention to the need for the other competencies. It is thus important to understand how behavior related to one particular perspective affects circumstances related to any of the others.

Each competency has to be balanced relative to the others

Fig. 3:



The figure illustrates the FOKUS competencies

Changes in relations with the outside world engender new self-understanding

The interdependency of external and internal competencies fits with this book's introductory trend analysis indicating that the new global security paradigm creates not only a new operational context - new *relations to*

the surrounding world – but also a new form of organization and management: a new military *self-understanding* for international missions.

In terms of the competency model, a fundamental shift in external perspectives, which deal with the generation of results and renewal, will impact on the internal perspectives, which address internal human relations and procedures. Internal changes in a military unit are caused by the transition from a formal, control-oriented style of organization and management to a more flexible practice based more on trust – a practice capable of counter-balancing the external demands on task performance. Neither should we forget that the process is two-way. When a Danish military unit is deployed to the Iraqi desert to enforce a set of international rules, it brings with it a special set of norms and an ethos that influence the civil-military encounter in the mission area. The norms and values of the soldiers also mold their outlook on task performance. A soldier convinced the mission is extremely hazardous will take security precautions accordingly, but will also signal to local actors that he considers the area unsafe and has little trust in them.

Assumptions soldiers form in the social sphere outside the unit are anchored in the two internal perspectives, but have their impact and are manifested in the way soldiers act when moving within the two external dimensions.

To illustrate how the interaction between the four perspectives plays out in a specific operation, we present below a case described by chief of staff of the Danish battalion, IRAQ Unit 6, Lieutenant-Colonel Tommy Kjær. The case illustrates the need for an adaptable form of leadership and management, one that is prepared for change, incorporates all four competency areas and can handle the dilemmas that arise when an armed force attempts to ensure both development and security simultaneously in the mission area.

Case: IRAQ 6

By Lieutenant-Colonel Tommy Kjær, chief of staff, DANBN IRAQ 6:

“The battalion arrived in Iraq as Unit 6 in early August 2005. During our preparation, Unit 6 had focused on operation planning and execution, including individual combat skills, but we had also prepared to carry out our primary mission of training Iraqi security forces and supporting the reconstruction process, with the emphasis being on contact skills.

“Around the time we assumed our duties, Unit 5 was ordered to conduct a major search and seizure in a northern suburb of Basra called Al Hartha. During the same period a Danish patrol with personnel from both units 5 and 6 was hit by an IED [improvised explosive device, ed. note] in Al Hartha.

“These episodes marked the start of a rapid and radical change in the security situation. Rebels had launched a roadside bombing campaign in the Basra area, and in the course of the next couple of months, 19 coalition force soldiers and humanitarian aid helpers were killed in the brigade’s area. These losses prompted the brigade to tighten security, with an escort system being introduced for all transport between the military bases, including transport between the Danish base and Kuwait. By the end of September, three roadside bombs had hit the Danish battalion, slightly injuring three soldiers. On October 1, a roadside bomb struck another Danish patrol in Al Hartha – this time with a fatality. A first lieutenant was killed, a private seriously injured and two others slightly wounded. Press reaction in Denmark was intense, and many relatives of soldiers deployed to Iraq expressed concern.

“We needed to re-assess our operating pattern. How was the battalion to protect soldiers on the roads without compromising the mission and barricading itself in the camp? Should soldiers use more heavily armored vehicles? Should we re-route the patrols? Would a change of responsibilities be a possible solution? Any and all ideas were welcome. In the short term, we needed to strengthen the passive security so soldiers could operate without being hit, but at the same time we clearly had to eliminate the threat and seize the bombers.

“After the October 1 attack, quite a few soldiers needed counseling from a psychologist and the battalion’s army chaplain. Some were so affected by the new situation that they had to be sent back to Denmark. The battalion soon acknowledged that inaction was bad for morale and would ultimately provoke a sense of meaninglessness in some soldiers. The battalion’s external strategy was to go on the offensive and cooperate with the British and Iraqi security forces to put maximum pressure on Al Hartha. Any incident remotely connected with the October 1 attack was followed up. One company was given the Al Hartha area to patrol, so there were always soldiers on the streets, and in the course of the next month, the battalion was sent into action seven times in the city as part of various operations whose primary objective was to find the bombing perpetrators.

“In the second half of October, the battalion finally put a stop to the bombing campaign. During an operation in which the battalion had British soldiers, Iraqi security forces, surveillance helicopters and fighter planes under its command, soldiers found a bomb factory where the roadside bombs were believed to have been made. The discovery eased the tension. Internally, the battalion pursued an open approach. All personnel were informed of accidents in the field through the camp’s loudspeaker system and, in the case of serious incidents, all personnel were summoned as fast as possible and informed. At these meetings, everybody was encouraged to make sure no one was left alone and to discuss the events with their

friends. A proper defusing team consisting of the army chaplain, doctor and subsection chief proved immensely useful.

“One of the lessons Unit 6 learned from these events was that individual soldiers and leaders alike must master the full spectrum of skills, from combat to contact skills, and be able to switch between them at ultra-short notice.”

