

## Russian Peacekeeping in Georgia/Abkhazia

By Peter Dahl Thruelsen, Institute for Strategy,  
Royal Danish Defence College.

Working Paper



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This working paper is a product of on-going research into conflicts and military involvement in the Eurasian region. The analysis of Russian peacekeeping in Abkhazia is the first product of a combined research project conducted between the Royal Danish Defence College, the Centre for Military-Strategic Studies of the Russian General Staff and the Institute of Europe of the Academy of Sciences.

The project concerns '*Conflicts and Military Involvement in the Eurasian Region from 1991 to 2006*'. The objective of the research project is to examine the variety of external military involvement in conflicts in Eurasia and the role of the military in conflict settlement and peace building. Another aim of the project is to fertilize the ground for improving the use of military force in peace-support operations in general and to strengthen the potential for regional and trans-regional military cooperation in the future. The conflicts concerned are Georgia/Abkhazia, Georgia/South Ossetia, Moldova/Transdnistre, Serbia/Kosovo, and Afghanistan, which have all been visited during field trips conducted within the last year.

The result of the project will be an editorial publication consisting of five analyses of military involvement in the above-mentioned conflicts to be published primo 2007.

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Copenhagen November 2006  
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PO Box 2521  
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Denmark  
Tlf.: 3915 1515  
Fax: 3929 6172  
Editor in chief: Major General Karsten Møller  
Editor: Ole Kværnø  
Printed in Denmark by Danish Defence, Korsør  
Graphic Design by Bysted  
ISBN-13: 978-87-91421-21-1  
ISBN-10: 87-91421-21-7  
Number printed 300

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## Background

The war between Georgia and the autonomous region of Abkhazia erupted in 1992, the first shot being fired on 14 August, when approximately 3000 members of the Georgian National Guard entered Sukhumi, the capital of the self-declared republic. The fighting continued at different levels of intensity until 14 May 1994, when the Moscow Agreement (appendix 1) was signed in Moscow by the Georgian and Abkhaz sides. The Moscow Agreement – a separation of forces agreement – listed the conditions under which a peacekeeping force should be implemented under the auspices of the Commonwealth of Independent States (the Commonwealth of Independent States Peacekeeping Force or CISPfK).<sup>1</sup> The agreement was later ratified by UN Security Council Resolution 937 (1994), which authorised an increase in the United Nations Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG<sup>2</sup>) to 136 military observers.<sup>3</sup>



Map 1: The southern Caucasus.

### CISPfK

CISPfK is a brigade-size force manned entirely by troops from the Russian Federation. The Russian soldiers who participate in CISPfK are sent to the mission area from the North

<sup>1</sup> The terms 'peacekeeper' and 'peacekeeping force' will be used when referring to CISPfK soldiers, without implying whether or not the force is recognised as such judicially. The term only refers to the title of CISPfK and the wording of the UNOMIG mandate.

<sup>2</sup> UNOMIG was originally established on 24 August 1993 (S/RES/858(1993)) with the goal of verifying compliance with the 27 July 1993 ceasefire agreement.

<sup>3</sup> For further information on the conflict, see Lynch 2000, Jonson and Archer 1996, Koehler and Zürcher 2003.

Caucasus Military District. Before deploying to the mission area, the soldiers undertake approximately two months of special training, when the entire battalion is assembled. The staff officers of CISP KF are brought together approximately five months in advance of the mission deployment. When deployed, the soldiers reside at their post – mostly check-points – for one year before returning to the Russian Federation for a well-earned leave. Individual soldiers can apply to extend their deployment on the mission.

The operational structure of the deployed brigade is specifically designed for the mission. This includes additional elements of medics, engineers and logistics. Also, in a rather new departure for the mission, a press information officer has been appointed at CISP KF HQ. The total force of CISP KF is approximately 2,100 soldiers. Its HQ is located in the Abkhaz main city of Sukhumi at a former sanatorium by the sea and is led by a major general. In direct line of command from CISP KF HQ, two operational groups are stationed in the area of the former conflict zone and ceasefire line. The Northern Operational Group is located on the northern side of the Inguri River, with its HQ in Gali. The Southern Operational Group is located on the opposite side of the river, with its HQ in Zugdidi (see the diagram below).<sup>4</sup>




Figure 1: CISP KF structure.

<sup>4</sup> For more on CISP KF, see Mackinlay and Cross 2003, Baev 1996.

## UNOMIG

Under Security Council Resolution 937, UNOMIG's mandate was extended to include the oversight of CISPKF as well. The expanded UNOMIG mandate in relation to CISPKF includes among other things:

- To monitor and verify implementation of the Moscow Agreement
- To observe the operation of the CIS peacekeeping force within the framework of the agreement
- To monitor the storage areas for heavy military equipment in cooperation with the CIS peacekeeping force as appropriate
- To monitor the withdrawal of troops of the Republic of Georgia from the Kodori valley and to patrol the Kodori valley on a regular basis
- To investigate reported or alleged violations of the Moscow Agreement and to attempt to resolve or contribute to the resolution of such incidents
- To maintain close contacts with both parties to the conflict and to cooperate with the CIS peacekeeping force.

UNOMIG consists of 133 uniformed personnel (121 military observers and 12 police), 100 civilian staff and 178 local staff.<sup>5</sup> The UNOMIG HQ is located in the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, which is also the office of the SRSG. The military pillar of the mission is led by a Chief Military Observer with the rank of major general who is based in Sukhumi, with a direct line of command to the three sectors: the Sukhumi sector, the Gali sector and the Zugdidi sector.<sup>6</sup> All daily patrols conducted by the UNMOs (UN military observer) commence from the respective sector HQ.<sup>7</sup>





Figure 2: UNOMIG structure

<sup>5</sup> As of 20 November 2006 (<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unomig/facts.html>).

<sup>6</sup> The Sukhumi sector's area of responsibility is the Kodory valley. The Gali sector's area of responsibility is the northern part of the former conflict zone (see map below). The Zugdidi sector's area of responsibility is the southern part of the former conflict zone (see map below).

<sup>7</sup> For more information on UNOMIG, see: [www.unomig.org/](http://www.unomig.org/)



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The following analysis is based on interviews conducted in Georgia and de facto Abkhazia from the autumn of 2005 to the spring of 2006. The informants represented different levels within a number of institutions and organisations. These included, among others, the Georgian Ministry of Defence, the Georgian Ministry of Conflict Resolution, the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, local Abkhaz authorities concerned with defence, foreign affairs and internal affairs, UNOMIG, OSCE and CISPKF, and the local population in the former conflict zone.

The analysis is structured and focused according to the operationalised success criteria based on NATO principles on peace support operations<sup>8</sup>. For the sake of clarity it is structured according to the three overall levels: political/strategic, operational and tactical.