Summary and the case in perspective

The description of the events from the battalion’s arrival in the mission area in August to the end of October 2005 identifies episodes that drastically threatened security, confronting the organization with a fundamental paradox: namely, how was the battalion to “protect soldiers on the roads” (security perspective) without “compromising the mission and barricading itself in the camp” (development perspective). Addressing the paradox generated a need for greater reflection within the organization. As the chief of staff puts it: “Everything was open to debate”.

The case thus illustrates an organizational learning process in which different, diametrically opposed competencies come into play: externally the choice fell on the result-oriented perspective with the battalion deciding to “go on the offensive” and “put maximum pressure on Al

Hartha". Simultaneously, the battalion acknowledged the importance of strengthening human relations and finding meaning in the episode, thus pursuing an open approach where "everybody was encouraged to make sure no-one was left alone and to discuss events with their friends". The conclusion to be drawn against the background of the entire learning process is that not only leaders but also individual soldiers "must command the full spectrum of skills, from combat to contact skills, and be able to switch between them at ultra-short notice".

The natural lessons learned are, firstly, that task complexity and unpredictability call for a holistically oriented management practice that can balance external, result-oriented activities with internal, meaningful ones. Second, management development and learning are not skills acquired exclusively in the classroom; on the contrary, the lessons learned are put into practice and challenged by the real-life circumstances soldiers confront during their deployment.

Using the competency model and the case-based lessons learned, in the following chapter we will discuss the concrete demands made on soldiers, and with these in mind identify an overall competency profile for soldiers in international service.

Chapter 6

The encounter of civil and military cultures: Towards a new competency profile

“The regulation of limits is possibly the commonest operative logic used in management. Managers regulate the external and internal limits of an organization; that is, the relationships with the surroundings, between departments and positions, between formal and informal structures and especially between the individual and the organization. Managers guarantee the existence of such limits and are responsible for maintaining and modifying them in acceptable ways.”

(Tian Sørhaug, 1996)

We all know that if you set yourself the task of observing changes in a society or an organization, you need to select a perspective for making these observations. The choice of perspective determines both what you can see and what you should ignore. For instance, if I choose to examine changes from an economic perspective, economic concepts and parameters will dictate what captures my attention as I observe. If I decide to look at changes from a technological perspective, technical terms and categories will determine the observations that emerge. If I select a cultural

perspective, cultural opinions and theories will shape my observations. In other words, the process of observation does not start with a blank canvas but always has a definite point of departure that helps to forge and delimit a certain domain.

Our decision to observe changes in the military organization and its management practices from a competency perspective implies selecting a set of concepts and assumptions that highlights certain conditions and circumstances related to learning, identity and the construction of meaning during international operations. Selecting concepts of competency and learning rather than traditional notions of skills and instruction is an advantage because it enables a more dynamic and relational management understanding. This form of understanding does not depend on a harmoniously balanced system, but rather accounts for how diverse interests, requirements and expectations within the organization and the world around it pose mutual challenges. Thus one can also pinpoint a series of dilemmas and paradoxes expressed in the interface between the internally and externally oriented competency areas presented in the preceding chapter.

Combat skills and contact skills

Taking the four perspectives of the competency model – generating results, human relationships, stability and renewal – as a starting point, we

can initially identify a general tendency: namely, that the military contribution to international operations rests on the handling of two diametrical competencies practiced at all levels: 1) the exercise of military *combat skills* to create security and 2) the exercise of *contact skills* to create development. In other words: Acts of terrorism and attacks on civilians have to be combated (security perspective) at the same time that a society has to be built (development perspective). Whereas combat skills are meant to intervene in and neutralize enemy opposition, the purpose of contact skills is to reduce insecurity and increase trust. Similarly, combat skills are employed to achieve military superiority using military force while the goal of contact skills is to support the political reform process by displaying cultural understanding and insight into local political, religious, economic and social conditions.

As mentioned earlier, the complexity involved in accomplishing this task means that mutual *trust capital* has to be established in the civil-military encounter. If civil-military relations fail to include this trust capital, security and development cannot be created simultaneously. The local population needs to be involved in rebuilding and establishing a working social order. To build mutual trust, however, the unit must exercise the military force needed to combat unrest in the area. As anthropologist Tian Sørhaug points out: "A prerequisite for developing trust is the presence of a leadership that has the authority to apply sanctions against disloyalty and

violence, but does not use power in a way that makes internal and external relationships of trust impossible." (Sørhaug [1996]).



Source: HOK Foto

Cooperating with local police, Afghanistan 2005

If the exercise of military force cannot stop conflict in the mission area, the military presence will quickly lose its legitimacy, not only in the eyes of the local population but throughout the international community. So the exercise of power goes hand in hand with trust capital, i.e. the authority required to establish a new and stable *order*. The achievement of this objective embodies a paradox related to two simultaneous but diametrical

Trust and power
are two sides of
the same *order*

Combat skills are developed through routine procedures and drills

competencies: On one side, the unit has to intervene and exercise political and military authority, at weekly meetings with the mayor as well as at mobile checkpoints and during house and area searches. On the other side, the unit has to open up dialog and show respect for local traditions and values, when attending the sheikh's dinner party, on patrol and during contact operations in villages⁵³.

At every level of task performance, the individual soldier must therefore be able to balance this tension between trust and power, between security and development. Put another way, he has to master the control-based and trust-oriented competencies that enable him to respond appropriately in both conflict and dialog situations.