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<sup>8</sup> NATO Allied Joint Publication 3.4.1: 'Peace Support Operations'.

## Political/strategic level

### Mandate and objectives

The Moscow Agreement,<sup>9</sup> ratified by the UN Security Council in its Resolution 937 (S/RES/937), put an end to the hostilities between the Georgian forces and the Abkhazian militias in the breakaway region of Abkhazia on 14 May 1994. The agreement was put in place after approximately two years of fighting<sup>10</sup> and was implemented under the auspices of the United Nations and the significant support of the Russian Federation. The Moscow Agreement is a 'separation of forces' agreement, not a comprehensive and detailed agreement. In full, its length only runs to three pages, including a map. The non-comprehensive and non-detailed nature of the agreement became evident to the research team during its two field trips to Georgia, where the team encountered a number of different interpretations of the mandate by the different parties to the conflict. The question of the mandate in relation to CISPKF in this paragraph will focus on two overall questions: whether or not clearly stated and attainable objectives or an 'end state' were incorporated into the mandate; and whether the lessons learned by the military component were incorporated into the review of the mandate and peace-building strategy.

In the following, the wording of the mandate will be analysed in relation to the mandating of CISPKF, their actual performance in the former conflict zone, and the implications of the mandate for local civilian perceptions of the peacekeeping force.

In its preamble, the Moscow Agreement states that *'the parties committed themselves to strict compliance with a formal cease-fire'* when, earlier that year, they signed the 'Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement'.<sup>11</sup> In the declaration it is stated that *'The parties agree to continue energetic efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement'*, while in the Moscow Agreement it is stated that *'The process of achieving a comprehensive political settlement shall be pursued'*. There is, however, no clearly stated 'end state' or transition strategy incorporated into either of the two documents, nor are any objectives or benchmarks stated on the road to reaching a comprehensive political settlement during the peace-building process. When a mandate is drafted in general terms, it opens up the risk of the parties exploiting any ambiguities in later negotiations. In the case of the Georgian-Abkhazian peace process, the imprecise and general terminology used in the different mandates, especially the Moscow Agreement, concerning the political process was explored by the parties from 1994 until the present. Particularly when one party has been able to accuse the other party of not cooperating, the vagueness of the mandate has been widely exploited. Consequently, the dynamics of the political settlement have ceased. The local population on both sides of the conflict zone, the victims of all of this, have for well over twelve years now been witnesses to a frozen political situation with no significant political or social development. During the two field trips to Georgia and Abkhazia, the research team witnessed a total lack of faith in the political process by the local population, a lack of faith which has consequently been diverted towards CISPKF and

<sup>9</sup> 'Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces' or 'Moscow Agreement', signed in Moscow on 14 May 1994 (S/1994/583).

<sup>10</sup> The first use of armed force was reported on 14 August 1992 (Uppsala University Conflict Database).

<sup>11</sup> 'The Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement', signed 4 April 1994 (S/1994/397 Annex I).

manifested in perceptions of it. This was expressed on all levels: the local population, higher political authorities and within UNOMIG.<sup>12</sup> It was also evident in the very limited development that has taken place in the zone of conflict and in the lack of any positive view of the future right across the board.

When interviewing locals<sup>13</sup> in the former conflict zone, their perception was that political developments had become frozen because of a lack of commitment on the part of the CISPKE and the politicians. According to the locals residing in the area, CISPKE is merely maintaining the status quo, that is, physical security on the ceasefire line, and not trying to move the situation forward in a positive direction. The result of this uncertain situation is a population with no belief in the future and no desire to improve their homes or develop the local community.<sup>14</sup> Much of their frustration was turned towards CISPKE for not being active in the development of the peace process. The CISPKE itself, on the other hand, did not regard a joint effort to develop the situation as being part of its mandate, nor did it have any intention to improve or redefine its tasks within the current mandate. The general nature of the agreements regarding the political process and the impact on the local population had a direct effect on the perception of CISPKE, a quite negative one overall. The perception of the local population will be described further later in this chapter.

Overall the main objectives of the Moscow Agreement were the ending of hostilities and the safe return of the approximately 250,000 internally displaced people (IDP) to the former conflict zone. In addition to the ending of hostilities, a plan for the separation of forces was put forward as part of the Moscow Agreement. The plan for the separation of forces is quite brief and is probably one of the primary elements of concern and confusion when talking to the parties today. The loose structure has resulted in varied definitions of the mandate that CISPKE is expected to pursue and seems to have prevented any positive development of the peace process. Traditionally the separation of forces is the most comprehensive part of a ceasefire agreement, which should optimally take into account as a minimum security zones, coordination zones, troops and weapons, restrictions on the use of airspace, and the control of armaments (Public International Law: 17).<sup>15</sup> The Moscow Agreement takes most of these elements into account, but not very precisely. It establishes a Security Zone and a Restricted Weapons Zone in which restrictions on troops and weapons are described. The extent and restrictions of the zones are described as follows:

*2. The armed forces of the parties shall be separated in accordance with the following principles:*

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<sup>12</sup> Interviews conducted in Tbilisi, Zugdidi, Gali and Sukhumi from 18 to 29 September 2005 and from 4 to 11 March 2006.


<sup>13</sup> Primarily the Mingrel population, but the lack of trust was also expressed by the Abkhazian population, especially with regard to the security situation, which was considerably worse on the Abkhaz side among both the Mingrel and Abkhazian populations.

<sup>14</sup> The lack of progress and development were expressed especially strongly on the Abkhaz side of the ceasefire line.

<sup>15</sup> <http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/programs/peace/drafters/Security/CFtemplate.pdf>

(a) The area between lines B and D on the attached map (see appendix) shall constitute a security zone. There shall be no armed forces or heavy military equipment within this zone. The territory between lines A and B and lines D and E shall constitute a restricted weapons zone. There shall be no heavy military equipment within this zone. The local civil authorities shall function in the security zone and the restricted weapons zone. The police/militia employed for this purpose may carry personal arms.

The descriptions of the area in which the two zones are located are not precise. As can be seen on the map below the precise coordinates for the lines that divide the area into the Security Zone and the Restricted Weapons Zone are not given. This has fostered a situation in which the parties have not been able to agree on the extent of the zones, resulting in frequent discussions between the parties at weekly quadripartite meetings (QPM). In interviews with the different UNOMIG staff, it was mentioned that the dispute has been going on since 1994 and that it frequently results in reports of 'pro forma' violations by UNOMIG. These reports typically relate to military exercises conducted in the periphery of the Restricted Weapons Zone (in Ochamchira and in Senaki), and normally nothing is done in response to them.<sup>16</sup> But the vagueness of the demarcation lines has also been used at the political level in respect of incidents where the parties have accused each other of redefining the ceasefire line and in accusations of trespasses across the border. CISPKF is also criticised for not trying to solve the problem, as in the numerous incidences in which woodcutters have been detained on the grounds of their having crossed the 'Abkhazian State border' and brought before a court.



Map 2: The zones and UNOMIG (S/1994/818)

<sup>16</sup> Interviews conducted with UNOMIG staff in Zugdidi, 21 September 2005.

Regulations for troops and weapons within the two zones are also unclear, as can be seen from the mandate and the accompanying map. Heavy weapons are defined in the mandate, but 'personal arms' are not. This implies that the police and militia deployed in the Restricted Weapons Zone can carry an assault rifle with a mounted grenade launcher without this being a violation. This makes it extremely difficult for CISPKF to distinguish between police or militia and regular soldiers, the former but not the latter being allowed in the zones. In other words the mandate does not clearly distinguish the police or militia from the combatants, a failure that greatly impedes the CISPKF in carrying out its mandate.

In sum, the lines drawn on the Moscow Agreement's map and the loosely formulated definitions have been a constant problem in achieving any positive development of the peace process. This has been used by both parties to alter the focus of peace-building from high politics and grand issues to elements of low politics and minor issues that blind the parties to real changes and developments.

The Protocol of the Moscow Agreement concerning the role of CISPKF is also concise in its wording. CISPKF is tasked to 'exert its best efforts' in relation to:

- maintaining and observing the ceasefire and preventing a renewed outbreak of hostilities
- promoting through its presence the safe return of refugees and displaced persons to their former places of permanent residence
- implementing the Moscow Agreement in relation to the Security Zone and the Restricted Weapons Zone
- enjoying freedom of movement in the zones and freedom of communication and other facilities needed to fulfil its mission
- pursuing the process of achieving a comprehensive political settlement.

At first glance, CISPKF's mandate seems obvious, its tasks and objectives being outlined. But in the complexity of a post-conflict situation, different interpretations of the mandate are to be expected and therefore countered. In interviewing parties with different interests in the conflict,<sup>17</sup> it became evident that a variety of interpretations of the mandate were constantly being used within CISPKF, UNOMIG and at the political level. In talking about 'security first' as an essential element of any peace process, the parties were generally agreed that CISPKF should guarantee physical security on the ceasefire line – which it accomplished with great success at a very early stage – but here the common understanding ends. On the question of how physical security should be maintained and expanded to foster a wider peace-building process, the difference of opinion was remarkable. Within higher levels of UNOMIG, representatives stated that CISPKF was only man-

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<sup>17</sup> Interviews conducted with leading UNOMIG staff, Georgian officials and de facto Abkhazia officials from 18 to 29 September 2005.

dated to monitor the ceasefire line from its permanent checkpoints. However, any greater activity, such as patrolling on foot day and night to show its presence and actively improve security in the two zones, would take it beyond its mandate. Other UNOMIG representatives thought that, within the current mandate, patrolling on foot would be justified, but actively to promote the safe return of IDPs would be to stretch the mandate beyond its original intention. From the Abkhazian side it was reported that CISPKF was in fact frequently patrolling the zone on foot, while from the Georgian side it was reported that patrolling on foot was out of the question as not being in accordance with the mandate. Those in CISPKF itself could not agree on whether they were allowed to patrol or not. Many differences of opinion were expressed, but it could also be argued that these disagreements do not constitute a problem, taking into consideration the generally calm situation in the zones. However, if the situation is to evolve in a positive direction the parties have to agree on this question, so they can focus their attention on settling the political issues connected with the conflict. Also, when disagreements also emerge inside UNOMIG and CISPKF, it raises the question of whether all the members of the two organisations are working towards identical goals.

CISPKF has successfully ensured security on the ceasefire line, with or without patrolling. But, given its current way of operating, its presence has not '*promote[ed] the safe return of refugees and displaced persons*' as the agreement requires. From the signing of the Moscow Agreement in 1994, the issue of the return of IDPs has been a top priority on the political agenda. Five weeks before the agreement was signed, a 'Quadripartite Agreement on the Voluntary Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons' gave IDPs the right to a '*safe, orderly and voluntary repatriation*'.<sup>18</sup> As in the situation regarding the Security Zone and the Restricted Weapons Zone, the vagueness of the mandate does not state how CISPKF is to promote the safe return of IDPs, something that is being used by both sides to stall the peace process. It is clear from the mandate that CISPKF does not have a policing function, and no one interviewed seemed to be in favour of this anyway, but a military presence in the area of IDP return, perhaps in corporation with UNOMIG, would fall within the mandate and could help IDPs to return. It became clear in the interviews that the two sides used the IDP question as a way of making accusations towards each other and that they had no genuine interest in solving the problem. The Georgian side used the situation to accuse the Abkhazians of not being willing to implement the Moscow Agreement and provide stability. In its turn the Abkhazian side accused the Georgians of using the IDP problem as an excuse to get rid of CISPKF because they had not fulfilled their part of the mandate.<sup>19</sup> Also, the return of up to 250,000 IDPs would change the ethnic balance in the former conflict zone entirely, to the disadvantage of the Abkhazians.

The uncertainties and imperfections identified in the Moscow Agreement should be re-

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<sup>18</sup> 'Quadripartite Agreement on the Voluntary Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons', signed 4 April 1994 (S/1994/397 Annex II).

<sup>19</sup> Interviews conducted with *de facto* Abkhazian officials in Sukhumi, 26 September 2005, and with Georgian officials in Tbilisi, 6-7 March 2006.

moved in an updated agreement based on the experiences of the initial implementation and on developments within the conflict zone. But it seemed that no one wanted to change the Moscow Agreement apart from the annexes. Nobody was in favour of a total re-arrangement of the mandate. After twelve years of stalemate, the parties not being any closer to a permanent settlement of the conflict, this solution seems to be the only one available. For example, the Dayton agreement and the status of Kosovo are currently being reviewed.

In sum, as already described, since CISPKE finds itself in a situation in which its mandate is too vague to define precisely its tasks and mode of conduct, the two sides to the conflict are exploiting the situation for political purposes.<sup>20</sup> Even if the CISPKE were to try and foster an environment for the safe return of IDPs, it would be met with resistance from the two sides in the conflict. The uncertainty and consequent lack of development in the political settlement is seen by a majority of the local population as the result of an inactive CISPKE not contributing positively to the process. Looking at the scope of the mandate they are right, but CISPKE does not seem to be able to solve the problem on its own, and the two sides to the conflict do not seem willing to engage in any constructive dialogue or to implement changes with a view to revising the mandate.