Discipline and inculcation

Control-based competencies are primarily built up through professional military training programs and drills. The traditional use of military units owes much to the fact that assignments have been carried out at company and battalion level, and smaller units like groups, sections and platoons have conducted their tasks within the framework of a company. This means that smaller units are trained to receive clearly defined assignments, which they carry out using a number of standard procedures. The focus is on routine, standardized combat skills and methods. The

53. Contact operations are a concept used by KFOR 12 to improve knowledge of daily life in the villages and to inform villagers about current activities in the DANBN area. See HOK Infoserver/KFOR week 24, 2005.

Soldiers should be able to act without hesitation using pre-defined methods

classic scenario for combat exercises has thus been based on the following characteristics:

- Objectives are achieved through combat. The goal is to establish military superiority in time and space.
- Missions are simple and clearly defined; they are formulated by officers higher up in the hierarchy and can be executed linearly.
- Friends and foes wear different uniforms and are easily distinguishable.
- Civilians are neutral and not directly involved in missions. Soldiers associate and communicate only with soldiers from their own unit.
- The conflict is geographically founded so soldiers know whether they are on dangerous ground or “home turf”.

Classic combat skills are thus based on a set of competencies acquired through inculcation and turned into automatic responses through frequent repetition, imitation and rote learning. As Colonel Lars Møller points out: “The Armed Forces have introduced procedures for basically everything, routines that are often very complex. Standardizing these procedures enables them to be inculcated in a way that allows them to be applied almost automatically.” (Møller: 46)

This form of instruction is meant to enable the soldier to respond to any conceivable situation without hesitation and using carefully predefined methods that seem appropriate from a security perspective. At the same

time, the instruction should equip the soldier with routine and an intuitive toolbox that frees up his resources to think about the more unpredictable and incalculable aspects of the assignment.



Source: 2PNINFKMP/DANBN/KFOR 3

Combating riots in Mitrovica, KFOR 3, 2001

The *combat skills* competency is therefore fundamentally developed with this learning method, which we will define using the general concept of *discipline* (forced adaptation according to fixed rules).

However, experience from complex international operations clearly shows that discipline alone will not get the job done properly and has to be supported by more flexible teaching methods. Major Anders B. Olesen, commander of the RECCE squadron, IRAQ 4, comments: "During complex missions, the way we tackle our assignments differs fundamentally from the way we are taught to carry out our tasks. We have essentially been trained to carry out Article 5 operations and are used to being led. Missions, on the other hand, require soldiers right down to the rank of platoon leaders and enlisted privates to be able to make on-the-spot decisions."⁵⁴

Reflexivity and establishing trust

Unlike control-based competencies, which are largely acquired through instruction and exercises during the training program, developing trust-oriented competencies is a life-long learning process. These competencies are basic social skills that evolve from the soldier's cultural background, upbringing and personal experience. Showing trust is a universal human behavior without which it would be impossible to build complex social structures. As Niklas Luhmann points out in his book *Trust: A Mechanism for the Reduction of Social Complexity*: "Without trust, only very simple forms of human cooperation which can be transacted on the spot are

54. Quoted from a seminar held at the Centre for Administrative Training, Høveltegaard, June 2005.

Trust enables a system to gain time

possible... Trust is necessary for raising a social system's potential for action above these elementary forms ... A system gains time through trust, and time is a critical variable in establishing more complex social structures" (Luhmann [1968]). In international operations trust therefore becomes a decisive operational tool, particularly for gathering intelligence and cooperating with local security forces. Thus, in the encounter between civil-military cultures, soldiers also draw on several "contact skills" that promote trust and cultural exchange.

Unlike combat skills, contact skills cannot be acquired through discipline. This would require that action taken have a highly predictable output, and output is extremely uncertain and non-transparent when one is dealing with cultural and interpersonal processes. We cannot write a manual or set of rules predicting that if you do A, other people will do B. Contact skills are not output-competencies but process competencies. The process outcome depends on the *generation of trust* based on mutual respect, communication ability, holistic understanding, cooperativeness, flexibility and the ability to de-escalate conflict situations.

Certainly, training can help a soldier strengthen these competencies to some extent. Factual insight into other cultures, understanding of human rights conventions and training using simulation exercises can provide a preliminary basis for navigating complex inter-cultural situations.

Contact skills can be strengthened through greater insight into other cultures



Source: HOK Foto

Mission-oriented training, Oksbøl 2005

However, it is only when a soldier has had first-hand experience of real-life situations that he can appreciate the complexity of and face his own limitations in creating development-oriented solutions. But experiencing this complexity does not in itself lead to competency development. The all-important factor is the soldier's subsequent conscious reflection on the experience, during which the new, strange and complex events are verbalized and interpreted in a future-oriented perspective.


Informal communication is crucial for learning and constructing meaning

Although debriefings are of considerable importance in this respect, informal communication about everyday incidents and the experience gained during international missions are paramount to the learning process. Discussion in the barracks corridors and in the quarters plays a major role in constructing meaning for soldiers. It is here, for example, that local actors are categorized either as “jerks who had it coming” or as “fine people who have landed in a terrible situation”.

The development of the *contact skill* competency thus builds on the organization’s formal and informal verbalization and construction of meaning, i.e. the learning style we will define using the general concept of *reflexivity* (reflection on the difference between one’s own values and those of the surrounding world).

We now have a picture of four equally important competency areas in military practice – *combat skills and contact skills* (external), *discipline and reflexivity* (internal).

Fig. 4:




The four competency areas

Reflexivity must be targeted through shared values

A key point to bear in mind with respect to competency development is that, like contact and combat skills, reflexivity and discipline constitute a mutual paradox. Exaggerating one learning style risks reducing the effect of the other. Excessive discipline negatively impacts reflexivity, turning the military profession into a matter of merely “keeping a stiff upper lip”, enduring the unendurable, obeying orders and learning by rote. Conversely, too much undirected reflexivity can diminish soldiers’ readiness to act if the processes of constructing meaning fail to produce shared values adopted as future practice. Without an action-based, future-oriented focus, reflexivity will not progress beyond loose, fragmented talk and unconstructive complaining that in learning terms can go anywhere. Leaders thus need to focus competency development on ensuring that both learning styles – reflexivity and discipline – influence the culture equally. Achieving this, like handling external relationships with the community, requires the establishment of mutual trust. Inwardly too, the organization needs to invest in its trust capital in order to maintain levels of motivation and commitment under exacting conditions. Thus a general trend analysis operates with the following key concepts for military practice: *contact skills, combat skills, reflexivity and discipline*, with *trust* as the organizing principle (see Fig. 5 on the following page).

Fig. 5:



Competency development in an operational context

So far, our aim has been to present a few concepts and analyses that pinpoint and express the conditions for management, leadership and learning in international operations. We have emphasized the need to balance diametrical competencies and leadership and management practices and thus stressed the importance of trust as the concept that practically unites internal and external competencies. Whereas some of the competencies presented – combat skills and discipline – have already been described in depth in a military context, contact skills and reflexivity are less familiar military competencies, for which reason we will describe and define them in more detail in the following pages.

Contact skills as a tactical concept

Contact skills are a personal competency that links a number of other FOKUS competencies, more specifically:

- Context awareness
- Cooperation
- Communication
- Flexibility
- Conflict handling

Like combat skills, contact skills span both internal and external competency perspectives. Externally, contact skills chiefly serve as a tool for intelligence gathering and inter-cultural cooperation. Internally, they function primarily as a coordination tool and as a means of communicating shared values. Contact skills can thus be used *externally as a tactical concept* in civil-military relations and *internally to construct meaning* within the organization.

We will first take a look at the externally oriented, tactical perspective.

- **Context awareness**

When a soldier is said to be showing holistic understanding in the cultural encounter between civilians and a military force, this means, first, that he understands the mission's overarching military and political goals: that he

has essentially identified the nature of the mission on which he has been sent. Is his job to go out and fight an enemy or to support humanitarian and political rebuilding – or possibly even both? Over and above this, he has to show understanding of the cultural context in which he has been placed – that is, respect for the norms and rules of conduct followed in the area. For example, male soldiers should not search Iraqi women, all soldiers should remember to remove their shoes before entering a private home and they should start a visit by praising and acknowledging the host and his house. As a contact skill, holistic understanding means that the soldier has assessed and adapted his actions in light of the cultural, political and security context into which he steps on arrival in the mission area.

- **Cooperation**

As mentioned earlier, the international mission assignments entail establishing civil-military cooperation, for example, in setting up electricity and water supplies or rebuilding roads, schools and hospitals.

Swift, efficient humanitarian aid helps to stabilize a situation and create goodwill among the population towards the military presence. Attention to the needs of the local population and cooperation with civil authorities and relief organizations are thus important elements of FORCE PROTECTION. Cooperation with the local population is also vital for generating the sense of co-responsibility that paves the way for an efficient, democratic social system in the long term. Coordination and

Knowledge-sharing underpins the rebuilding process and embeds legitimacy

knowledge sharing with local authorities and other coalition forces thus supports the political process of reform and helps to embed the legitimacy of new government bodies in the local areas. One such example is training and cooperating with local police and security forces in Kosovo and Iraq, who are intended to assume gradually increasing responsibility for security tasks.

As a contact skill, cooperation is thus manifested in a soldier's ability to coordinate his own and others' efforts during task performance, to ensure the sharing of knowledge and, if necessary, to assist others in their work.



Training Iraqi Police, IRAQ 6, 2005

Source: MPDET/DA BG/IRAK 6

Good communication generates good intelligence

Decision-making is a collective competency practiced at all levels

- **Communication**

Effective cooperation between military and civilian actors requires that a framework for ongoing dialog be created. Here, the main rule is to send clear, precise messages that can be followed up by action and thus avoid unnecessary misunderstandings and barriers to communication. As with all else, respect for others' views and the will to find a common ground for understanding are also keys to constructive dialog.

Good communication generates good intelligence. When paying a social call, for example, it is usually a good idea to start the conversation with a "soft" introduction focusing on the family and everyday matters before one asks the "hard-core" intelligence questions. In situations like these one must dare to "play the game", assume a role and go along with the opposite party's terms rather than strike an immediate military tone. As a contact skill, communication is manifested in the soldier's ability to formulate his messages succinctly, "go along with the game", create space for differences of opinion and collect relevant information.