### **Unity of Effort**

Unity of effort is essential to any post-conflict environment if a political settlement to the conflict is to succeed, especially when dealing with the unity of effort between the security forces and the surrounding political and NGO presence. As for the analysis above, it became clear to the research team relatively quickly that unity of effort between CISPKE and international and local efforts to build peace hardly existed, despite the fact that a forum for mutual dialogue was established early in the peace process. In the following, one overall question regarding unity of effort will lead the analysis: has there been sufficient coordination in relation to the military and to international and national peace-building objectives in the case of CISPKE in Abkhazia?

A peace process must be dynamic and move forward. For it to do so, there has to be coordination between the various actors and elements of the process, which must all work towards a common goal. However, this does not seem to be the case in this conflict zone. Initiatives to coordinate the various peace-building efforts have been made by setting up weekly QPM meetings attended by CISPKE, UNOMIG, the de facto Abkhazian authorities and the Georgian authorities. But as mentioned earlier, during our interviews the meetings were represented as being more of a courtesy call, where nothing substantial was ever done,<sup>21</sup> but only a lot of sabre-rattling where the parties both provoke each other and make a lot of small talk. However, the QPM meetings do not seem to be a total waste of time: a forum where the former belligerents can meet and talk is in itself a good

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<sup>20</sup> The question of Russia's military bases in Georgia also influenced the support of CISPKE by the Georgian side negatively. This was especially seen during interviews with Georgian officials and UNOMIG, where the subject was frequently raised. It seemed that the subject of these bases was seen as having a direct effect on Georgia's support for CISPKE.

<sup>21</sup> Interviews conducted with leading UNOMIG staff in Gali on 23 September and in Sukhumi on 27 September 2005.

development in the peace process. The meetings are described by UNOMIG as facilitating a platform for accountability and discussion among all sides, thus preventing situations from escalating. This role was positively confirmed by several informants during the interviews, but these also indicated that the meetings could have been used more efficiently to discuss and solve some of the problems concerning the situation of frozen conflict and the general perception of CISP KF.

It can of course, be difficult to coordinate peace-building efforts when, as shown earlier, the mandate does not list objectives and benchmarks, nor even a desired 'end state'. That said, the vagueness of the mandate should not be made an excuse for the parties not to take actions to resolve the stalemate. When the parties to the former conflict do not demonstrate a genuine desire to act positively, UNOMIG and CISP KF should initiate that process as third parties. During an interview at the Russian Ministry of Defence in Moscow, it was emphasised that the primary task of CISP KF was security on the ceasefire line and that it had been successful in accomplishing that.<sup>22</sup> When the issue of the lack of development in the peace process was raised, it was stated that this was not within the CISP KF mandate. As with the IDP situation, the lack of initiative on the part of CISP KF in more actively promoting positive developments has intensified the negative perceptions of its soldiers. With few exceptions, CISP KF has been stationed at the same checkpoints for the past twelve years and has taken no initiative in making changes and thus moving the peace process out of the impasse into which it has fallen. As some of our informants mentioned, CISP KF managed to control the security situation in the zones within the first two years of its presence. Now, however, the static presence of CISP KF at the same checkpoints is proving counterproductive in freezing the situation in terms of positive development.

In sum, it is clear that there is no overall unity of effort between CISP KF, UNOMIG, the Russian Federation, Georgia and de facto Abkhazia. CISP KF is solely focused on physical security in the zone of operation, and not particularly with coordinating its activities with either local civilian or international authorities. Also, no genuine initiatives have been implemented to move the process forward in a positive direction. On the contrary, CISP KF's narrow focus on its tasks and its static presence in the former conflict zone has indirectly prolonged the stalemate between the parties, so that its role as a third-party mediator and the responsibility associated with this have not been fulfilled.

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<sup>22</sup> Interview conducted in Moscow at the Ministry of Defence, 2 August 2005.

## Operational level

### Credibility

Enjoying the confidence of the local population in the mission area is vital for any peace-keeping force. When force commanders, at whatever level, interact with the local community in a small village or in the political centre of the conflict, any lack of credibility regarding the troops will come to predominate and thus curb cooperation and progress. As shown in the analysis of the political/strategic level CISP KF has experienced problems in this regard, and initiatives to counter the problem seem limited. The aspect of credibility will be directed towards two overall questions: is the military force seen as a positive contributor to the overall peace process, and is anything being done to improve and sustain its credibility?

The point of departure for identifying the credibility of CISP KF is to measure the issue in relation to the force's tasks as listed above. Credibility in relation to maintaining security and preventing a renewed outbreak of hostilities was positive. In studying the tasks, it is obvious that, almost without exception,<sup>23</sup> CISP KF has maintained security on the ceasefire line for the past twelve years with great success and is still doing so. After deploying its forces into the zone of conflict, CISP KF controlled the security situation and thus contributed positively to the peace process. CISP KF chose to implement the task by conducting its operations from stationary checkpoints in the area of the ceasefire line, the aim being to establish a strong visible military presence. Initially this heavy static approach had a positive effect in stabilizing the situation, but as time went by the static nature of the military contribution seems to have become counterproductive.

Today the tactic of using stationary checkpoints placed primarily in relation to the ceasefire line in the Security Zone, with no patrolling in the rest of the zone or in the Restricted Weapons Zone, has created a situation where local people on both sides are being tormented by crime.<sup>24</sup> Criminal elements are especially active during the harvest seasons,<sup>25</sup> on which the local population depends to earn enough money to see them through the rest of the year. At night criminals rob and steal the crops from the peasants and smuggle them over the ceasefire line into Georgia, where they are sold. Also, illegal taxation when crossing the cease-fire line is a problem that is often referred to. But what can CISP KF do? It is claimed that the force's mandate does not cover policing and it therefore cannot engage actively in crime prevention and investigation. In fact, however, crime prevention through its active presence in the area does fall within its mandate (see the Protocol of the Moscow Agreement). Presenting an active presence by, for example, patrolling on foot day and night could, if conducted professionally, have a preventive effect on crime and encourage a positive perception by the local population towards the peacekeepers in experiencing some thing constructive being done.

Currently the local population in the area generally does not regard CISP KF as making a

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<sup>23</sup> In 1998 fighting between Georgia and Abkhazia erupted in the Galskiy region, with the result that some 30,000 people fled the region into Georgia. Again in 2001 fighting erupted in the area of the Kodori valley.

<sup>24</sup> On the Georgian side in the Zugdidi region, crime rates have been declining because of an increasing local police presence. On the other hand, in the Gali region crime rates are rising without much being done.

<sup>25</sup> Hazelnuts and mandarins are two of the main sources of income in the region.

positive contribution to the peace process. Instead it is viewed as having an agenda of its own that is not in accordance with the interests of the people living there. A high representative of UNOMIG expressed the view that CISP KF is focusing exclusively on security, not on peace and development in general. Many of the locals interviewed who were living in one of the two zones were of the view that CISP KF should leave, and that if they were to stay, they should remain solely at their checkpoints.<sup>26</sup> However, the experience of other peacekeeping operations, such as KFOR in Kosovo,<sup>27</sup> have shown that a positive presence in the area of operations can help initiate a constructive dialogue and demystify the peacekeepers, even though the latter might initially be perceived as occupiers or as a party to the conflict. If CISP KF were to conduct patrols on foot in the zones night and day, they might be met with mistrust at the beginning, but a professional and positive attitude towards the population could change this. It is, of course, a precondition that CISP KF be prepared and trained properly to conduct this kind of work, involving, for example, cultural understanding, social interaction and proper conduct towards the local population. Patrolling on foot could be seen as 'baby steps' in improving CISP KF status. The bias of especially the Mingrel population is effected by the involvement of former Soviet Union soldiers in the fighting from 1992-1994. But the experience of other peace-support operations (PSO) show that the bias and thus perceptions can be altered to neutral or positive, for example, by training peacekeepers in social conduct, that is, to engage in social patrols, where the peacekeepers meet and talk with locals in their own homes. These may be small steps, but interaction with peacekeepers can contribute positively to the winning of hearts and minds in the area of operation, eventually turning the CISP KF presence into something positive for the population.

It is fundamental for any peacekeeping force that training in local customs, social conduct and understanding is completed prior to deployment. This kind of training can oppose negative perceptions and positively prepare the individual soldier for negative encounters with the local population in the area of operations. Through these initiatives, combined with patrols on foot, CISP KF could build up trust and establish a healthy relationship with the local population. Relationships built on mutually trust could become a tool with which to advance the peace process and eventually improve security and thus the possibility of IDP returns.

In sum, the credibility of CISP KF in its ability to implement its mandate is high because of its securing the ceasefire line and preventing renewed fighting in the former conflict zone. However, with regard to the subsequent tasks given to CISP KF in respect of, for example, creating a safe and secure environment for the population and for IDPs to return, the stationary approach to PSO – long-term stationary checkpoints, absence of patrolling on foot, and the lack of positive interactions with the local population – have frozen development in the area and even allowed criminal gangs to root themselves firmly in the

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<sup>26</sup> Interviews conducted with high-level UNOMIG officials in Zugdidi, Gali and Sukhumi from 21 to 27 September, and with locals in the Gali Sector from 24-25 September 2005.

<sup>27</sup> Danish peacekeeping troops in the northern, Serb parts of Kosovo were indeed viewed as occupiers in 1999 when the first contingent arrived. This perception was eventually undermined by their positive presence in the area of responsibility.

two zones. The lack of positive interaction with the local population and thus of efforts to improve their rather negative perceptions of the peacekeepers have reinforced this tendency.

### **Transparency of Operations**

Regarding the transparency of operations and whether or not CISP KF's military tasks have been obvious to the parties, the international community and the civilian population, it was clear that different interpretations were dominant. Also, transparency in respect of cooperation between UNOMIG and CISP KF was quite blurred. The question of the transparency of operations with regard to CISP KF and their relationship with the surrounding environment will be analysed on the basis of this overall question: were the tasks of the military force clear to the parties, the international community and the local population?

No overall or common understanding of the tasks mandated to CISP KF emerged from interviews with different informants during our field trips. CISP KF, UNOMIG and the parties could not agree on the scope of the mandate in connection with the relationship and division of responsibilities between CISP KF and UNOMIG, such as the role of CISP KF when conducting joint patrols with UNOMIG. From UNOMIG's point of view, CISP KF has to provide security when conducting joint patrols in areas like the Kodori valley, but according to some officials in UNOMIG the protection that is being provided is not satisfactory. As a consequence, only a few joint patrols are carried out, and the areas covered by the mandate have not been patrolled frequently enough. Also, in one incident at a CISP KF checkpoint, where a local was shot and killed by a CISP KF soldier,<sup>28</sup> the subsequent investigation was obstructed by CISP KF. In particular, UNOMIG was not able to participate in the investigation due both to a lack of cooperation on the part of CISP KF and the fact that the unit involved in the incident was rotated out of the checkpoint before UNOMIG was informed of the shooting.<sup>29</sup> Transparency in a military operation is essential when cooperation between the different actors is required. If the actors do not cooperate and share information on operational procedures and incidents like this shooting, mistrust will be created and intensify, thus undermining cooperation over the overall peace-building task. Also, the local population's understanding of the different tasks and the division of labour between CISP KF and UNOMIG has been damaged by the lack of transparency. When interviewing UNMOs in the mission area, they expressed concern over the local population's apparent impression that UNOMIG is there to conduct the same tasks as those of CISP KF. A prominent example here is that the task of security in the zones is wrongly being understood as an UNOMIG task. The spill-over effect of the lack of transparency within CISP KF regarding their tasks has resulted in misperceptions towards UNOMIG as not implementing and securing a safe environment in the zones, as a result bringing UNOMIG itself into disrepute.

On the other hand, some positive signs of transparency have been detected in the fact

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<sup>28</sup> The UNOMIG helicopter was shot down 8 October 2002, killing seven observers, the pilot and the interpreter.

<sup>29</sup> Interview conducted with UNOMIG in Gali, 23 September 2005.

that CISP KF has allowed Georgian military observers a permanent presence at their checkpoints. Whether or not this agreement was initiated because of political pressure and/or mistrust of CISP KF, it should be seen as a positive sign of openness and transparency. The Georgian Chief Military Observer emphasised the importance of this arrangement and the positive impact it had had on the perception of CISP KF and on its actual performance at the checkpoints.<sup>30</sup> Georgian military observers are now stationed at all CISP KF checkpoints on the Georgian side of the ceasefire line and are rotated every fourteen days. Since the arrangement was implemented in, incidents involving the local population and CISP KF have decreased significantly at the checkpoints, with the result that popular mistrust of CISP KF has diminished.

In sum, however, even with the Georgian Military Observer agreement in place, CISP KF does not seem to operate and function as a transparent organisation engaging in good constructive dialogue and cooperation. The closeness of CISP KF has had several consequences for the situation and development in the zones. First of all, cooperation and the idea of CISP KF and UNOMIG working with, not against one another is being undermined. Secondly, some of the local population has misunderstood the respective tasks of and the division of labour between CISP KF and UNOMIG, with the consequence that the latter's efforts have been undermined. Finally, too much energy is being directed towards these aspects rather than towards the primary objectives of the operation.