- **Flexibility**

Flexibility has become a virtual mantra in a wide range of contexts. In a complex and unpredictable world it means we all need to be prepared for anything any time, while for soldiers flexibility means the ability to adapt to changing conditions, make independent decisions and assume new responsibilities and work routines on their own initiative. In mission areas, a great deal of work is planned and implemented at group level, and huge

distances have to be covered, frequently across dangerous and difficult terrain. In this case, decision-making is not a competency reserved for officers and commanders, but a collective competency practiced at all levels. Flexibility can be seen as a contact skill that accelerates task achievement and enables more complex security strategies. As a personal competency, flexibility is often reflected in the way an individual soldier demonstrates change readiness and independent decision-making skills under variable conditions.

- **Conflict handling**

Conflict handling entails preventing as well as resolving conflict. Preventive initiatives rely on detailed local knowledge and insight into the everyday life of the area. Armed with a good grasp of the different relationships and interests between the various families, clans, villages, businesses, political and religious groups, etc., soldiers are in a better position to identify changes in the normal situation and intervene before a conflict flares. Once a conflict has erupted, the first move is to retain control, act calmly and level-headedly, and maintain neutral relations with the parties involved. A mediation process can then be initiated in which the parties negotiate compensation for stolen cattle, use of agricultural land, water supplies or ransoms for kidnapped relatives, to name but a few examples. As a battalion representative, the soldier has the task of creating and facilitating negotiation frameworks and suggesting constructive solutions that accommodate as many interests as possible.



Source: 2PN1NFKMP/DANBN/KFOR 3

Social Patrol, KFOR 3, 2000

Above all, however, a conflict is handled by establishing good contact with the local population and making them responsible for rebuilding their society, for instance, by turning development projects into joint assignments⁵⁵. Essentially, therefore, conflict handling is about building

55. See, e.g., the article "Mod lysere tider" in Danish in *Forsvaret*, June 2005, pp. 24-25, which describes a joint tractor project that required Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians to work together in Banja.

trust and, as such, acts as a “common management competency”; that is, a competency practiced at all levels of the organization.

As a tactical contact skill, conflict handling is manifested when the individual soldier exercises timely judgment and stimulates cooperation. He assesses the various interests at play in a conflict and suggests a forward-looking compromise.

Contact skills and values in the organizational culture

From an internal perspective, as mentioned earlier, contact skills relate to the formal and informal construction of meaning that takes place in the organization and the values this establishes. Contact skills are variously expressed through daily social conventions, personal relationships and appreciation of each other’s strengths and weaknesses. Reconsidered in light of the organization’s culture and its internal management practices, the five competencies of holistic understanding, cooperation, communication, flexibility and conflict handling acquire new meaning:

- **Context awareness:** Refers to a soldier’s understanding of how he belongs and contributes to the organizational entity, and to his appreciation of the community’s overarching values and objectives.
- **Cooperation:** Expressed in the delegation and coordination of daily tasks, willingness to share experience, and acknowledgement and appreciation of the competencies and responsibilities of others.

- **Communication:** Relates to the communication and decision-making processes within the organization. How is information to be passed on through the hierarchical structure? Which topics are “legitimate” and which not?
- **Flexibility:** Shown in the willingness to act according to the situation rather than insisting on rules and regulations that fail to take into account the “spirit of the assignment”.
- **Conflict handling:** Expressed in the handling of disagreements and diverging views within and across units as well as in the ability to spot the opportunities presented by alternative solutions rather than their limitations.

Naturally, this is not intended to be an exhaustive description of an organization’s cultural themes, but serves solely to indicate some of the internal factors and situations that call for the reflective potential of contact skills rather than the disciplinary potential of combat skills. Within the framework of the organizational culture, contact skills serve first and foremost to shape and communicate certain values and rules of acceptance in the military community. They thus support a more flexible, value-based style of management that promotes a greater degree of delegation and individual decision-making. In other words, contact skills support the style of management we have previously termed *risk management*.

Combat and contact skills form the basis of a soldier's risk management ability

Risk management and the construction of meaning

A general characteristic of contact skills – whether external or internal – is that they derive from the individual soldier's reflexivity, or his *sense of judgment* and ability to make independent decisions. Along with combat skills, contact skills therefore form the basis of the soldier's *risk management* ability. If a VIP escort encounters a funeral procession or a shepherd with his flock, the escort leader needs to make a quick overall assessment: should the escort take an alternative route (combat skill) or would it make more sense to negotiate with the mourners/shepherd to let the escort through (contact skill)? Both solutions pose unforeseeable risks, and the right decision requires a good sense of the situation: What is the relationship with the particular village and its residents, what is the overall threat, and does an ongoing, fragile trust-building process need to be factored into the equation?

The problem soldiers frequently confront in relations with civilians is whether to select power or trust as a risk-handling strategy. Obviously, the dilemma they face here is only an apparent one. From a competency perspective, it is not necessarily a question of either-or but rather both-and. Soldiers need to strike the right *balance* between trust and power, taking both security and trust capital into consideration regardless of whether the escort leader decides to re-route his escort to avoid

provoking a tense situation or negotiates a solution enabling the escort to complete its route through safe terrain as planned.

A liaison officer from KFOR 3 gives an example of this type of situationally determined trade-off between trust and power: "Good relations with the local people is crucial for the battalion down here at the moment and all-important for keeping things calm and quiet. And I'd rather spend four hours sitting talking to people and prevent a demonstration or other form of unrest than have to go into combat for one hour."⁵⁶

Executing this trade-off depends on the presence of a versatile, flexible contingency force that can deploy both combat and contact skills depending on the situation. We wish therefore to reiterate: Trust alone is not enough, but must be regularly re-considered and balanced using control mechanisms. Neither is trust accorded normative priority over power. On the contrary, trust and power exist in a mutually reinforcing relationship, intermeshing with each other in numerous ways (Nørgaard 2004:164).

56. See Nørgaard, 2004 p. 167.



House/area search, IRAQ 4, 2004

Contact skills and combat skills should thus never be perceived as mutually *exclusive*, but rather as mutually *reinforcing* competencies. In the mission area, where the threat level can change dramatically from hour to hour and from village to village, soldiers need to be able to switch from dialog to conflict and vice versa in the space of a very short time. It is not merely a matter of promptly and dutifully obeying a five-point order, but of carrying out the assignment in the right *spirit*; that is, with the proper understanding of the basic values and the operative context in which the

Flexibility is achieved through an active learning process in the mission area

Understanding of the "right spirit" is created in the field encounter

unit works. Thus, an understanding of the mission "spirit" is what enables the soldier to handle unforeseen events and make situation-specific decisions in accordance with the battalion's overall strategies and objectives.

However, this approach requires extra reflection and more intensive information processing on the part of the individual. This is why being "independent and flexible" is in many ways more demanding than being "dutiful and predictable". Whereas blind obedience rests on formal, passive learning, independence and flexibility require an *active* learning process during which the soldier *forms* himself into a competent decision-maker and risk-taker. It is thus important to re-emphasize that this learning process takes place during the college training program but primarily through a process of personal *self-formation* in the mission area. Here, the techniques and procedures learned are put into a *meaningful* context and gain relevance for the individual soldier. It is also primarily during duty in the field that a soldier's attitude to and understanding of the "right spirit" are formed and reflected in the carrying out of duties. A company commander from KFOR 3 puts it like this: "It is far easier to lose your grasp and lose sight of the spirit in the Armed Forces than anywhere else, because as I say: We have the right of command, we have a duty of obedience ... but it is the *spirit* of the mission we need to capture."⁵⁷ Put

57. See Nørgaard, 2004 p. 145.

another way: You can certainly teach a soldier to say “Yes, sir!” but the ultimate goal is to make sure he understands why he does and what the *point* of the exercise is.

To sum up, we could say that the overriding competency in international operations is the ability continually to adapt and regulate the *balance* between trust and control, between combat and contact skills, between security and development. At the same time, the constant construction and reconstruction of the “spirit of the assignment” is the space in which the individual soldier forms himself as a decision-maker in a way meaningful to him and the organization.

Summary

The fighting spirit and esprit de corps in a competency perspective

In conducting an introductory trend analysis of the changes in the international security environment and making a new military competency profile, we have attempted to provide an overall organizational diagnosis conceptualizing the special conditions and needs that shape the military risk community in international operations.

Commenting on these conditions and needs, an officer from KFOR 4 said: "This is where we create, where we react to and also *act* on – from day to day, in fact – developments in the situation. This is where we actually employ some of these standard command structures, battle drills and trust-generating measures that our training and education have helped to establish ... Similarly, we need to create an environment where we can refine our social relations and foster an organization whose members trust and respect each other and who can use the tools a soldier needs when his life is on the line."⁵⁸

58. See Nørgaard, 2004 p. 51.

The interesting aspect of this interpretation is how it presents a form of military self-understanding based not on consensus and accord but on the handling of paradoxes. It simultaneously highlights the inherent tension in the competency model interface between security/development and relationships/results: In complex, international operations where soldiers “create... react to and *act* on ...from day to day ... developments in the situation”, both “battle drills” and “trust-generating measures” are required, i.e. the need for both security and development. In the same way, the “need to create an environment where we can refine our social relations” arises in tandem with the ability to “use the tools a soldier needs when his life is on the line”, i.e. the need to both develop human relationships and deliver results.

Seen in light of the competency model’s internal and external perspectives, the competencies put into play externally clearly depend on the competencies put into play internally. This is nothing new. In the context of international operations, it does, however, assume a new dimension whereby the fundamental values of the organization, basically the organization’s underlying view of society and humanity, become what set a “good example” for day-to-day routines. Put another way: these relationships of trust and the spirit of the military working community form the basis for trust and the spirit of relationships with the civilian community.

“Authority is built up by showing interest in people and creating esprit de corps”

Good results depend therefore not only on *fighting spirit* but also on *esprit de corps*, in other words the sense of community. As an officer from KFOR 3 pointed out: “You have to be able to see that the authority is in place for everyone, more or less, from the start, but that it can disappear equally quickly for those who aren’t actually in authority – that is those who only have formal authority, like those sergeants with their three chevrons... And it’s all rooted in the fact that the people who create a framework for loyalty go this far (showing two almost closed fingers) – and the rest is built by showing interest in people, creating this esprit de corps and making sure that people care about each other, feel something for each other.”⁵⁹

His words reiterate that formal authority and the military hierarchy cannot exist on their own but must be imbued with meaning through the acts of “showing interest in people” and by “making sure that people care for each other, feel something for each other”, in other words, “creating this esprit de corps”. In a competency perspective, esprit de corps is related to the handling of a specific paradox: the dichotomy between the need to create results and the need to develop human relationships. On the one hand, focus is trained on the task, on being result-oriented, effective and dynamic. On the other, the focus falls on creating the best backdrop for working together, for being loyal and supportive and for developing and motivating others.