### **Promotion of Cooperation and Consent**

Cooperation and consent can manifest themselves in a variety of ways, depending on the focus being adopted. During our field trips to Georgia, the prevailing concept related to this issue was Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC). Cooperation, information exchange and consent regarding CIMIC were non-existent, due to the fact that CISP KF had a quite different interpretation of what the phrase means. It became obvious that CISP KF did some sort of CIMIC, but on a different level and with a different intention than in NATO operations. CIMIC for CISP KF should be seen as providing support to the local community in terms of restoring basic and essential needs and as part of the overall winning of hearts and minds and force protection. In analysing the question of promoting cooperation and consent, two overall questions will be addressed: has the military entered into relations of cooperation and consent with the local authorities, the local population and NGOs, and have sufficient funds been allocated to the mission to promote CIMIC activities? The commander of CISP KF informed the research team about CIMIC activities such as mine-clearance, medical operations and a number of initiatives to restore power supplies to a number of villages in the region.<sup>31</sup> People in one small town in the Gali sector had been without power for more than a month during the winter due to a generator having broken down. The town had contacted the CISP KF check-point located on the outskirts to ask for help in repairing the generator and restoring the power supply. The checkpoint commander contacted the Northern Observation Group, and after some weeks the

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<sup>30</sup> Interview conducted in the vicinity of Zugdidi with the Georgian Chief Military Observer, 22 September 2005.

<sup>31</sup> Interview conducted at CISP KF headquarters in Sukhumi, 27 September 2005.

commander reported that CISP KF would transport the generator to Gali for maintenance. After approximately two months the power supply to the town was restored.<sup>32</sup>

This story is one example of CISP KF's CIMIC activities. CISP KF conducts CIMIC when a situation becomes too serious for it not to act – a sign of goodwill on its part, but not something that can be classed as large-scale CIMIC activities such as humanitarian assistance, preparations for winter, social patrols, community projects or repairing infrastructure, none of which seem to be included among CISP KF's standard operations. However, this does not seem to be because of any lack of will on the part of CISP KF. On the contrary, many CISP KF representatives gave the impression in interviews and conversations that they thought they were doing CIMIC, when in fact they were only doing very limited activities.

The explanation for this may be found in the reality in which the peacekeepers themselves exist, that is, the conditions under which the soldiers have to operate in the mission area. For example, they have to stay at a stationary checkpoint for a whole year without leave or rotation. Their supply situation is unstable, and conditions at the checkpoints are not ideal. When a soldier does not have enough food and when living conditions are of a low standard, his ability to identify problems and help the local population with sufficient energy is obviously diminished. If operational and off-duty conditions do not support or strengthen the soldiers, they will be less able to identify the problems of the locals and therefore will not act and perform CIMIC according to the standards of PSOs conducted elsewhere.

Another explanation could be found in the fact that CISP KF does not view CIMIC activities as essential to the mission as NATO does when conducting PSOs, that is, as means of both force protection and building up a positive relationship with the population. Their focus is on another level, meaning that the focus on physical security outweighs the importance of CIMIC. It seems that CISP KF perceives PSO in the 'traditional' way, in which PSO is strictly a matter of maintaining security, not civil relationships in the context of peacebuilding. The missions conducted by NATO today can be categorised as complex peacekeeping, good relations and interactions with the local population being seen as essential for mission success. CIMIC should be seen as a combination of helping the locals to a minimum of both living and force protection. If the local population sees the soldiers' presence as an advantage, they will in turn ease the operational work of the force.

One could argue that sufficient training and education in CIMIC activities could counter the problem of maintaining security, but it seems that the CISP KF's educational focus is in line with its conduct in the operational area. Therefore all elements – training, mission conditions and the advantages of CIMIC – have to be rethought if CISP KF's CIMIC standards and the mission as a whole are to be improved. These aspects determine CISP KF's

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<sup>32</sup> The research team visited the town on 24 September 2005 and talked with the local administrator regarding their problems and cooperation with CISP KF.

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perception of CIMIC and of the local population's need for help.

In sum, the promotion of cooperation and consent in terms of CIMIC initiatives seems quite different from their provision in other peacekeeping operations, in Kosovo or Afghanistan, for example. CISP KF is conducting CIMIC to support the local population in relation to the essentials of human life, but CIMIC is not fully incorporated into the operational procedures as an element of mutual advantage. CISP KF forces are not tasked to conduct CIMIC, and the CISP KF leadership does not regard CIMIC as an essential element of force protection, or even a task of peacekeeping. The consequence of this approach seems to be a population which, after twelve years of ceasefire, has a hard time identifying the continuing benefits of CISP KF.

## Tactical level

### **Mutual Respect, Impartiality and Legitimacy**

As discussed above, the general perception of CISP KF among the local population is none too good. The majority of the population think that CISP KF is freezing the situation and thus not contributing significantly to the peace process. Different explanations have been mentioned for this, but some quite fundamental issues have yet to be discussed, namely those of mutual respect, impartiality and legitimacy. These three topics will be analysed on the basis of the following question: is the military force perceived as treating the civilian population with proper respect, and does it respect national laws and local customs?

In the context of CISP KF, these three elements seem quite essential because the force is a peace-keeping force in the 'traditional' sense, as distinct from a peace-enforcing force. If a peace-keeping force like CISP KF does not incorporate the elements of mutual respect, impartiality and legitimacy, it will find it difficult to carry out its tasks in the area and its authority will be undermined. This is mainly because the support of the local population will decrease if it is not treated according to local values and customs.

When talking to the local population in the area of operations, the perception of CISP KF was of its extreme partiality in favour of the Abkhazian side, and that the Mingrel population in general tried to avoid contact with the peace-keepers.<sup>33</sup> The situation as seen from the Abkhaz side is relatively positive. They perceive CISP KF as making a positive contribution to safer living conditions, the belief here being that the Georgian government will not intervene with force so long as CISP KF is present. This perception was reflected in the Mingrel population as well, but in this context negatively. It seems that perceptions are manifested on two levels, the tactical and the political. On the tactical level CISP KF consists only of Russian soldiers, who have a reputation for living off the land,<sup>34</sup> not interacting with the locals and being very static operationally – all aspects that contribute to a negative perception of the force, though primarily among the Georgians and Mingrels. On the political level, the aspect of impartiality appears clearly, especially in the rhetoric of politicians on both sides. When interviewing different high-level Abkhaz politicians,<sup>35</sup> the research team was surprised by the blunt rhetoric it encountered. It seemed obvious that the politicians who were interviewed relied blindly on Russian support in achieving their goals. On the Georgian side, it took the form of announcements made by high-level politicians<sup>36</sup> on Russia's involvement in the conflict.