59. See Nørgaard, 2004 p. 142.

To enable the military risk community to accommodate these opposing needs, the organization as a whole and the individual soldiers in particular have to increase their own reflexivity – communicate more about their own values, norms and rules of acceptance. In other words, the object is to create and communicate an organizational culture, a military *communitas* that more strongly accentuates its own ethos (see Chapter 2), shaping individual soldiers as ethical and political actors in a complex and unpredictable landscape (see Chapter 3). Soldiers cease to be merely passive obedient bodies, anonymous, dispensable elements in a rigid and mechanical bureaucracy; in the civilian encounter, their commitment makes them personal representatives of the entire battalion, the public face of the organization. They become symbols and bearers of a distinct social and cultural *order* and thus also of a specific regime of disciplinary and formative principles and practices.

An officer from KFOR 3 put it like this: “I have to be the type of person who is visible out there. As a battalion representative, I have to be available to anyone who needs me if they have a problem of any sort, whether related to CIMIC or security or whatever. My main duty out there is actually security but ... I also need to create something and activate some of these people to stabilize and ensure the level of security out there.”⁶⁰

60. See Nørgaard, 2004 p. 169.

Dichotomies are overcome and made meaningful in the self-narrative

These words concisely link the soldier's own self-representation as a "person who is visible out there" and who, as "a battalion representative", has to "be available to anyone who needs him" and who has a general security perception based on development, creating something and activating people – in other words on the formation of a civil society. This personal narrative thus encapsulates the conclusion of the introductory trend analysis we carried out regarding the new security paradigm, in which the dichotomies between security/development and results/human relationships are overcome and made meaningful.

A new military competency profile capable of offering an adequate contemporary diagnosis must be able to make allowance for this meaningful management of personal and organizational paradoxes. In this context, the competency model's four perspectives or forms of logic show how the personal and organizational formative processes mutually interconnect and cause interference. In brief: How does the organization shape its individual members, and how do they shape the organization?

Conclusion

With this summary in mind, we arrive at the following conclusion: the new security paradigm creates not only a new operative context for international missions, but also a new military regime of formative principles and practices capable of handling new types of risk and creating more complex cooperative relations with civilian populations and political actors. We believe that the changes in the security policy environment have had an impact as a new value-oriented form of leadership and management and as a new military identity and that, as such, they have produced new perspectives for our perception of leadership, management and competency development.

The organizational diagnosis identified the intensity of the risk community and the blurring of the division between formal and informal relations. Social life as it unfolds in the military risk community is crucial to personal construction of meaning and the individual soldier's professional development. Extrapolating the organizational diagnosis, we can pose the question of how each individual soldier "acclimatizes" to the risk community and handles the various types of risk inherent in the civil-military encounter. Which competencies come into play and how are they acquired?

New demands on soldiers as constructors of meaning

The cultural encounter produces new types of cooperation and learning

First, we established that the formative ideal of individual competency development is to render the soldier and position him as a professional and trustworthy decision-maker. This is both a promising and a disconcerting perspective as we do not yet fully understand the extent of the demands this makes on the individual soldier as a constructor of meaning. For, as we point out in the leadership and management diagnosis, the fact that Danish soldiers are increasingly expected to both “govern themselves” and lead and manage the development of civil society means that the division between personal, political and cultural formative processes is gradually becoming less distinct. Internal and external boundaries become more fluid, requiring ongoing justification and negotiation.

In an overall trend analysis we argued that the encounter of civilian and military cultures in the new wars engenders not only new types of risk but also new forms of cooperation, learning processes and identity formation – in short, new types of social *organization*. The organizational diagnosis thus reveals an ethical and political paradox in international operations: the creation of greater order and more freedom at one and the same time.

For the individual soldier this means not only seeking out and defeating an enemy but also educating and building up a society. The soldier becomes an ambassador not only for an occupying military force but also for a disciplinary and formative regime. This role transition indicates the

emergence not only of a new set of threats but also of daily military practices based less on rules and more on values than in the past.

The future perspective for this publication is to show how these new tendencies and perspectives arising from the civil-military cultural encounter can be put to use in formal frameworks during and around international missions. By introducing the concept competency and illustrating it with empirical examples, it became obvious that the complexity and growing politicization of military tasks have made it necessary to supplement military combat skills with interpersonal skills. The question is then how to train soldiers in contact skills? The immediate answer is: through increased reflection, through communicating and acting on personal values, and through the knowledge and understanding of cultural diversity. Contact skills do not mean subscribing to the personal opinions and points of view of others at the cost of one's own; they mean handling uncertainty and building trust in an international security environment. Neither are contact skills about depriving soldiers of their combat ability – the very reason they were sent to the mission area in the first place. The aim of these skills is to give soldiers tools enabling them to maneuver in a far more complex and politically charged network of interests and positions of power.

Against the background of the above analysis, we have considered changes in the broader community of the armed forces and thus compiled

a competency profile for soldiers in international service that meets the new threats presented by the international security environment and anchors the execution of military assignments in personal values, norms and cultural categories.

We hereby hope to open a discussion of this paradoxical phenomenon and its intrinsic contradictions.

Glossary

Adequate conduct: Actions that demonstrate and promote the underlying values of the military mission. Adequate readiness thus relies on a combination of combat and contact skills developed through disciplinary and reflexive learning.

Civility: Moral and political social practice that minimizes the use of violence as a means of regulating social relations.

Civil Society: The political and moral organization of the relationship between individual and state.

Combat skills: The competencies soldiers exercise through concrete actions to create security and stability in a mission area. The actions are based on the use of military force to intercept and neutralize enemy resistance, demonstrate military combat authority and create military superiority.

Competency (FOKUS): Experiences that are translated into concrete actions in order to achieve current and future objectives.

Competency development (FOKUS): Learning through targeted activities that utilize and challenge staff experiences.

Contact skills: The competencies soldiers exercise through concrete actions to support development in a mission area. The actions rely on one's having cultural understanding and insight into local political, religious, economic and social conditions intended to reduce insecurity, increase trust, and support the local process of reform.

Context: The social, cultural and physical setting in which an event takes place. For example, actions are always carried out relative to a specific context. A meaningful assessment of whether an action is adequate and therefore competent is thus only possible when it includes the social, cultural and physical phenomena characteristic of the setting in which the action takes place.

Disciplinary regime: The socially accepted norms, values and rules of acceptance that allow certain standpoints, meanings and alternative avenues of action (inclusion) while others are disallowed (exclusion).

Discipline: The learning associated with adapting to fixed rules and routines. Discipline supports formal, traditional learning and the execution of actions requiring automatic processes, uniformity, obedience and predictability. Examples of learning methods are drills, frequent repetition, imitation and rote learning.

Ethos: The core values, visible *spirit* and mutual sense of community that exists across hierarchies and is expressed in "professional attitude".

Experience: The constant construction of meaning relative to people's interaction with the world around them. Experience is built on the basis of the learning person's experience of the world, but also creates the platform for understanding it. Experience is thus an ongoing exchange between the construction and reconstruction of meaning and action. Experience is created in the encounter between the individual's observations and the social negotiation of meaning.

Externalization: The transfer of one's own categories and behavioral expectations to other social and cultural contexts.

Formative history: An individual's personal narrative that is continually constructed and reconstructed through his experience and interpretation of the world.

Global Governance: Complex network of government and international institutions that uses formal and informal power structures to regulate and monitor the international security environment.

Recontextualization: Putting past experiences and interpretations into a new meaningful context.

Reflexivity: The learning acquired as a result of flexible adaptation to new, unfamiliar situations with elements of risk. Reflexivity supports the construction of new meaning and the execution of actions requiring change readiness, cultural understanding and self-understanding. The learning process can take place, for example, through feedback, coaching, critical self-reflection, experiments or exercises that challenge group mentality.

Risk community: A community working in a situation with elements of risk that shapes the individual as a professional and trustworthy decision-maker in a complex and changing security environment.

Risk management: Decentralized, value-based management practice that replaces bureaucratic control with personal self-control. The faster pace of risk management offers the advantage of allowing more complex relations to be established with the broader community.

Security discourse: Communication strategy that establishes a phenomenon or a circumstance as a security issue.

Security paradigm: The temporary repertoire of generally accepted opinions, attitudes, strategies and criteria set out in the security discourse.

Security program: The political agenda that operationalizes and institutionalizes the security discourse in concrete (military) security practices.

Social construction: Our experiences are created and re-created in social relationships. Our active involvement in the world around us always takes place in interaction with other people. We build up a collective understanding of knowledge and competencies in the social community and we fight about what is true and what is false.

Trust: A social mechanism that lessens the insecurity continually generated in complex decision-making contexts.

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Appendix

The following feedback on the report shows clearly that deployment on international missions has extensive, positive learning impact for individual soldiers.

| What impact did your deployment have on you? | | Completely or largely agree | Partially agree or disagree |
|--|----------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| You have gained good military experience. | Privates | 79.5 % | 19.8 % |
| | Officers | 81.6 % | 17.9 % |
| You have gained experience that you can use in your civilian life. | Privates | 70.3 % | 28.8 % |
| | Officers | 73.5 % | 25.1 % |
| You have learned something about other peoples and countries. | Privates | 83.8 % | 15.9 % |
| | Officers | 86.3 % | 13.2 % |
| You have broadened your horizons. | Privates | 87.7 % | 11.9 % |
| | Officers | 89.5 % | 10.0 % |
| You have learned to handle difficult situations. | Privates | 77.0 % | 22.4 % |
| | Officers | 78.2 % | 20.9 % |
| You have greater self-confidence. | Privates | 71.3 % | 28.0 % |
| | Officers | 71.9 % | 27.5 % |
| You feel your deployment has contributed to your personal development. | Privates | 76.2 % | 23.4 % |
| | Officers | 79.2 % | 20.4 % |