CISP KF itself gave the impression of being impartial because it focused on the principles of UN peacekeeping. They admitted that they had some problems with individual soldiers, but all in all they saw themselves as being impartial. This was to some extent confirmed by the Chief Georgian Military Observer, who stressed that only a small number of Rus-

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<sup>33</sup> The research team participated in two patrols in the Gali Sector on 24 and 25 September 2005 with UNOMIG, on which the team talked with a number of local residents.

<sup>34</sup> Stories about CISP KF stealing livestock from the locals were widespread. The research team was frequently presented with these stories from UNOMIG, the locals and politicians.

<sup>35</sup> The research team conducted interviews with representatives from the de facto Abkhaz ministries of foreign affairs, defence and internal affairs in Sukhumi on 26 September 2005.

<sup>36</sup> The research team conducted interviews with representatives from the Georgian ministries of foreign affairs, defence and conflict resolution in Tbilisi on 6-7 March 2006.

sian soldiers behaved unprofessionally, but also emphasised that the soldiers and their mission were being controlled by high politics, not by the mandate or the overall goal of peace-building and stability.

Some of the local perceptions of CISPKF could have spilled over from the rhetoric on the political level and not only be a direct consequence of the conduct of individual soldiers. This seems to be confirmed by an investigation of the incidents that occurred in the region between the two sides. However, CISPKF still plays an active role in contributing to its own position in the political game. The criteria of success regarding mutual respect states that a soldier should be educated and trained to be an ambassador representing the country from which he is deployed. Accordingly he should be trained in morals and ethics, in understanding national laws and customs, and should be supported from within his own system. If this does not happen, as shown in the analysis above, the task of dissociating a mission from the political game and of separating it from high politics as a traditional peace-keeping mission should do will perish. Furthermore, winning the confidence of the people will be an uphill struggle if these measures are not taken into account.

In sum, if a peace-keeping force is perceived as being partial to the conflict by one of the parties to the conflict, the force itself is in effect partial. It seems to be generally acknowledged that only a small number of individual soldiers are violating the mandate, but the peace-keeping force as a whole cannot be separated from matters of high politics, primarily because of the rhetoric used by both sides to the conflict, but also because of Russian political involvement in it. This perception has a rather negative effect on CISPKF and is one of the main reasons for the lack of goodwill shown towards the soldiers by a large part of the population residing in the zone of conflict.

### **Freedom of Military Movement**

Freedom of movement is a key issue when it comes to the peacekeeping force implementing its mandate. If the soldiers are restricted in moving from A to B or in receiving supplies, the effectiveness of the operation will decline significantly. Violations of CISPKF's freedom of movement have been made on several occasions by both the Georgian and Abkhazian sides. The analysis of this question will be guided by two questions: has freedom of movement been achieved for the mission, and have there been any incidents in which the parties to the conflict have declined to invoke freedom of movement towards CISPKF?

On 12 and 31 August 2005, Georgian police confiscated a number of cigarettes and bottles of vodka from two CISPKF military trucks. The confiscations were the culmination of Georgian allegations that CISPKF troops were smuggling vodka and cigarettes into the region to sell them on the black market. The Georgians insisted that all cigarettes and vodka imported into Georgia had to go through Georgian customs, including cigarettes only intended for use by CISPKF soldiers. This was the first time since the mission had

been implemented in 1994 that the Georgian authorities had insisted on this.<sup>37</sup> CISP KF denied the charges and accused Georgian politicians of using the soldiers to exert political pressure on Russia. Different sources interviewed during our field trips indicated that the Georgian allegations were just part of a political game and not genuine. CISP KF distributed cigarettes to the soldiers on a regular basis and on the first seizure only about 4000 cigarettes were confiscated. Also, importing cigarettes and vodka under these circumstances had not been a problem in the first ten or eleven years of the mission.

As indicated in some of the analysis above, this situation could have been avoided if a clear mandate on the matter had been formulated. The Moscow Agreement states that CISP KF '*...shall enjoy freedom of movement in the Security Zone and the Restricted Weapons Zones and freedom of communications, and other facilities needed to fulfil its mission*'. This, however, does not seem to be sufficient in a situation of political conflict. Here again CISP KF is being dragged into the political sphere as an instrument of high politics, a problem that to some extent could have been rendered less dramatic if the mandate had been clearer.

It is not only CISP KF that experiences problems regarding freedom of movement: UNOMIG has also experienced this problem in some isolated cases, but in this case CISP KF was the violator. On one patrol in which the research team participated, a Russian checkpoint commander denied us passage through the checkpoint because he could not see any reason for UNOMIG to pass through it.<sup>38</sup> First of all, the CISP KF commander insisted that his checkpoint was actually an observation post, even though the road went straight through it, and therefore UNOMIG had no right to pass. Secondly, he insisted that since he could inform the UNOMIG patrol leader about the situation in his area, the patrol did not need to pass through. Thirdly, he could not see the purpose of UNOMIG going to the other side of his checkpoint. The situation was resolved when the patrol leader showed his card stating freedom of movement and implicitly threatened to call in the Northern Observation Group. The incident lasted thirty minutes, and eventually the UNOMIG patrol was allowed to pass through. However, it should not be seen as representative of CISP KF, and the research team was also told by UNOMIG that it was only this CISP KF checkpoint commander that was causing problems for them. Nonetheless a situation like this should not occur. Other incidents, in which one of the parties has declined to invoke freedom of movement, reflect the fact that UNOMIG does not have unrestricted access to the Kodori valley. In the lower part of the valley UNOMIG has conducted a few joint patrols with CISP KF, but in the upper valley no patrols have been conducted since 8 October 2002, when a UN helicopter was shot down, killing seven observers, the pilot and the interpreter. The Georgians who control the area will not guarantee security to UNOMIG, which is why UNOMIG is quite reluctant to go there.

In sum, freedom of movement has to a large extent been respected by the parties to the

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<sup>37</sup> Interview conducted with UNOMIG in Gali, 23 September 2005.

<sup>38</sup> Patrol conducted on 25 September 2005 in the Gali sector.

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conflict. But on the issue of both the Kodori alley and the more recent incident involving the confiscation of CISPKF goods, violations have been occurring. The reason for them seems to lie in the operation of high politics and the fact that the Georgian side wants a resolution to the conflict resolution that will necessarily involve the Russians. Through this process, CISPKF has been trapped in a political quarrel in which it should have no part if it is to maintain its role as peace-keepers.

## Findings on CISP KF in Abkhazia

### Political/strategic level

- Loosely formulated and vague mandates must be reviewed after the primary objective – the ending of hostilities – has been achieved, a review into which the lessons learned must be incorporated. If this does not happen, there are strong indications that the peace process in Abkhazia will stall and that no political movement will occur. Consequently this lack of movement will be manifested in CISP KF because of their activities in the area and because they are the visible part of the peace process – they will simply become synonymous with the lack of progress. Also, if the mandate is too concise and insubstantial, any uncertainties within it can be used in a political dispute and again result in the local population developing negative perceptions of the peace-keepers and the lack of progress.
- Unity of effort with respect to the creation of a dynamic and forward-moving peace-building and settlement process is essential if sustainable peace is to be achieved. The static nature of the presence of CISP KF and its lack of will in moving the peace process in a positive direction are having a counterproductive influence on the local population and on the situation as a whole.

### Operational level

- If a peace-keeping force is to achieve credibility, it must participate actively in these efforts. The explicitly stationary static approach of CISP KF and its limited contact with the local population seem to be hampering the creation of a positive operational environment with constructive interaction with the local population. The contributions to the overall peace-building efforts seem to have been limited by adapting this static and isolated operational procedure.
- When a variety of actors are cooperating under a common umbrella – a mandate, an agreement, a strategy – transparency is essential so that the parties can unite their efforts towards the common goal. The findings of the analysis show a significant lack of transparency between CISP KF and the other actors in the area of operations. This lack of transparency has resulted in mistrust and ineffectiveness, with the consequence that the peace process and peace-building initiatives have been undermined.
- CIMIC activities within a PSO are an essential element in winning the support of the local population and improving force protection. However, when CISP KF troops who are expected to conduct CIMIC are not supported or even tasked to carry out these initiatives on lower levels of command, the population loses its faith in CISP KF and consequently its support for it.

### Tactical level

- A peacekeeping force that perceives itself as impartial and legitimate will actually be the opposite as long as a large part of the local population has a view of the force as impartial. CISP KF must devote more energy into improving the local population's per-

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ception of itself, even though high politics and political statements are influencing and outweighing the overall agenda of peace-building, with the effect that the mission is undermined.

- It should be foreseen that violations of freedom of movement induced by disagreements at the level of high politics and directed to using CISP KF as hostages in the game may take place. The mandate needs to specify the terms under which freedom of movement can be conducted with the purpose of minimising misuse of these. This will probably not solve the problem entirely, but the peacekeepers will then have the mandate to negotiate their conditions on the ground.

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United Nation Security Council Resolution S/1994/937: ratifying the Moscow Agreement.

United Nation Security Council Resolution S/1994/818.

## Appendix I

### Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces

In the Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian–Abkhaz Conflict, signed in Moscow on 4 April 1994 (S/1994/397, annex I), the Parties committed themselves to strict compliance with a formal ceasefire from that date, and once again reaffirmed their commitment to the non-use of force or threat of the use of force against each other, as expressed in their communiqué of 13 January 1994. That commitment remains valid. This Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces formalizes that commitment.

1. The parties shall scrupulously observe the ceasefire on land, at sea and in the air and shall refrain from all military actions against each other.
2. The armed forces of the parties shall be separated in accordance with the following principles:
  - (a) The area between lines B and D on the attached map (see appendix) shall constitute a security zone. There shall be no armed forces or heavy military equipment within this zone. The territory between lines A and B and lines D and E shall constitute a restricted-weapons zone. There shall be no heavy military equipment within this zone. The local civil authorities shall function in the security zone and the restricted-weapons zone. The police/militia employed for this purpose may carry personal arms.
 

Heavy military equipment includes:

    - (i) All artillery and mortars of a calibre exceeding 80 mm;
    - (ii) All tanks;
    - (iii) All armoured transport vehicles;
  - (b) The peacekeeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the military observers, in accordance with the Protocol to this Agreement, shall be deployed in the security zone to monitor compliance with this Agreement;
  - (c) The heavy military equipment to be withdrawn from the security zone and the restricted-weapons zone shall be stored in designated areas to be determined by the parties and shall be monitored by United Nations military observers;
  - (d) Under the supervision of representatives of the peace-keeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States and United Nations observers, with the participation of representatives of the parties from the Kodori valley, the troops of the Republic of Georgia shall be withdrawn to their places of deployment beyond the frontiers of Abkhazia;

A regular patrol of the peace-keeping force and international observers shall be organized concurrently in the Kodori valley;

(e) All volunteer formations made up of persons from beyond the frontiers of Abkhazia shall be disbanded and withdrawn;

(f) The movement of units and subunits of the peace-keeping force and of the international observers outside the security zone in the relevant areas shall be subject to agreement with the parties;

(g) United Nations military observers shall also monitor the coastal waters and air-space between lines A and D;

(h) In the event of an attack or a direct military threat against the peace-keeping force, it shall take appropriate measures for its safety and self-defence.

3. The precise demarcation on a detailed map and a plan for the separation of forces in the initial phase of the deployment of the peace-keeping force shall be worked out by the command of the peace-keeping force with the participation of the parties in the context of a step-by-step, comprehensive settlement, with a continuation of the return of refugees and displaced persons and in compliance with this Agreement, in a working group, which shall begin its work to this end in Moscow within five days after the signing of this Agreement. It shall complete this task within five days. Disengagement shall commence five days after the working group has completed its task. The process of disengagement shall be completed no later than 10 days after it has commenced.
4. A map indicating the security zone and the restricted-weapons zone is contained in the appendix.

Protocol. The Protocol concerning the peace-keeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States is as follows:

The parties agree that:

The function of the peace-keeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States shall be to exert its best efforts to maintain the ceasefire and to see that it is scrupulously observed. Further, its presence should promote the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, especially to the Gali region. It shall supervise the implementation of the Agreement and the Protocol thereto with regard to the security zone and the restricted-weapons zone. In carrying out its mission, the force shall comply with local laws and regulations and shall not impede the functioning of the local civil administration. It shall enjoy freedom of movement in the security zone and the restricted-weapons zone and freedom of communications, and other facilities needed to fulfil its mission.

'The peace-keeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States shall operate under the Interim Unified Command and the Commander of the Peacekeeping Force.'

5. The process of achieving a comprehensive political settlement shall be pursued.
6. The parties appeal to the United Nations Security Council to expand the mandate of the United Nations military observers in order to provide for their participation in the operations indicated above.
7. On the basis of the statement by the Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth of Independent States dated 15 April 1994 (S/1994/476, annex), the parties appeal to the Council to take a decision on the use of a collective peace-keeping force within the zone of the Georgian–Abkhaz conflict.

Signed in Moscow on 14 May 1994.

For the Georgian side: (Signed) J. Ioseliani

For the Abkhaz side: (Signed) S. Jinjolia